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ABSTRACT 
THE BODY AS SYMBOL: BRINGING TOGETHER  
THEORIES OF SEX/GENDER AND RACE  
FOR THEOLOGICAL DISCOURSE 
 
 
Patricia Lewis, B.A., M.A. 
 
Marquette University, May 2010 
 
 
This dissertation focuses on race and sex/gender as critical theological topics that are 
not being adequately addressed in most theological discourse.  They are either deemed 
irrelevant to mainstream theology and addressed in a theoretically unsophisticated manner, if 
at all, or compartmentalized in theological specializations leaving them outside mainstream 
theological discourse and separate from each other.  Sex/gender and race are important topics 
for several reasons.  First, much suffering has resulted from the meanings human beings have 
assigned to various articulations of sex/gender and race and the actions taken and institutions 
established based on these meanings.  Second, reflection on race and sex/gender leads to 
conversation about the reality and meaning of the body, and the body is a crucial theological 
topic.  Third, the most central questions in theology lead us to the body and discussion of the 
body leads us to the most fundamental questions of theology.   
 
I argue that theology needs to create common approaches for reflection on the body 
that consider the whole body.  My project presents a tool to establish better theological 
discourse about the body that takes these specificities into consideration and brings them 
together in theological anthropology.  I first explore theological discourses concerning race 
and sex/gender in order to plot a landscape of and for these conversations.  This landscape 
exposes the complexity of these topics and reveals that within each conversation there is 
great disparity about how to talk about race and sex/gender.  This first step of the project can 
help theologians articulate and map their own theories of sex/gender and race and promote 
more sophisticated conversation about the body within the discipline of theology.  This part 
of the dissertation also illustrates the centrality of the questions of sex/gender and race for 
theology.  In the second part of this dissertation, I explore womanist theology to gain insights 
for bringing race and sex/gender together in theological discourse.  Building on these 
insights, my proposal of the body as symbol argues that a full appreciation of the body in its 
specificity and complexity must address the body as construction and the body as expression. 
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The fact that theology also considers the body should not astonish or surprise anyone who is 
aware of the mystery and reality of the Incarnation.  Theology is that science whose subject 
is divinity.  Through the fact that the Word of God became flesh, the body entered theology 
through the main door. 
John Paul II, The Theology of the Body1 
 
 
CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
 
I. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
 James Cone asserts that people enter the liberation struggle, in the broadest sense, 
from their own specific experience and perspective.  This project arises from the questions of 
my own life.  I have been thinking about the body for a long time.  I have had life-long 
questions of how and why sex/gender differences affect family, society, and church.  My 
decision to live and work in a low-income community led me to question how class 
differences keep some segregated and award others benefits.  My experience in the inner city 
as well as academia raised my awareness of how race differences seep through all class 
structures.  I witness how differences in the sexual orientation of my friends keep them 
isolated and uncelebrated in society.  These experiences have taught me the influence the 
meanings we assign to body categories have on all aspects of life.  These observations have 
challenged me to think more deeply and critically about the body in its specificity.  This 
project brings my theological study to bear on the questions of my life and an important, 
though often neglected, subject of study.  This dissertation focuses on race and sex/gender as 
critical theological topics that are not being adequately addressed in most theological 
discourse.2 
                                                 
1
 John Paul II, The Theology of the Body: Human Love in the Divine Plan (Boston: Pauline Books and Media, 
1997), 88. 
2
 Of course, conversations about race and sex/gender are being had in some specialized fields of theology.  I am 
concerned here with “mainstream” theological discourse and the fact that one can more often than not take a 
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 In my own study of theology, I have found two main reasons for this lack of adequate 
consideration of race and sex/gender.3  First, sex/gender and race are often deemed irrelevant 
to mainstream theological discourse.  Most theologians whose work does not specialize or 
focus on race and sex/gender relegate conversations about the concrete realities of the body 
to those theologians who have problematic bodies.  These same theologians seem content to 
brush aside the realities of race and sex/gender and speak about a theoretically unraced and 
unsexed/ungendered body.  This unwillingness to engage in theological discourse about race 
and sex/gender seems to be accompanied by a general inability to have these conversations.  
There is much confusion about how body categories like race and sex/gender are used and 
what is meant when they are invoked.  Terms such as gender, sex, woman, man, and race are 
conflictual and there is widespread disagreement about these terms.  I approach the body not 
simply as matter versus spirit or as that hypothetical material body that all humans have that 
makes us human.  Bodies are always part of the social, political, cultural, and economic 
matrix in which we find them.  Theology must discuss the body in all its concreteness and 
difference.  The body is always raced and sexed/gendered and this reality must be 
incorporated into mainstream theological anthropology. 
                                                                                                                                                       
graduate level theological anthropology course or read a theological anthropology text and never come across 
the words race or sex/gender. 
3
 In this chapter, I explain my reasons for this lack of adequate consideration of race and sex/gender.  Other 
reasons given by both theologians and theorists will be explored in Chapters 2 and 3 of this dissertation.  In 
Chapter 4, womanist scholars give their reasons why the intersection of race and sex/gender is not adequately 
addressed even in theological specializations.  For more discussion on race and sex/gender and theological 
education and endeavor, see James H. Cone, “Theology’s Great Sin: Silence in the Face of White Supremacy,” 
Union Seminary Quarterly Review 55, no. 3-4 (2001): 1-15; Dwight H. Hopkins, “Black Theology on 
Theological Education,” in Black Faith and Public Talk: Critical Essays on James Cone’s Black Theology and 
Black Power, ed. Dwight H. Hopkins (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1999), 41-52; Robert J. Deotis, “And We 
Are Not Saved: A Black Theologian Looks at Theological Education,” Religious Education 87 (Summer 1992): 
353-69; Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, “Religion, Gender, and Society: Shaping the Discipline of 
Religious/Theological Studies,” in The Relevance of Theology: Nathan Söderblom and the Development of an 
Academic Discipline, ed. Carl Reinhold Bråkenhielm and Gunhild Winqvist Hollman (Uppsala, Sweden: 
Uppsala University, 2002), 85-99; and Denise Lardner Carmody, “Integrating Feminist Perspectives with the 
Religious Studies Curriculum: Setting the Question,” Horizons 16 (Fall 1989): 292-301. 
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 The second reason sex/gender and race are not adequately addressed in theological 
discourse is that theologies that do take categories of materiality like race and sex/gender into 
consideration have been compartmentalized, and often marginalized, into separate and 
distinct specializations.  This is problematic for two reasons.  First, they are cordoned off 
from mainstream theological discourse.  This results in an ostracism of discussions of 
sex/gender and race from mainstream theology and a ghettoization of this important 
conversation.  Second, because of specialization these discourses about race and sex/gender 
become distinct and separate from each other.4  Race and sex/gender become separate 
subjects in theology because they are based on such specifics as personal and community 
experience.  Both can and have been treated as essential to identity.  Within the separate 
theological conversations about race and sex/gender, one may now be required to note the 
importance of the other bodily reality but not to explore it at any great depth.  Theology 
needs to explore how discourses about race and sex/gender can come together for theological 
anthropology. 
 This dissertation is my response to these frustrations and challenges.  My goal in this 
project is twofold.  First, I explore theological discourses concerning race and sex/gender in 
order to plot a landscape of and for these conversations.  This landscape exposes the 
complexity of these topics and reveals that within each conversation there is great disparity 
about how to talk about race and sex/gender.  This first step of the project can help 
theologians articulate and map their own theories of sex/gender and race and promote more 
sophisticated conversation about the body within the discipline of theology.  In addition, this 
part of the dissertation illustrates the centrality of the questions of sex/gender and race for 
                                                 
4
 This of course is not the case in womanist theology but this specialty, like most liberation theologies, claims to 
be and is treated as a theology of, by and for a specific community resulting in only that community attending to 
it, in this case African American women.   
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theology and demonstrates how theories of the body and theology are intertwined.  Although 
this first step begins to connect sex/gender and race discourses around a central organizing 
concept, it is in the second part of this dissertation that I propose a theological approach to 
the body that brings discourses about race and sex/gender together for theological 
anthropology. 
 This project is based on the presupposition that race and sex/gender are important 
topics for theological discourse.  They are important for several reasons.  First, much 
suffering has resulted from the meanings human beings have assigned to various articulations 
of sex/gender and race and the actions taken and institutions established based on these 
meanings.  Definitions of sex/gender have resulted in the second-class citizenship of women 
in society and church.  The black/white racial divide in the United States has resulted in the 
suffering of the black community.  The essentialization of the meanings of woman and black 
to mean white women and black men has resulted in a general ignorance of the plight of 
black women.  Meanings of the categories of race and sex/gender include various 
assumptions about acceptable sexuality.  Women, people of color, and people with 
“alternative” sexual orientations all struggle with the meanings imposed upon their bodies.  
They struggle because their bodies are read in society as abnormal, inferior, or scripted for 
specific roles that they may not want.  Their freedom in living these bodies is limited by the 
scripts presumed imprinted on them by genitalia, color, or “perversion” based on the 
assumed misuse of their bodies. 
 I understand oppression to include both the unjust limitation of persons, 
opportunities, and lives as well as outright discrimination and violence.5  This unjust 
                                                 
5
 I find helpful Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza’s use of Iris Marion Young’s criteria of oppression for social 
groups, which include exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, cultural imperialism, and systemic 
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limitation and discrimination is based on theories and theologies of the body.  Religious 
belief systems have undergirded the oppositional way we think about men and women and 
have contributed to the way we understand different races.  Theologians need to recognize 
the contributions of Christianity to the dehumanization of certain bodies and its justification 
of the violence and oppression of persons based on physical attributes.6  If Christian 
theologians believe that reflection on sin and redemption is important theological work, then 
consideration of sex/gender and race must be part of theological discourse.  Some may argue 
that race and sex/gender in themselves are neutral and that racism and sexism are the true 
problems.  I contend that racism and sexism are inherent in the racial categories of black and 
white and the sex/gender categories of male/female and masculine/feminine because the 
history and language embedded in these descriptions are racist and sexist.  Any real 
liberation from these impediments and attacks must include a better understanding of the 
concepts and realities of race and sex/gender.   
The second reason discourse about sex/gender and race is important for theological 
study is that reflection on race and sex/gender leads to conversation about the reality and 
meaning of the body, and the body is a crucial theological topic.  The work of the theologians 
I explore evidence the body’s centrality for theological study.  Pope John Paul II understood 
the body as central to all theology, both our anthropology, which is our understanding of 
                                                                                                                                                       
violence.  Schüssler Fiorenza adds two criteria related to theology and religion, namely silencing, and 
vilification and trivialization.  See Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, Sharing Her Word: Feminist Biblical 
Interpretation in Context (Boston: Beacon Press, 1998), 29-31.  For Young’s use of these criteria, see Iris 
Marion Young, “Five Faces of Oppression,” in Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1990), 38-65. 
6
 From its inception, feminist theology has been concerned with uncovering and naming the patriarchy in the 
Christian tradition.  See Mary Daly, The Church and the Second Sex (Boston: Beacon Press, 1985), and 
Rosemary Radford Ruether, Sexism and God-Talk: Toward a Feminist Theology (Boston: Beacon Press, 1983) 
as two seminal works in early feminist theology.  Likewise, black theology has always called attention to the 
racism in the Christian tradition, such as the biblical interpretation of white scholars and ministers that claimed 
that the enslavement of black people was intended by God and recorded in scripture, thereby justifying slavery 
in this country.  See James H. Cone, God of the Oppressed, rev. ed. (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1997), and 
Gregory Baum and John Coleman, eds., The Church and Racism (New York: Seabury Press, 1982). 
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ourselves, and our theology, which is our understanding of God.7  James Cone also makes 
this connection when he asserts that our search for identity is nothing less than our search for 
God.8  Consideration of the body is crucial because human persons live as specific bodies.  
We immediately notice the race and sex/gender of each person we meet.  We use these 
categories to provide clues to who a person is and we are uncomfortable if we cannot classify 
the person within the categories we use.  Michael Omi and Howard Winant are race theorists 
who argue that without racial identity one is in danger of having no identity.9  I would extend 
that argument to include sex/gender identity as well.  Feminist, womanist, and black 
theologians challenge the theological community to recognize that not all bodies are the 
same.  With the growth of these liberation theologies, there is a growing awareness of the 
complexity of the body.  Since the specificity of bodies matters so much in the living of life 
and church, we must think theologically about specific bodies not just the body as flesh 
opposed to the soul.   
Consideration of the body is also crucial for theology because at the center of 
Christian belief and life is the Body of Christ.  This most important body is individual, 
communal, and eucharistic.  The study of this body is concerned with the life and 
circumstances of a specific person, the community born out of this life, and the sacramental 
reality that binds them together.  Theological reflection on the Body of Christ affects and is 
affected by how we theologize about our own bodies.  To understand Jesus Christ as the 
Incarnation means that Jesus was a body-person.  God took on humanity and shared in its 
condition.  Therefore, we must understand that Jesus Christ lived specifically as all humans 
                                                 
7
 John Paul II, The Theology of the Body, 47. 
8
 James H. Cone, A Black Theology of Liberation (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1986), 14.  
9
 Michael Omi and Howard Winant, Racial Formation in the United States: From the 1960s to the 1990s (New 
York: Routledge, 1994), 59. 
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do.  Jesus of Nazareth was a first century, Jewish man who lived in an occupied country.  
These were the constructions that formed his identity.  But he also lived deliberately.  His 
personal expression of his body was to make his place with the oppressed and outcasts of his 
society and religion and to share in their condition in his very humanity, which included his 
materiality.  This is why liberation theologians see the Incarnation as key to theological body 
talk.  God is present in our very humanity.  The body is the instrument for divine presence.   
Roman Catholic Christianity still professes Christ’s material presence in the Eucharist 
and in the community formed by its belief in the Incarnation.  The liturgy and presence of 
Christ in it involve specific meanings of bodily categorization as the community decides who 
represents and reflects Christ.  The Body of Christ that is the Church is human and therefore 
both forms and is formed by the categories of sex/gender and race.  The following 
investigation into race and sex/gender argues that who the Church is and how the Church 
lives is deeply affected by the meanings assigned to race and sex/gender.  Since the Church is 
a body and bodies do not exist outside of these categories, the Church must reflect on what 
meanings of race and sex/gender it embraces and which bodies it excludes.   
My third reason why discourse about the body is crucial for theology is that the most 
central questions in theology lead us to the body, and discussion of the body leads us to the 
most fundamental questions of theology.  Discourse about sex/gender and race can serve as 
entry points to discussions of inequality and injustice, but also elicit and engage biblical 
hermeneutics, ecclesiological practices and beliefs, as well as ontological considerations.  
How one interprets biblical revelation informs their understanding of the body.  The body is 
central to reflection on Christian mysteries that occur during liturgical rites in word and 
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action.10  Theological reflection on bodies in their specificity explores the significance of 
history for human identity and the question of how persons come to be at all.  The 
theologians included in this dissertation argue, and I would agree, that the very topic of the 
subject cannot be considered without addressing the concepts of sex/gender and race.  These 
considerations of personhood are in turn intimately connected to notions of ontology and 
truth.  Therefore, ideas about sex/gender and race and the body in its specificity enter the 
debate about whether universals exist in human living.  The meaning a theologian attributes 
to the body also goes to the very heart of their method and reflects their goals and concerns.  
All ideas have bodies.  Patricia Hill Collins argues that ideas cannot be divorced from the 
individuals who create and share them so the identity, and therefore bodily categories, of the 
owner of any idea matters.11  Liberation theologians argue that how we think, what we think 
about, and what we think is true is intimately related to our placement within intersecting 
oppressions based on body differentiation.  Our experience and our prejudice influence our 
research and our scholarly claims.   
 
II. METHOD 
 My approach to discourse about the body is informed by both my study of liberation 
theologies and contemporary gender and race theories.  Liberation theology anchors this 
project within the struggle to liberate body-persons from oppression associated with the 
meanings assigned to bodily categories.  The analysis of race and sex/gender found in this 
                                                 
10
 At the heart of any Christian Eucharistic ritual are the words, “This is my body.”  Other Catholic liturgical 
observances that involve reflection on the body are Corpus Christi, the Assumption of Mary, and Easter.  Karl 
Rahner’s theology of the symbol, which includes his reflections on the body as symbol, originates in his 
thoughts on devotion to the Sacred Heart.  The statement of belief found in the Apostles’ Creed includes the 
words “We believe in the resurrection of the body.” 
11
 Patricia Hill Collins, Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment, 
2d ed. (New York: Routledge, 2000), 265. 
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dissertation is not just an intellectual exercise but a task that is part of the greater project to 
liberate individuals from that which oppresses and limits them and to create more inclusive 
communities.  I focus on prominent theologians who investigate bodily meaning for theology 
with emphasis on race and sex/gender and examine how these theologians read the body and 
explore its specificity within a theological context.  In addition to insights from liberation 
theology, I utilize theological investigations of symbol and its application to bodies, both 
individual and communal, and the Body of Christ in all its aspects to create a method for 
discourse of the specific materiality of bodies. 
 My study of the body also utilizes insights from contemporary theory about race and 
sex/gender.  Contemporary race and gender theories are becoming more and more part of 
theological discourse about the body.12  Theology cannot ignore the specificity of bodies, and 
contemporary theory is a great aid in thinking about this specificity.  Theorists explore how 
meaning is assigned to bodies and how these meanings can be changed.  It examines how 
history and language are at the heart of bodily reality.  Theology needs to consider theoretical 
approaches to the body that critique the very body categories that theologians often assume.  
I believe that these theoretical critiques can help liberation theologians achieve their goal of 
freedom from oppression.  My own felt need for theoretical help to analyze the body in its 
specificity led me first to gender theory.  Reading Judith Butler and her theoretical approach 
to the very idea of the materiality of the body opened up to me the space to think about the 
fluidity of bodily meaning and how it is determined within discourse.  Race theory 
challenged me to see the historical nature of bodily meaning and how the body is always both 
                                                 
12
 Critical race theory began as a development in contemporary legal studies, but now can encompass an 
intellectual movement in natural and scientific scholarship that critically analyzes and problematizes the 
concept of race.  Gender theory is a field of inquiry that questions any universal beliefs about women and men 
and attempts to map the cultural, societal, and political roots of gender and sex.  See the introductions of 
Chapters 2 and 3 of this dissertation for a more in-depth account of the focus of both gender and race theory. 
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present and past.  These contemporary theories recognize that bodies are difficult to capture 
and define with any one, or once and for all, category.  Race and gender theories reveal the 
diversity of the very categories of race and sex/gender.   
 My project embraces this pluralism and sits comfortably within a postmodern 
context.13  This context treats pluralism as the way we are, not something to be overcome.  
Diversity in the meaning and reality of sex/gender and race is the realization that postmodern 
consciousness opens up to us and for us.  This consciousness does not demand a single 
answer or smooth synthesis.  In a postmodern context we need tools that allow us to better 
live in the pluralism of the world today.  It is not my intent to dismiss the theories of any of 
the theologians and theorists I encounter in this dissertation, but to understand each approach 
to race and sex/gender and create dialogue among them.  The central problem for theology 
that I am addressing is the lack of sophisticated dialogue about race and sex/gender.  I am 
proposing a tool for discussion.  Knowledge about different theories allows us to think better 
about sex/gender and race.  By arranging these theories around a central organizing principle, 
we can better understand where they are in agreement and where they diverge.  By situating 
these theories within a theological context, we better understand how sex/gender and race are 
related to the core questions and values of any theological system. 
 I believe that bodies exist as diverse and complex realities that are not easily defined 
and never fully captured in language.  Every body-person is different and complex.  People 
authentically live sex/gender and race differently.  Race and sex/gender exist as multi-
                                                 
13
 For more detailed accounts of the meanings of postmodernity as well as its intersection with theology, see 
Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Explained: Correspondence 1982-1985 (Minneapolis, MN: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1993); Walter James Lowe, “Postmodern Theology,” in Oxford Handbook of Systematic 
Theology, eds. John Webster, Kathryn Tanner, and Iain Torrance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 617-
23; Graham Ward, ed., Blackwell Companion to Postmodern Theology (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 
2001); Kevin J. Vanhoozer, ed., Cambridge Companion to Postmodern Theology (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003); and A. K. M. Adam, ed., Handbook of Postmodern Biblical Interpretation (St. Louis: 
Chalice Press, 2000). 
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faceted, complex realities.   Identity can never be captured with any one category or bodily 
description.  There is always difference and diversity.  People are more than any category of 
identity; but they are always these categories as well.  Therefore, no one theoretical approach 
to race or sex/gender is sufficient.  Race and sex/gender overlap, intersect, influence each 
other, and exist with other identifying realities like class and sexuality.  Adequate discourse 
about race and sex/gender must also recognize that the meanings of bodies change over time.  
This project considers a complex and messy body.   
 How do we talk about the body then?  Can we talk about the body or must we talk 
about individual or specific bodies?  I think there must be a balance.  Theologies that 
intentionally begin with specific experiences are very important for any theology of the body.  
People do have something authentic to say about themselves and their identity.  Theology 
must leave room in theoretical discourse for life stories, both past and present, and personal 
experiences.  But too much reliance on experience for discourse about the body can be a 
frustrating endeavor.  Some use their own experience to cancel out another’s experience or 
the other’s frustration with body categories.  A counter argument is often formed around a 
differing opinion one member of any group in question holds.  Therefore, theology must 
include theoretical approaches to the body in addition to the experiential witness of 
individual bodies.  I contend that all theologies include theories about sex/gender and race, 
whether articulated or not, because all theological methods lead to certain theories of 
sex/gender and race.  An engagement with various theories of categorizing the body can help 
theologians better appreciate the significance of these categories for their theological work 
whether they personally think race and sex/gender are important or not. 
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III. ARGUMENT 
 To do this work of liberation of body-persons, theology must reflect on the body itself 
because racism, white privilege, sexism, androgyny, heterosexism, and homophobia are body 
issues.  Bodies are sites of oppression and the meanings we give to them justifications for 
this oppression.  Theology needs to create common approaches for reflection on the body 
that consider the whole body, attending to all of its specificities.  My project presents a tool 
to establish better theological discourse about the body that takes these specificities into 
consideration and brings them together in theological anthropology for the whole body.  This 
tool addresses the two problems outlined above, namely, the reality that discourse about race 
and sex/gender is often deemed irrelevant for mainstream theology and therefore addressed 
in a theoretically unsophisticated manner, if at all, and that discourse that does occur about 
race and sex/gender is ostracized into theological specializations usually ignored by most 
theologians and often separated from each other.   
 The first problem is addressed through analyses of theories of sex/gender and race.  I 
use construction as an organizing concept for these analyses.  The notion that sex/gender and 
race are somehow constructed realities is present in both theological and theoretical 
discourse.14  The idea that the body and the categories by which it is given meaning are 
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 Even before the term construction was widely used in theology some theologians recognized that the 
meanings of bodies are ambiguous and shifting.  In their early work, theologians such as James Cone, Elisabeth 
Schüssler Fiorenza, and Delores Williams took quite seriously the idea that the meanings we give to certain 
bodies are socially, culturally, and religiously constructed by history, language, and power.  All three 
theologians are interested in some way in unmooring bodily categories from “natural” descriptions.  The 
ambiguity and shifting meaning of the body is now expressed in the notion that the meanings of bodies, even 
bodies themselves, are constructed within and by the context in which they are located.  The concept that bodies 
are constructed is a result of the wider discourse of deconstruction, which is a term used to refer to a 
contemporary intellectual movement in philosophy, literary theory, and criticism, although not restricted to 
these, and best understood in terms of its association with the writings of French philosopher Jacques Derrida.  
Deconstruction is a strategy to analyze texts and social reality in order to disclose their cultural and social 
dynamics and unquestioned assumptions as well as unresolved tensions, conflicts and contradictions.  
Resonating Derrida’s statement that “There is nothing outside the text,” deconstruction recognizes no essential 
difference between language and the world.  The critical analysis of deconstruction is not meant to obliterate or 
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constructed means that body categories once understood to have ahistorical, scientific, or 
ontological meanings can be understood to have political, contextual, ever-shifting, and 
changeable meanings.  We are now being challenged to deconstruct these body designations 
to understand why they have the meanings they do.  There is much debate about the very 
notion of construction; this debate will be part of my examination of theories of sex/gender 
and race. 
 Reflecting on the body as construction is a tool to systematize specialized liberation 
theologies and as a bridge to connect them together in order to better theologize about the 
body.   Using construction as an organizing principle I map theories of race and sex/gender to 
aid theologians in navigating these discourses.  There is no one theory or meaning to 
sex/gender or race and these maps help clarify the differences.  Theologians can then plot 
their own theories of race and sex/gender.  Acknowledging and understanding one’s own 
ideas about each of these categories is an important first step to doing justice to the 
importance and relevance of body categories for theology.  One must be clear about where 
one stands in these dialogues to have relevant and sophisticated discourse and dialogue about 
                                                                                                                                                       
demolish that which is its object of analysis, but to open up space for rethinking or new thinking about it.  
Nicholas Royle claims that deconstruction is, above all perhaps, a questioning of the “is,” a concern with what 
remains to be thought, with what cannot be thought within the present.  Derrida himself writes, “Destabilization 
is required for ‘progress’…And the ‘de-’ of deconstruction signifies not the demolition of what is constructing 
itself, but rather what remains to be thought beyond the constructivist or destructionist scheme.”  Jacques 
Derrida, “Afterword: Toward an Ethic of Discussion,” in Limited, Inc., ed. Gerald Graff, trans. Samuel Weber 
and Jeffrey Mehlman (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1988), 147.  He has described as “the least bad 
definition” of “deconstruction,” namely “the experience of the impossible.”  Jacques Derrida, “Afterw.rds: or, at 
least, less than a letter about a letter less,” in Afterwords, ed. Nicholas Royle, trans. Geoffrey Bennington 
(Tampere, Finland: Outside Books, 1992).  For more on deconstruction and its place within theological 
discourse, see Thomas J. J. Altizer et al, eds., Deconstruction and Theology (New York: Crossroad, 1982); John 
D. Caputo and Jacques Derrida, Deconstruction in a Nutshell: A Conversation with Jacques Derrida (New 
York: Fordham University Press, 1997); David W. Odell-Scott, “Deconstruction,” in Handbook of Postmodern 
Biblical Interpretation, 55-61; Nicholas Royle, ed., Deconstruction: A User’s Guide (New York: Palgrave, 
2000); and the work of Mark C. Taylor including Deconstructing Theology (New York: Crossroad, 1982), 
Erring: A Postmodern A/Theology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), and “The End(s) of 
Theology,” in Introduction to Christian Theology: Contemporary North American Perspectives, ed. Roger A. 
Badham (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1998). 
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the body in theology today.  This dialogue must consider the particularities of any body and 
these particularities are specific to the context in which bodies are situated.  The implications 
of race for a body in the United States have been shaped by the experience of slavery and 
legalized discrimination.  The meanings of sex/gender for a body in the United States are part 
of the inheritance of Western culture and religion.  Exploring these body categories through 
the lens of construction highlights the complexity of bodies and how we categorize them.  It 
calls attention to not only different understandings of race and sex/gender as body categories 
but also various notions about materiality itself and the materialization of bodies.  Theories 
about the constructedness of the materiality of the body can and do include the understanding 
that these categories are not constructed at all.  In this way, theologians who do not adhere to 
the concept of construction in either discourse of race or sex/gender can still be part of the 
dialogue.  I recognize that the concept of construction is problematic for scholars who equate 
it with illusion.  That is not how I am using the term in this dissertation. 
 Using construction to think about the concepts of sex/gender and race challenges 
theologians to go beyond their personal opinion and experience.  Everyone must learn the 
history of these designations and understand how they affect who we are and how we think.  
Just as we need to expand our understandings of racism and sexism beyond personal 
prejudice to structural discrimination, so too we need to recognize that the meaning of the 
body goes beyond the individual person and has meaning according to the discourse of the 
context in which it lives.  Recognizing the contextual meaning of the body is not the 
equivalent of a structuralist view of personal identity.15  Persons are able to deconstruct the 
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 Structuralism began as a specialist method of inquiry used first in linguistics and then in anthropology, most 
notably in the work of Ferdinand de Saussure and Claude Lévi-Strauss.  Structuralism focuses on the way that 
human behavior is determined by various structures and often becomes rigid and ahistorical, losing sight of the 
individual, their freedom, and their ability to act.  For more on structuralism, see Terence Hawkes, 
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body and can change the realities of sex/gender and race.  If bodies are constructed through 
human action and thought, then they can be reconstructed through these same means whether 
one believes this entails a new understanding of the body or a return to a true understanding 
of the body.16 
 Exploring various theories of sex/gender and race around the same organizing 
concept of construction begins to bring these disparate conversations together.  While I focus 
on the level of the construction of the body in theories of sex/gender and the meaning of the 
construction of the body in theories of race, consideration of both race and sex/gender 
embrace how and to what extent bodily identities are constructed in time and place.  Bringing 
discourse about race and sex/gender together in and for theological anthropology is the focus 
of the second part of this dissertation and addresses the problem of ghettoizing these 
discourses in theological specializations.  Liberation theologians challenge all theologians to 
understand that body designations and the meaning given to them in social and ecclesial life 
are not only relevant but crucial for theological study and discussion.  Womanist theologians 
in particular call on theologians to recognize that body classifications and the social and 
ecclesial structures and teachings based on them intersect and influence each other.  Only by 
                                                                                                                                                       
Structuralism and Semiotics (New York: Routledge, 2003); and John Sturrock, ed., Structuralism and Since: 
From Lévi-Strauss to Derrida (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979). 
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 This belief that bodies can be reconstructed by first understanding their categorization as constructed is a 
central notion in white studies, an area of research now being embraced by theologians.  The editors of 
Disrupting White Supremacy From Within write that the possibilities raised by constructionist theories have 
major implications.  Once it is recognized that race is not a fixed or static fact of nature, but a contested and 
changing social-political reality, it becomes possible to interrogate the meanings it has been 
given…Constructionist theories enable more sufficient understanding of how racial oppression actually works.  
Understanding how race functions in processes of white supremacy can lead to pragmatic thinking toward 
resistance.  Recognizing race as constructed makes visible the human agency involved in constructing it, one of 
the most important insights to leverage in understanding racism as a white problem.  Jennifer Harvey, Karin A. 
Case, and Robin Hawley Gorsline, eds., Disrupting White Supremacy From Within: White People On What We 
Need To Do (Cleveland: Pilgrim Press, 2004), 100.  Conversely, John Paul II in his theology of the body argues 
that many contemporary approaches to sex/gender have “constructed” it as false and that the proper course of 
action is to realign our understanding and living of sex/gender with the biblical and true meaning of it. 
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addressing the whole body in all its particularity can theologians produce theology about and 
for real life. 
 Womanist theology addresses both the helpfulness and the limitations of construction 
as a tool for reflection on the body.  Womanists balance the objectification and limitation of 
bodily identity that can occur through the lens of construction with a consideration of the 
expression and individuality of bodily reality.  Christian theology cannot be concerned only 
with the historical winners’ points of view since Christian faith is centered on a person who 
was most concerned with the realities of the outcast and oppressed.  Therefore, theological 
consideration of sex/gender and race cannot be satisfied with an analysis of the construction 
of the body as instituted by power.  Theology must also attend to the communal self-
definition of those historically oppressed by the meanings assigned to race and sex/gender.  
Womanists show how reflecting on the identity of black women from the point of view of 
power is very different from the same reflection from the point of view of black women 
themselves.  In order to understand any body, one must develop a familiarity with their 
discourse not just discourse about them 
 Womanist scholarship teaches that careful attention to group identity reveals the 
diversity in every group.  In addition to race and sex/gender, identity markers such as class 
and sexuality also influence and shape the identity of body-persons.  Attending to individual 
expressions of bodily identity deepens our reflection on human identity and bodies.  If 
Christians believe that God is concerned with each individual person in their uniqueness, 
then theology must be able to reflect on the individuality of body-persons as well as what 
creates community among us.  Theological reflection on the body must include an ability to 
read the texts of our materiality as well as an ability to listen to individual life stories.  I want 
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this dissertation to help us learn to face each other as individuals.  We must learn how to 
stand quietly with another and wait to be told and taught who that other is and wants to be.  
People know something real and important about their experience and history.  It is only in 
the listening and accepting and being with the other that we can recognize we are all unique 
bodies and at the same time one body.  The combination of construction and expression sees 
our commonality in history and language and our uniqueness as individual creations of God. 
 Approaching the body as symbol embraces the body as a construction and the body as 
an expression.  The body is given meaning, and therefore constructed, through categories 
such as race and sex/gender.  Each body-person expresses these constructions within their 
own individuality.  Symbol is a concept that brings these ideas together.  It has a long history 
in theological reflection and is a useful tool to think about the body and the much needed 
consideration of its sex/gender and race.  I draw on my study of symbol in sacramental 
theology and Christology.  In both a symbol is understood as a material reality that reveals 
mystery.  Symbols are always contextual as they must have relevant meaning for the current 
community.  The body is materiality that reveals the mystery of humanity and is always 
situated in its history, language, and context.  The body expresses both.  The body is 
individual and communal.  Bodies are not static but changing and changeable.  Within this 
fluidity of materiality, new identities are possible.  New symbols of humanity will appear and 
reveal more of its mystery.  The more we are open to the diversity of bodies the more diverse 
they appear.  As a multivalent concept, symbol allows room for diverse understandings of 
sex/gender and race, as well as other identity markers. 
I find this approach to race and sex/gender as construction and expression helpful and 
freeing in my own life as well as my thinking about the body.  It allows for conversation 
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between people with varying views on bodily categories such as race and sex/gender that 
does not just disintegrate into personal experience but still allows personal experience to be 
part of the conversation.  I believe we must understand how and why people are oppressed by 
race and sex/gender.  We must find ways to create change that alleviates the oppression we 
discover.  My investigation of these theories and theologies of race and sex/gender proposes 
a way of thinking about the body that allows the unique image of God that is each person to 
be fully realized and shared.  There is no simple fix to the problem of oppression based on 
body categorization.  The change that is needed is always happening and never done.17  We 
cannot simply transcend our understandings of race and sex/gender to a completely different 
reality.  We must first understand why we think the way we do about these categories before 
we can make any changes.  It is my hope that in the learning and appreciation of race and 
sex/gender as constructions and expressions, we will speak and live them in a more liberating 
way. 
 
IV. SOURCES 
 The body is not a new theological topic.18  Throughout the centuries, Christian 
theologians have struggled with issues concerning the meaning of the body in general, its 
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 The notions of gradual change and the always illusive reality of complete liberation from oppression are 
specifically noted in the work of many of the scholars I include in this dissertation.  James Cone and Elisabeth 
Schüssler Fiorenza both recognize the important strides taken toward liberation and the always present need for 
more and relate it to the theological concept of the already and not yet reality of Christian redemption.  The 
kingdom of God broke into the world with Jesus Christ but it is never fully experienced here.  Delores Williams 
argues that because total liberation is a hope and goal, liberation theologies cannot and should not just 
concentrate on total liberation but also find ways to help people survive in the midst of their oppression that 
presents hope for new ways of living.  Kelly Brown Douglas presents a proposal for change based on the 
gradual change of discourse.  This same idea of gradual shifts in meaning through discourse is also at the heart 
of Judith Butler’s work.  Her analysis of bodies as formed in discourse allows room for repetitions in and of this 
discourse that bring about changes in the meanings of bodies. 
18
 See James F. Keenan, “Christian Perspectives on the Human Body,” Theological Studies 55 (June 1994): 
330-46; and Lisa Isherwood and Elizabeth Stuart, Introducing Body Theology (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic 
Press, 1998), for historical surveys of Christian approaches to the human body.  See Sarah Coakley, ed., 
19 
 
value, desires, and needs, as well as with issues concerned with specific bodies, such as the 
value of women and people of color in society, church, and before God.  The body’s 
importance has been recognized in biblical studies, historical theology, Christian ethics, as 
well as systematic loci such as Christology and ecclesiology.  In fact, there is now a 
theological specialization called body theology.19  Theology is being challenged to consider 
the importance of the body and the ramifications of how we categorize people based on the 
body.  This challenge has grown stronger with the emergence of various liberation theologies 
and questions arising in and from contemporary theory.  This dissertation focuses on the 
categories of race, specifically those defined as black and white, and sex/gender, recognizing 
that there is work being done on other areas of bodily identity.20  Theories of sexuality also 
arise in this project since they have been intricately woven into our understandings of race 
and sex/gender.21  This project brings together various voices addressing these topics, with 
                                                                                                                                                       
Religion and the Body (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), for a wider perspective about the body’s 
intersection with religion. 
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 Lisa Isherwood and Elizabeth Stuart describe body theology as theology through the body not about the body.  
The starting point of body theology is all the experiences of the body, including but certainly not limited to 
sexuality and body image issues.  Isherwood and Stuart contend that body theology argues for a radical 
understanding of incarnation that places the divine solidly in the world and challenges any notions of dualism.  
See Isherwood and Stuart, Introducing Body Theology; James Nelson, Body Theology (Louisville, KY: 
Westminster John Knox Press, 1992); and Marcella Althaus-Reid and Lisa Isherwood, Controversies in Body 
Theology (London: SCM Press, 2008). 
20
 For theological reflection on other ethnic identities, see the Journal of Hispanic/Latino Theology; Miguel A. 
De La Torre and Gastón Espinosa, Rethinking Latino(a) Religion and Identity (Cleveland: Pilgrim, 2006); 
Andrés G. Guerrero, A Chicano Theology (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1987); Alma Rose Alvarez, Liberation 
Theology in Chicana/o Literature: Manifestations of Feminist and Gay Identities (New York: Routledge, 2007); 
Jonathan Y. Tan,  Introducing Asian American Theologies (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2008); and Peter C. 
Phan, Christianity with an Asian Face: Asian American Theology in the Making (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 
2003).  For theological reflection on how disability and disease affect identity and theology, see Denise 
Ackermann, “Engaging Stigma: An Embodied Theological Response to HIV and AIDS,” Scriptura (2005): 
385-95; Thomas E. Reynolds, Vulnerable Communion: A Theology of Disability and Hospitality (Grand Rapids, 
MI: Brazos Press, 2008); and Hans S. Reinders, Receiving the Gift of Friendship: Profound Disability, 
Theological Anthropology, and Ethics (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Press, 2008). 
21
 For theological reflection on sexuality and identity, see Marcella Althaus-Reid, Homosexualities (London: 
SCM Press, 2008); Jeffrey S. Silker, ed., Homosexuality and Religion: An Encyclopedia (Westport, CT: 
Greenwood Press, 2007); Grace M. Jantzen, “Off the Straight and Narrow: Toward a Lesbian Theology,” 
Theology & Sexuality (September 1995): 58-76; and Richard Cleaver, Know My Name: A Gay Liberation 
Theology (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Pr, 1995). For specific reflection on how race and sexuality 
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special emphasis on liberation theologies.  I incorporate their work and wisdom into a more 
general theological approach to the body as symbol. 
 Liberation theologies in the United States and elsewhere have been especially 
concerned with the body.  Feminist, black, and womanist theologians have critiqued how we 
think of some bodies as “different,” while white male bodies are gauged normative.  These 
theologians argue that how we value bodily attributes and therefore specific bodies 
influences all aspects of ecclesial and theological life and thought.  The way we have decided 
to categorize bodies, and therefore people, has determined how we have lived and continue to 
live as individuals and as community.  Historically, some bodies have been valued more than 
other bodies.  Certain physical attributes have been conceived as more valuable and we have 
created a hierarchy of bodies based on the theories we have imagined concerning 
embodiment.  Some physical attributes have been theorized to reflect reason and leadership 
while others have come to mean brutishness and weakness.  The meaning ascribed to 
physical aspects of the body has been used to justify the oppression and limitation of certain 
body types and the unearned privilege of others. 
 I concentrate closely on the work of liberation theologians because like them I am 
concerned with bodily categorization because it is used as a tool of oppression.  Difference 
becomes a problem only when people are limited and oppressed by it.  Oppression is often 
defined in terms of “isms” that result from negative body evaluation, namely racism, sexism, 
classism, and heterosexism.  I include in the meaning of oppression based on body 
categorization the limitation of the spirit of individuals by the circumvention of their identity 
and therefore their lives by the meanings given to their bodies.  I focus on liberation 
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Black Religious Studies and the Erotic (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).  
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theologies because my ultimate goal of this theological discourse about the body is more 
fulfilled living for individuals and communities.  Liberation theologies do not simply engage 
in theoretical debate about the body, but start with the reality of oppression and work toward 
its alleviation.  Oppression is the key concern of liberation theologians and what unites them 
under the designation of liberation theology.  The alleviation of oppression includes survival 
while oppressed, a better quality of life while struggling against these oppressions, and the 
destruction of the systems and prejudices that cause this oppression in the first place.  The 
ultimate goal of liberation theologies is to create new ways of being and thinking that 
overcome the “isms” that result in oppression.  My goal for creating better discourse about 
the body is to liberate people to be the image of God they are.  This includes the destruction 
of these “isms” as well as encouraging positive self-affirmation.  It is the goal of all 
liberation theology to create space for each human being to be whole and fulfilled.  I believe 
that when we liberate individuals we liberate the Spirit to better dwell among us.  This 
project is a result of my learning from liberation theologies and an attempt to contribute 
something to the discourse.   
 Stephanie Mitchem describes liberation theologies as reactions against prevalent 
Western-focused traditional theology and its universals.  She claims that the domination of 
Christian theology by Western tradition has led to the development and establishment of 
“correct” theological methods as well as the promotion of cultural domination by 
Christianity.  Liberation theologies present a challenge to the tendencies of traditional 
theology to (1) make sharp distinctions between body and soul; (2) give preference to the 
spiritual/mental over the physical; and (3) believe that a universal, one-size-fits-all theology 
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is possible.22  Liberation theologies argue that there are different perspectives for doing 
theology because people are different based on their social location, which is often based on 
their bodily identity.  This declaration is a direct questioning of the reality and possibilities of 
universals for the experience of all people and the theology created for them.  Liberation 
theologians challenge all theologians to recognize and consider their own social location and 
how it affects their theology.  Luis G. Pedraja, a Hispanic theologian, writes that 
“Marginalized groups and theologies carry qualifiers, such as ‘Hispanic’ theology, while 
those who are in power simply see their theologies and experiences as universal and thus as 
the normative or universal expression of theology.”23  This “normative” expression of 
theology has been used to subjugate persons and communities.  For example, James Cone 
states that his black theology emerged from his awareness of the weaknesses of white 
theology.  In his study he found white theologians too indifferent to suffering and patient 
with cruelty, especially concerning blacks.  Cone observed a bankruptcy in white American 
theology because it was and is too tied to oppressive structures and furthers their social, 
political, and economic interests.  White theology led to a wrong ethics that excused and 
justified slavery and black suffering.  This realization led Cone as a black man and black 
theologian to conclude that the biblical God/Christ cannot be limited to the prejudiced 
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(Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1990).  
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interpretations of white scholars.  Black theology, Cone contends, must be liberated from 
white theology for it does not and cannot speak to oppressed blacks.24 
Since mainstream theology has been found wanting for oppressed peoples, and 
thereby for all people, a main focus within liberation theologies is the recovery and 
restatement of the subjugated strands of human meaning, particularly those of women and 
people of color.25  Liberation theologies engage people’s lives, their histories, and their 
current political realities.  These theologies focus on specific “group” experiences, including 
both the experience of oppression and the resources and strengths developed to counter this 
oppression.  The history, stories, wisdom, and everyday realities of the community are the 
basis for the construction of theology.  People who were formerly viewed and felt themselves 
to be outsiders to the closed circles of Western thought began to have a voice and a theology 
that speaks of and to their particular experience and culture.  Theologies of liberation are 
specific.  They are written out of the concrete situations and experiences of particular groups. 
Specificity about bodily life and experience is the main subject of this dissertation.  I 
am interested in the meanings ascribed to the specific body categories of race and sex/gender 
and their affect on how we are and act.  I explore feminist and black theologies that argue 
that how we value bodily attributes, what meaning we give to them, affects not only 
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 Cone, God of the Oppressed, 43ff.  Cone presents black theology as a more accurate and authentic Christian 
theology because the black experience witnesses to the same God one finds in the Bible.  White scholars are 
ignorant of this context where God is at work now so they cannot accurately represent Christianity today.  Cone 
contends that the reason white theology misses the mark is because it is not centered on the truth of a liberator 
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E. Sontag, “Coconut Theology: Is James Cone the ‘Uncle Tom’ of Black Theology,” Journal of Religious 
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theology. 
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individual identity but the community and its theology.  If we value male bodies, feminists 
argue, we will live in a male-dominated, patriarchal society and church.  If we value white 
skin, black theologians contend, we will live in a white supremacist, racist society and 
church.  Feminist and black theologies have attempted to sharpen our focus on body-persons 
and experiences that have been historically oppressed and often ignored in theology.  They 
have challenged theologians, mostly white men, to see that these female bodies and black 
bodies matter; they make a difference in how one experiences life, reads texts, views history, 
thinks about God; in short, does theology.  Because of their focus on the experience of being 
raced and sexed/gendered, I rely heavily on the work of feminist and black theologians to 
explore these body categories.   
It must be clear from the beginning that there is not one or a black or feminist 
theology or even one way of doing either and I do not approach them as such.  In fact, I 
chose each voice for this dissertation to represent a different approach to race and sex/gender, 
very consciously exposing the differences within each of these theological discourses.  
However, all black theologies and likewise all feminist theologies have shared historical 
roots.  Black theology traces its history back to the faith and experiences of enslaved 
Africans in this country.  The major catalysts for the emergence and development of black 
theology as a twentieth century Christian theology are the Civil Rights Movement and the 
Black Power Movement.26  Likewise, feminist theology has its roots in the movements for 
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 The modern Civil Rights Movement began on December 1, 1955, with Rosa Parkss calculated refusal to give 
up her seat and move to the back of the bus.  This Christian nonviolent movement was led by the Reverend 
Doctor Martin Luther King, Jr.  Many young black pastors and ministers were affected by this movement and 
their theology was formed out in the streets struggling and fighting for justice.  Following the example of King, 
they took the Christian gospel of Jesus Christ and applied it to the black experience.  The Black Power 
Movement of the 1960s and 1970s arose out of the Civil Rights Movement and can be said to have begun with 
Stokley Carmichael’s call for black power during a civil rights march in Greenwood, MS, on June 16, 1966.  
The cry was for the power blacks deserved, not integration into the white world and white values.  There was a 
recognition that freedom and justice for the black community would have to be wrested from white oppressors.  
25 
 
women’s suffrage and later in the fight for Equal Rights for women.27  Both theological 
movements began in the disenfranchisement of persons based on their bodily identity.   
The question of how to approach race and sex/gender and what their meanings should 
be has always elicited a wide variety of responses from theologians in both discourses.  Some 
feminists have continued to maintain that sex and gender are essentialist categories and that 
“woman” is indeed a term that can be used without further description.  Some of these 
scholars have declared Christianity irredeemably sexist and have worked to develop 
                                                                                                                                                       
Members of the Black Power Movement were determined this would be achieved by and through whatever 
means were necessary.  Malcolm X preached the right of self-identity and self-determination.  He called on all 
blacks to love themselves and stop equating positive with white.  For more on both of these movements and 
their leaders, see James H. Cone, Martin and Malcolm and America: A Dream or a Nightmare (Maryknoll, NY: 
Orbis Books, 1991).  A third catalyst for the emergence of black theology was the 1964 publication of and 
subsequent reaction to Joseph Washington, Black Religion: The Negro and Christianity in the United States 
(Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1984).  In this work, Washington argues that although blacks have 
a unique culture, their religion and theology are merely folk religion and folk theology because black churches 
are not genuine Christian churches.  Genuine Christianity is found only in white churches since they embody 
the faith, tradition, and church structure handed down through the centuries in Western Europe.  He maintained 
that a religion of justice, even one based on the justice of Jesus, did not qualify as faith and therefore was not a 
proper foundation for Christian theology.  Since blacks had been excluded from the genuine Christianity of 
white churches, the goal should be to rejoin them.  Black theology arose partly to refute this charge.  Black 
clergy began to create a theology for black people fighting for liberation that stated quite clearly that 
Christianity and the God it worshipped were centrally interested in justice.  For more on the catalysts of black 
theology, see Dwight N. Hopkins, Introducing Black Theology of Liberation (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 
1999), 28-41; and Diana L. Hayes, And Still We Rise: An Introduction to Black Liberation Theology (New 
York: Paulist Press, 1996), 53-78.   
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 Both religious and secular feminism can be divided into three waves.  The first wave began in the 1830s and 
called for the legal and economic equality of women with men in the United States.  U.S. women challenged the 
inferior status of women as part of their participation in the pre-Civil War abolitionist movement.  The Female 
Anti-Slavery Society, founded in 1833, connected the oppression of slaves with the subordination of women.  
Elizabeth Cady Stanton (1815-1902) brought attention to the ways the Bible contributed to the subordination of 
women and to a biblical commentary by first wave feminists called The Woman’s Bible.  First wave feminism 
paved the way for the Nineteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution in 1920, which gave women the right to 
vote.  This achievement, however, virtually ended the feminist movement at that time.  In the 1960s and 1970s a 
second wave of feminism broadened its call for the political and economic equality of women with men.  In 
conjunction with the civil rights struggles of African Americans, feminists sought civil rights for women.  This 
second wave was launched by the publication of Betty Friedan’s The Feminine Mystique in 1963 and was 
supported by the National Organization of Women, founded in 1966.  Second wave feminist theology was 
initiated by Euro-American women who pursued advanced degrees in theology for the first time and brought 
attention to the shortcomings of the “maleness” of Christian theology.  The third wave of feminism began in the 
late 1970s and has drawn attention to the differences in race and social class of women.  Women of color, such 
as bell hooks, exposed the whiteness of second wave feminism and called on all women to recognize the 
importance of social location for all people.  This new development in feminism has expanded its goal from the 
equality of women with men to a recreation of all humanity according to right relations.  For more on the 
historical roots of feminist theology, see Anne M. Clifford, Introducing Feminist Theology (Maryknoll, NY: 
2001), 9-28. 
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theologies and language that are woman focused.  Others have worked to revalue the place 
and status of women within the Christian tradition.  Some feminist theologians would agree 
that the categorization of sex and gender is natural but argue not essential.  These theologians 
temporarily focus on this categorization in order to one day focus on our shared humanity 
rather than bodily divisions.  Still other feminist theologians recognize the problem of using 
the term “woman” unreflectively; but still consider it an important political and theological 
category.  They recognize that those struggling for the end of racism do not agree that 
patriarchy is the most foundational evil in our country or church.28   
There are corresponding trends in black theology concerning the challenge to race as 
a body category.  Some have argued that being physically black has become essential to how 
one lives in the world and therefore they have called for Black Nationalism and separatism.  
Others understand the goal of black theology as a work of liberation and reconciliation so 
that we focus our attention on our shared humanity rather than racial divisions.29  All black 
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 Anne Clifford argues that the different types of feminism are the result of different experiences of patriarchy 
and androcentrism and lead to different ways of analyzing its causes and remedies.  She relies on Maria Riley’s 
mapping of the feminist terrain and applies these to the discipline of feminist theology.  These differentiations 
are most applicable to second wave feminism.  Riley identifies four major types of feminism of the second 
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Clifford connects revolutionary feminist theology with radical feminism.  These theologians can be described as 
post-Christian since they believe Christianity is irredeemably patriarchal, even anti-woman.  Carol Christ, Mary 
Daly, and Christine Downing are revolutionary or radical feminists.  Clifford associates reformist feminist 
theology with cultural feminism.  This form of feminist theology does not wish for a totally revolutionized 
Christianity but rather a more egalitarian one that involves women more.  I would classify Elizabeth Johnson as 
a reformist feminist theologian.  Clifford’s third category of feminist theology is reconstructionist.  Although it 
shares with reformist feminist theology a commitment to Christianity, it calls for a deeper transformation and 
reconstruction of Christianity and its structures.  Included in this category are Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza and 
Rosemary Radford Ruether.  See Clifford, Introducing Feminist Theology, 32-38. 
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 Dwight Hopkins divides black theology into first and second generations.  The first generation is further 
delineated into political and cultural theologians.  He defines political theologians as those claiming a 
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theologians continue to maintain race as a legitimate and currently important theme for 
Christian theology and its work of liberation.  Other voices have challenged black scholars to 
move away from understanding race as central to identity.  They argue that racial categories 
are themselves becoming limiting and non-liberating for people who find they fit less and 
less comfortably within the boxes of “black” and “white.”30 
Both black theology and feminist theology came under criticism for their exclusive 
focus on one aspect of bodily identity.  Since black theology was done mostly by black men, 
they were concerned with the problems race presented them since their sex was not 
problematic.  Feminist theology was done mostly by white women who did not have 
problems with their race but focused on the problems their sex/gender caused them.  What 
neither saw was their own exclusive approach to theology.  Black women challenged both 
white women and black men to see that black female bodies experience a different 
womanhood and blackness.  Womanists have challenged the sexism and racism found in the 
                                                                                                                                                       
theological mandate for political activism for the full empowerment of black people.  Included in this group is 
James Cone who understands race as basic to how we live and think in this country and calls for a general 
liberation from whiteness.  Another political theologian is J. Deotis Roberts who understands blackness as a 
symbolic reality in our society and believes there must be room for both a black and white Christ in 
Christianity.  However, he hopes Christians can go beyond color to worship a colorless Christ and achieve true 
reconciliation between whites and blacks as equals.  Hopkins also includes Albert Cleage in this division of 
black theology.  Cleage was the leader of the Black Christian Nationalism Movement who advocated black 
separation from the white world and a development of an independent church.  Hopkins’ second category of 
first generation theology includes cultural theologians Gayraud Wilmore and Charles Long who called on black 
theology to be in touch with the African American cultural context.  Open to both secular and non-Christian 
sources, cultural theologians uncover and create black religious thought and language based in the American 
black community and its cultural ties with Africa.  Blackness in the U.S. is a cultural construct that does not 
exhaust African American identity but also cannot be ignored.  Second generation black theologians extended 
black theology’s scope to include the place of women and the role of class in the creation of black theology.  
See Hopkins, Introducing Black Theology of Liberation, 49-124.  For a classification and criticism of 
methodological perspectives in the academic study, interpretation, and construction of black theology in the 
United States, see Frederick L. Ware, Methodologies of Black Theology (Cleveland: The Pilgrim Press, 2002).  
Ware classifies black theologies as belonging to a hermeneutical school, philosophical school, or human 
sciences school.  All avenues of black theology are involved in the on-going task of identity formation and the 
challenge of defining blackness amid its positive and negative realities.   
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 See Victor Anderson, Beyond Ontological Blackness: An Essay on African American Religious and Cultural 
Criticism (New York: Continuum, 1995); and Alistair Kee, The Rise and Demise of Black Theology 
(Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2006), which question the usefulness of the category of race for theology.  These 
texts are part of my analysis of race in Chapter 3 of this dissertation. 
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black and feminist political movements.  They argue that black male theologians do not 
adequately interrogate the patriarchal moorings of traditional Christian language about God 
and humanity.  Womanist writers have also exposed the racism of both secular and 
theological white feminism.  Womanists criticize feminists for being too focused on sexism 
as the sole oppression in society and church.  Womanists argue that the experience of black 
women is different from that of white women.  They cannot stand exclusively with white 
women against sexism because they must stand with black men against racism.  They argue 
that neither white women nor black men can speak for black women; they stand at the 
intersection of racism and sexism.  Womanist theologians are concerned with the unique 
position of black women’s bodies.  From this unique position, they challenge liberation 
theologians to fight against oppression in all its forms.  Their critique of both black and 
feminist theologies has led to a more complex conversation about the body and theological 
reflection that brings race and sex/gender together.  The inclusion of all three of these 
theological specializations in this project brings attention to the complexity and importance 
of the body in life and religion.   
My investigation of and attention to black, feminist, and womanist theologies helps 
create better overall theological discourse about race and sex/gender, but there are limitations 
to the use of these sources.  First, race is not just about being black or white.  Black theology 
does not concern itself with race per se but with a specific race, namely African American 
people.  This focus on race as black and white may seem to be a limitation for my bigger 
project of thinking about the body as symbol.  I recognize that not all people identify as being 
white or black, but in the United States racial categories began and have been deeply affected 
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by the black/white divide.31  In addition, dealing with race in a theological context means 
addressing a genre of theology that reflects on the experience of a particular community of 
people for whom their particular race is a consciously important aspect of life.  Each genre of 
theology begins with this community’s experience of race not race in general.  To talk about 
race in theology in general terms would be to address multiple genres of theology, which 
would make this project unwieldy.  However, the ideas and conclusions from this project 
translate to such a wider analysis of race, at least in theology.  My method of addressing the 
materiality of the body as symbol calls for inclusion of all the specifics of the body into 
theological conversation, including the particularities of each person’s racial identity and 
struggles.  In this way theological analysis of race broadens to include those beyond the 
black-white paradigm. 
The specific focus of each liberation theology is both its strength and one of its 
limitations.  All of these theologies are based on the experience of those people who fit 
within the bodily parameters of the theology’s focus: black theology was for and by black 
people, supposedly both men and women; feminist theology was by and for women, 
supposedly white women and women of color; and womanist theology was by and for black 
women.  Because these theologies begin and focus on the experiences of specifically defined 
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 Michael Omi contends that how we think about, engage, and politically mobilize around racial issues have 
been fundamentally shaped by a prevailing “black-white” paradigm of race relations and that such biracial 
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groups, there is not much room for overlap.  Even though womanists have critiqued both 
black and feminist theologians for too narrowly defining identity under the categories of race 
and sex/gender, their primary concern is also on a specific and delineated group of persons, 
namely black/African American women.  There was and is the challenge among the 
theologies to respect and respond to the reality of those whose bodily identities and lived 
realities were and are different.  But thinking about race and gender as problematic and/or 
oppressive realities one must experience to understand creates a problem for men wanting to 
talk about gender and whites wanting to deal with race.  Discussion and debate has arisen on 
how one talks about an oppression one has not experienced.32  Using experience as central 
has become divisive even in attempts to unite people with the same body categories, such as 
women or blacks.33  Narrowly focusing on these realities has also led to an isolation of these 
discourses from mainstream theology.  It is argued for example that black theology is strictly 
for blacks and feminist theology is strictly for women even though both are advocating a 
change in how theology is done in general.  Not everyone thinks about the(ir) body as 
                                                 
32
 For more on appropriation and reciprocity in theology, see Katie Cannon, “Appropriation and Reciprocity in 
the Doing of Womanist Ethics,” in Katie’s Canon: Womanism and the Soul of the Black Community (New 
York: Continuum, 1995), 129-35; and “Appropriation and Reciprocity,” pt. 5 of Deeper Shades of Purple: 
Womanism in Religion and Society, ed. Stacy M. Floyd-Thomas (New York: New York University Press, 
2006); Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza and Judith Plaskow, eds., “Appropriation and Reciprocity in 
Womanist/Mujerista/Feminist Work,” Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion 8 (Fall 1992): 91-122; and 
Deanna A. Thompson, “Teaching What I’m Not: Embodiment, Race, and Theological Conversation in the 
Classroom,” Teaching Theology & Religion 3 (October 2000): 164-69.   
33
 This division is at the heart of third wave feminism and feminist theology.  For an exploration of the use of 
women’s experience in feminist theological discourse, see Sheila Greeve Davaney, “The Limits of the Appeal 
to Women’s Experience,” in Shaping New Vision: Gender and Values in American Culture, eds. Clarissa W. 
Atkinson, Constance H. Buchanan, and Margaret R. Miles (Ann Arbor, MI: UMI Research Press, 1987), 31-49; 
Ann Elizabeth O’Hara Graff, “The Struggle to Name Women’s Experience: Assessment and Implications for 
Theological Construction,” Horizons 20 (Fall 1993): 215-33; Loraine MacKenzie Shepherd, “The Deceptive 
Monolith of Women’s Experience: Struggling for Common Feminist Visions Amidst Diversity,” Toronto 
Journal of Theology 11 (Fall 1995): 151-64; Linda Hogan, From Women’s Experience to Feminist Theology 
(Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1995); Serene Jones, “Women’s Experience Between a Rock and a Hard 
Place: Feminist, Womanist, and Mujerista Theologies in North America,” in Horizons in Feminist Theology: 
Identity, Tradition, and Norms, eds. Rebecca S. Chopp and Sheila Greeve Davaney (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress 
Press, 1997), 33-54; and Jennifer Beste, “Limits of the Appeal to Women’s Experiences Reconsidered,” 
Horizons 33 (Spring 2006): 54-77. 
31 
 
problematic.  Pauli Murray has also argued that the particularization of these liberation 
theologies can stifle self-criticism, lead to isolation and frustration, and can develop into 
myopia.34 
Another critique of these liberation theologies is that they also essentialize bodies.  
Feminist and black theologians have been criticized for their own exclusionary, limited, and 
limiting categorization of bodies.  Womanist theologians have critiqued feminist theologies 
that do not consider race as a divisive aspect within the feminist movement.  These same 
theologians have also critiqued black theologies for not recognizing the sexist aspects of 
black theology and the black church.  Some womanists in turn have been criticized by black 
lesbian women who do not find sexual orientation to be a prominent part of womanist 
discourse about oppressed bodies.  All of these theologies are being challenged to find room 
in their discussion of bodies for social location and class structures.  Challenged to face their 
own exclusionary beliefs and practices, these theologies are beginning to address new 
questions and different approaches to bodily identity.  Groups based on bodily categorization 
are being challenged to face their own diverse reality.  No one is ever just raced or 
sexed/gendered but always both.  In addition, our individual identity is defined by many 
other identity markers as well.  Focus on community can neglect the individual but an 
exclusive focus on the individual can lose sight of how people are community.   
Contemporary theory challenges liberation theologies to recognize that the very 
categories of race and sex/gender, such as black and white and woman and man, 
continuously fragment.  The postmodern subject is a complex entity not easily defined with 
simple categories.  However, we cannot simply discard such categories for they do have 
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meaning both historically and in the present struggle of people for liberation.  Liberation 
theologies must recognize that liberation today may mean not only liberation of the group 
from oppression and discrimination in general but also the liberation of the individual from 
the group.  I contend that any theological approach to the body must address it in its 
constructed group reality as well as in its individuality.  I utilize additional sources to focus 
on these two aspects of the body. 
Contemporary social theory is reevaluating the very categories at the heart of 
liberation theologies.  Theorists outside of theology contend with how to categorize and 
ascribe meaning to the body.  These theorists challenge essentialist theories about the body 
and use the tools of philosophy, sociology, law, and language to examine the complexity of 
body categorization.  Critical race theorists wrestle with the questions of what race is, how it 
came to be meaningful for our identity, and what the current meanings of race are.  As North 
Americans, we must be attentive to how the experience of colonialism, the African slave 
trade, as well as centuries of slavery and segregation have affected our notions of race.  Race 
theory in general challenged me to see the changing meaning of the body.35  Gender theory in 
general challenged me to see the level to which the body can be thought of as a social 
construction.  Gender theorists struggle with the meaning and naturalness of gender and 
sexual differences for identity and the organization of society.36 
Some theologians hesitate to dialogue and/or incorporate these contemporary theories 
into their theological discourse.  Some theologians fear that many “postmodern” theories lead 
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to relativism and provide no basis for community or individual agency to exact change.  They 
also fear that the loss of categorizations such as “woman” or “black” will undermine their 
progress toward the liberation of people who self-identify with these categories.  Therefore, 
they continue to use language about the body that maintains dualistic overtones such as 
“man” and “woman” and “black” and “white.”  It is a question whether this dualist language 
will in the end prove more harmful to their causes of liberation than what contemporary 
theories have to offer.  I believe that critical liberation theologians are increasingly aware of 
the complexity of categorizing the body for analysis or political action in society and church.  
While studying the theologies of select liberation theologians, I recognized a shift occurring 
in their thought from reflection on body categories as natural/ontological/ahistorical to a 
greater appreciation of race, sex/gender, and sexuality as culturally, including religiously, 
constructed realities.  There is an increasing number of theologians who do address 
contemporary theory about the body in their work.37  Many, like me, are recognizing that 
contemporary theory has something important to offer theology and is not contradictory to its 
goals of love and unity.   
I incorporate contemporary theory to help me think more deeply about the 
constructedness of the body; but this is not all there is to the body.  In order to reflect on the 
individuality of body-persons, I incorporate sources that reflect both on how various social 
constructions come together to create unique identity within any group as well as how 
individuals express uniqueness in their own person.  I turn to the work of Karl Rahner to 
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reflect on the individuality of each body-person from a theological perspective.  Rahner’s 
work began my own thinking about the body as symbol and I use his theological reflection to 
flesh out this aspect of the body as expression.  Starting with his theological reflections on 
the Trinity to his Christological considerations, Rahner’s work explores how symbols express 
uniqueness and individuality of being.38  His application of the concept of symbol to the 
human body is illuminating but not the definitive way of theologizing about the body.  No 
one source is the key to a theological approach to the body that is concerned with the 
complexity of bodily identity in terms of race and sex/gender.  Discourses must be brought 
together.  Dialogue is beginning to happen with the growing awareness that all oppression is 
interrelated and that the body categorizations it produces are intersecting and multilayered.  I 
bring the conversations about race and sex/gender together with theoretical and theological 
approaches to the body to propose a theology of the body that incorporates many voices.   
I approach each source as an approach to the body that flows from the thinker’s 
method and corresponds to their goals for body-persons.  I explore how they challenge or 
defend traditional notions about the body in terms of race, sex/gender, and sexuality and what 
tools they offer to expand how we have conversation about the body in theology.  I propose 
how these discourses can be brought together to create a Christian approach to the body that 
respects individuality and communal connectedness.  Specific voices are not being used to 
represent all black, feminist and womanist theologies.  Nor are they being explored in their 
entirety.  Each source is used as an example of a different approach to and theory about 
sex/gender, race, and the body in general.  I bring theory and theology together in an 
approach to physical and personal identity that respects individuality, acknowledges 
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constructs, calls for community, and invites all theology to know the wisdom of liberation 
theology.   
I consider this project a contribution to the conversation of liberation theologies as 
well as theological anthropology in general.  My basic premise is that an analysis of the 
categories of sex/gender and race is crucial for both liberation theology and theological 
anthropology.  Bodily categorization is intimately connected to racism and sexism so we 
must analyze race to combat racism and sex/gender to combat sexism.  These conversations 
in turn must be brought into mainstream, traditional theology since everyone is working with 
a theory of race and sex/gender whether they know it or not and it affects their theology.  
Only by exposing these theories can theologians have better discourse about human 
materiality, identity, and community.  My investigation of liberation theologies and their 
theories of sex/gender and race leads to my proposal of the body as symbol, which respects 
the specificity of the body in liberation theology and a more general Catholic appreciation of 
human materiality. 
 
V. PROJECT OUTLINE 
 This chapter has laid out the problems that are addressed in this dissertation and how 
I address them.  Theology needs better tools in order to engage in more in-depth 
conversations about sex/gender and race.  These conversations cannot be isolated from each 
other or mainstream theological thinking about anthropology.  My goals are to map theories 
of sex/gender and race for better discourse about these body categories using the concept of 
construction to organize the theories and to bring these separate discourses together for 
theological anthropology.  It is my argument that thinking about the body as symbol creates 
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more sophisticated discourse about race and sex/gender in theology and brings them together 
for and in theological anthropology.  Part I of this dissertation will analyze various theories 
of sex/gender and race in theology.  Part II will explain my proposal to bring them together 
for theological anthropology. 
 Part I introduces the reader to gender and race theory before outlining various 
theories of sex/gender and race found in theology.  Using construction as an organizing 
principle, I map various theories about race and sex/gender, analyzing key differences, 
emphases, and how these theories intersect with other important theological concepts such as 
ontology, truth, methodology, philosophy, historical perspective, rhetorical and political 
goals, understandings of language, subjectivity, personhood, and community, as well as 
theological themes such as Christology, ecclesiology, biblical interpretation, sin, and 
redemption.  The maps of sex/gender and race theories serve as tools for clarification of these 
theories and a template on which theologians can plot their own theories.  In mapping various 
theories of the materiality of the body, they are shown to exist in multiple ways.  These 
theories are explored within an overall concern for the liberation of bodies from oppression 
based on bodily categories and as building blocks for a theology of the body that keeps 
sex/gender and race as central concerns. 
 Chapter 2 explores theories of sex/gender according to how each theory explains the 
level of construction of bodily materiality in terms of sex and gender.  Theologians and 
theorists disagree about the level of constructedness of the body in terms of sex and gender 
with opinions ranging from no construction to total construction.  Theories are explored that 
explain sex and gender as ontological and transcendent categories of identity, that understand 
the dual sex of humanity as natural but how sex is gendered as constructed, that view 
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sex/gender as constructed for rhetorical and political reasons, and that understand all aspects 
of bodily identity as constructed in time and space.  Sex and gender are exposed as 
multivalent concepts with differing relationships between the two depending on the theory in 
question.  This chapter is an exploration of how theology can bring together very different 
ideas about the meaning of sex and gender into one conversation.  Central to this 
conversation about sex/gender and resulting sexualities is the notion that the meaning of 
bodies is based on language and power and a deeper understanding of one’s notions of 
language and power explains much about one’s notions of bodily identity.  How each 
theologian and theorist understands the very idea of construction expounds their theory of 
sex/gender more deeply.  Each theory of sex/gender is also dependent on the theologian’s 
methodological starting point as well as their theological goals.  This chapter explores how 
theories of sex/gender are central to theological discourse. 
 Chapter 3 continues to use construction as an organizing principle to explore theories 
about bodily materiality, but shifts its focus from the level of bodily constructedness to the 
meaning of materiality once it is accepted as a construction.  Outside of white supremist 
writing, race is rarely thought to be a biological or “natural” category of human persons.  It is 
understood to be a social construction invented in time and place.  The meaning assigned to 
this construction varies from an essential aspect of identity that needs to constantly be taken 
into consideration to an illusion that must be jettisoned from descriptions of human identity.  
I explore five different meanings of race.  Race as essence presents race as central to our 
sense of self and for our living.  Approaching race as historical legacy considers the history 
of the concept; how race has been thought of in the past and how these past interpretations 
influence how we think about it today.  Understanding race as culture or community 
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considers race as the worldview we receive from the community that has shaped us.  The 
fourth consideration of race reflects on how economic systems influence the meanings we 
assign to race.  The approach to race as illusion contends that race is losing its meaning.  This 
approach shifts focus from the community to the individual and asserts that to beat racism we 
must transcend race.  This chapter highlights the fact that race does not mean one thing to 
everyone even if we limit our conversation of race to black/African American and 
white/Caucasian.  Race is an amorphous concept.  The body reveals itself as historical; its 
meaning shifting over time.  Its meaning reflects its time and context as well as the ideas 
applied to it by its interpreter.  The same body means different things to different people.  
 Part II of this project explores the problem of bringing the study of sex/gender and 
race together in theological anthropology.  It presents some of the challenges of bringing 
them together in theology and a tool that addresses these challenges.  Chapter 4 investigates 
womanist theology as a discourse that brings together race and sex/gender.  Womanist 
scholarship calls attention to the fact all body-persons are both and always raced and 
sexed/gendered, and the reality that these identities interact and change each other.  The 
specifics of these interactions and their outcomes are unique to different communities and to 
different individuals.  Any community’s identity fragments and diversifies with the influence 
of additional factors such as class and sexuality, highlighting the uniqueness of individuals 
within the community.  Womanist theologians explore the body in terms of identity being a 
complex phenomenon.  They investigate African American female identity in terms of the 
interaction of sex/gender, race, class, and sexuality, recognizing that identity is formed within 
matrices of oppression.  Because of the uniqueness of identity for both communities and 
individuals, womanist scholars challenge theologians to attend to both communal and 
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individual discourses that contribute to determining identity for body-persons.  Communities 
construct counter-discourses that self-define their members, usually in a positive way.  The 
literature and culture of the community are the loci in which these discourses are found.  
Individual discourses include the unique manner in which body-persons express the concepts 
of race and sex/gender as well as the uniqueness of each subject.  These discourses are only 
learned through attention to specific life stories.  Womanist discourse has much to teach 
theologians about bodily identity and the interaction of race and sex/gender; but its focus 
remains on the experience of specific identity constructions, namely African American 
women.  Womanist discourse is concerned with particular bodies. 
 Chapter 5 presents my proposal for a theological approach to the body that keeps 
sex/gender and race central.  This tool is based on what I have learned from my investigation 
of race and sex/gender in theology and theory.  My approach to the body as symbol 
incorporates both an analysis of bodily identity through the lens of construction and a 
consideration of bodily identity as the expression of both communal and individual 
discourses.  The body as construction is a useful tool since it can organize and map theories 
of sex/gender and race and disclose how and why they differ, but it is limited in that it looses 
sight of the individual aspect of the body.  The body as expression is a useful tool since it 
recognizes there are always counter-discourses in the construction of the body and an 
individuality to each body, but it is limited in that it looses sight of the social aspect of the 
body.  Any theological approach to the body must balance construction and expression.  With 
the theological concept of symbol, theology has a tool that enables such an approach to the 
body-person.   
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Chapter 5 begins with an investigation of the notion of symbol in general and how it 
has been and can be applied to the body in order for theological anthropology to better 
address the identity concepts of race and sex/gender.  Symbol is a theological concept that 
brings together ideas teased out in the previous chapters.  Symbols are multivalent, allowing 
for different understandings of what is being symbolized and how, and are contextual and 
shifting.  There is precedent for thinking about the body as symbol in theology and theory.  
Karl Rahner’s theology of the symbol focuses on the uniqueness of each person and how the 
body expresses this.  His work is important for how it illustrates the importance of the body 
as symbol for all of theology.  His approach to the body is limited, however, as it does not 
spend ample attention on the body as social.  This aspect of the body is more fully explored 
in philosophical, anthropological, and sociological approaches to the body as symbol.  These 
disciplines investigate how the body is a construction and central to how life is lived and 
understood, but are limited in their lack of attention to the individuality of each body-person.  
My tool of the body as symbol incorporates both aspects of the body as construction and as 
expression.  I argue that this tool can allow for better discourse about sex/gender and race in 
mainstream theological anthropology.  It highlights the varied realities and theories of race 
and sex/gender and brings them together as central to discourse about the body.  Although 
my purpose in this project is to focus on the concepts of race and sex/gender for bodily 
identity, the body as symbol is a tool that invites theologians to explore other identity 
concepts as well.   
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VI. USE OF LANGUAGE 
 There are many ideas and concepts about bodily identity explored in this dissertation.  
It is customary to give an explanation of how one is using terms at the beginning of such a 
project.  However, a major theme of this dissertation is that categories about the body cannot 
be contained in one definition.  They exist as varied realities and therefore have multiple 
meanings.  In general, when I use the term body I mean the materiality of human persons.39  
The body includes and encompasses ideas about biology as well as group and individual 
identity that forms its experience and reality.  I use the term body-person to reflect the reality 
that we are not, nor are we ever, able to refer to mere materiality when the body is invoked.  
The body is always a person.40  Body-persons are categorized according to supposedly 
physical attributes that are easy to recognize such as skin color and “biological” sexual 
differences.  Body categorization is the way we group people according to physical attributes 
or categories of materiality.  I use the group identity markers black and African American 
interchangeably to reflect that race has more than one meaning.41 
 Since this dissertation takes up the topics of race and sex/gender because of 
discriminatory practices based on them and the resulting suffering of some based on body 
categorization, let me say a few words about the “isms” that follow from bodily identity.  I 
will not address racism and sexism directly but work toward their elimination with closer 
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 For further explorations of the concept of the body, see William R. Lafleur, “Body,” in Critical Terms for 
Religious Studies, ed. Mark C. Taylor (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 36-54; Jörg Splett, 
“Body,” in Sacramentum Mundi, vol. 1, ed. Karl Rahner et al (New York: Herder & Herder, 1971), 233-35; 
Richard H. Roberts, “Body,” in The Blackwell Companion to the Study of Religion, ed. Robert A. Segal 
(Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 213-28; Donn Welton, ed., The Body: Classic and Contemporary 
Readings (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1999).  
40
 The meaning of person is contested.  See Charles E. Winquist, “Person,” in Critical Terms for Religious 
Studies, 225-38.  When I invoke the term here I mean an individual instance of the imago Dei that inhabits both 
a social context and encompasses a deep mystery. 
41
 Some authors make a distinction between black and African American depending on the heritage of the 
person or group in question. 
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attention to the concepts of race and sex/gender.  I enlist sociologist Graham Kinloch’s 
definition of racism and expand it to cover sexism as well.  He writes that racism is 
“uncritical acceptance (through socialization) of a negative social definition of a group 
identified as a race [or sex/gender] on perceived physical grounds along with the legitimacy 
of the discriminatory treatment accompanying that definition.”42  This discriminatory 
treatment includes both individual and structural practices.  It is my project to help us avoid 
such “uncritical acceptance” of these identifications through a more attentive approach to the 
categories that create group identities. 
 Being attentive to the history and language of body categorizations means 
recognizing that the concepts of race and sex/gender shift and change over time.  For 
example, sex has meant the anatomical difference [in reproductive systems] between females 
and males and gender the set of social roles, symbolic functions, and so on, that are assigned 
to this difference.43  This distinction is very much contested now.  The ambiguity is evident 
in scholarly discourse as well as everyday use.  Gender and sex are often used 
interchangeably, for example, when one asks the gender of a newly born child.  Although I 
use the terms masculine and feminine to refer to traditional notions of gender as the 
tendencies of persons within specific sexes, some of the authors I use do not make such a 
distinction and use masculine and feminine, man and woman, and male and female 
interchangeably.  I employ the term sex/gender to reflect that there is debate about the 
meanings of sex and gender and their relationship to each other and the fact that they are 
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 Graham C. Kinloch, The Dynamics of Race Relations: A Sociological Analysis (New York: McGraw-Hill, 
Inc., 1974), 54.  
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 Daniel Boyarin, “Gender,” in Critical Terms for Religious Studies, 117.  See also Mary Ann Tolbert, 
“Gender,” in Handbook of Postmodern Biblical Interpretation, ed. A. K. M. Adam (St. Louis, MO: Chalice 
Press, 2000), 99-105.  
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always in relationship to each other so both must be considered in our analysis of body 
categories.  Sexuality is intimately related to both of these categories.  I do not mean 
sexuality when I use the term sex.  Sexuality is how and with whom one has intimate/sexual 
relationships and involves the concepts of heterosexuality, homosexuality, bisexuality, and so 
on.  This is not a central focus of this dissertation but because it is very much connected to 
race and sex/gender it will arise throughout the project. 
 I introduce the reader to not only theories of sex/gender and race in theology but also 
gender theory and race theory.  These introductions are meant to be just that.  I have chosen 
theorists who present main ideas and central questions for gender and race theory 
recognizing that they are just one voice in these larger disciplines.  I also present black 
feminist theory as a basis for womanist theology, recognizing the debate between black 
feminists and womanists concerning the best self-naming for black female scholars.44  Some 
of these theorists embrace a more modern approach to the body while others self-identify as 
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 Black women in some disciplines are more likely to designate themselves black feminists rather than 
womanists because of a longer development in these disciplines.  Black women scholars in ethics and theology, 
however, are more likely to identify themselves as womanists.  These lines of demarcation are not set and black 
feminists and womanists share in the commitment to analyze and deconstruct at least race, gender, and class 
constructions from the perspective of African American women.  The term womanist originates in the work of 
Alice Walker, most notably in In Search of Our Mothers’ Garden.  Walker locates the term within the black 
female community; uses it to describe such a black woman’s relationships with other women, men, her 
community, and the world; describes a womanist’s loves; and situates womanism in relationship to feminism.  
Those scholars who advocate for the term black feminism contend that black women’s thought and activism is 
better connected to the global feminist agenda.  It both broadens this agenda and disrupts feminism’s racism.  
African American women scholars who embrace the term womanist contend that the feminist movement has 
been a white movement and argue that the term womanist better respects their connection to the whole African 
American community.  Perhaps most importantly, womanists claim that this way of self-naming makes clear 
that at the forefront of their thought is the concrete experience of black women.  This distinguishes them from 
both white feminists and black male scholars.  Many womanist scholars adopt the name because it feels right to 
them; it fits.  See Alice Walker, In Search of Our Mothers’ Gardens: Womanist Prose (San Diego: Harcourt 
Brace Jovanovich, 1983), xi-xii, for Walker’s definition of womanism; Patricia Hill Collins, Fighting Words: 
Black Women and the Search for Justice (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), 63-68, for an 
exploration of the debates between black feminists and womanists; “Christian Ethics and Theology in 
Womanist Perspective,” Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion 5 (Fall 1989): 83-112, for a roundtable 
discussion about the adoption of the term womanist for theology; and Joy James, Shadowboxing: 
Representations of Black Feminist Politics (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), for a mapping of a range of 
black feminisms. 
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postmodern scholars.  Postmodernism is another ambiguous term.  As Colin Campbell 
writes, 
Postmodernism is an exceptionally difficult phenomenon to pin down…As Alex 
Callinicos has suggested, the term is certainly something of a “floating signifier” and 
consequently, in Tom Docherty’s words, “hovers uncertainly in most current writings 
between a difficult philosophical concept and simplistic notion of a certain nihilistic 
tendency in contemporary culture.”  When first used, the term did have a largely accepted 
and determinate meaning, but it has since become “an irredeemably contested concept.”45 
 
A definitive definition of postmodernism is not necessary for this project, but my work 
attends to what Campbell calls North American postmodernism, which includes movements 
that aim to change some aspect of culture because the orthodoxy of “modernity” oppresses 
their members in some way.  These movements are usually named “identity politics” and 
critique the universalism of human identity embraced by modern discourse.46 
 I need to address two final notes about language in this dissertation.  I use the 
pronoun “their” rather than “he or she” to refer back to “person” or “one.”  This seeming lack 
of agreement is my intention.  It reflects the fact that the duality of sex has become 
problematic and I do not want to use language that simply enforces this duality.  I want the 
reader to take note of the tension inherent in discourse about sex/gender.  Finally, I will use 
women’s full last names reflecting before and after marriage with before first whether 
hyphenated or not.  This use reflects the dissertation’s concern with self-naming within such 
constructs as heterosexual marriage.   
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VII. CONCLUSION 
 This chapter has provided an introduction to my project, its presuppositions, 
argument, method, and sources.  Given the obvious relevance and importance of the body in 
its specificity of sex/gender and race for theological study, theologians need tools to help 
those outside of specialized sex/gender and race discourses to incorporate an adequate 
analysis of the body into their theology.  I am proposing a tool that helps theologians think 
about sex/gender and race in a way that embraces the complexity of these concepts and 
realities and brings them together for theological anthropology.  There are great thinkers out 
there creating new ways of thinking about the body and I welcome and celebrate their work.  
I try to embody some of that theory for I find it challenging and exciting, and I believe it 
could be freeing to many others in their own struggles with identity.  This project gives me 
the opportunity to bring my theological learning to bear on the questions of my life and 
contribute to a larger conversation intended to alleviate oppressions that body-persons 
experience.  This liberation allows all persons to more fully embody and experience the 
Spirit of God within and among us. 
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To claim that the materiality of sex is constructed through a ritualized repetition of norms is 
hardly a self-evident claim.  Indeed, our customary notions of “construction” seem to get in 
the way of understanding such a claim.  For surely bodies live and die; eat and sleep; feel 
pain, pleasure; endure illness and violence; and these “facts,” one might skeptically proclaim, 
cannot be dismissed as mere constructions.  Surely there must be some kind of necessity that 
accompanies these primary and irrefutable experiences.  And surely there is.  But their 
irrefutability in no way implies what it might mean to affirm them and through what 
discursive means.  Moreover, why is it that what is constructed is understood as an artificial 
and dispensable character? 
 Judith Butler, Bodies That Matter1 
 
 
CHAPTER 2:  SEX/GENDER AND THEOLOGY 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 The first step in my proposal of considering the body as symbol explores how the 
body is constructed in and by its temporal and spatial location.  The concept of construction 
invites reflection on the degree to which the materiality of the body is established within and 
by means of social discourse as well as the meaning and significance attributed to identity 
markers such as sex/gender and race that categorize this materiality.  This chapter 
specifically focuses on the degree of bodily construction by exploring the extent to which the 
identity categories sex and gender are constructed in different theories of sex/gender.  Using 
construction as an organizing principle illuminates the differences in the theories as well as 
how each theory flows from and informs the theologian’s or theorist’s method and goals.  
This investigation into different theories of sex/gender can help theologians better understand 
their own, perhaps until now unacknowledged, theory of sex/gender and the relevance and 
significance of a consideration of sex/gender for all theological investigation. 
 The starting point for any gender theory is the identity categories described as sex and 
gender.  Sex refers here to the materiality of the body usually defined in terms of biology, 
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 Judith Butler, Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex” (New York: Routledge, 1993), x-xi. 
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which classifies persons as either female or male.  Gender indicates how female and male 
bodies do or should live this dyadic sexual differentiation.  Descriptors such as feminine and 
masculine fall under the domain of gender.  Sex/gender written together invites consideration 
of the relationship of the two and recognizes that both must be considered in any approach to 
body-persons.  A gender theory is an explanation of the meaning and significance of these 
categories of identity.  The work of philosopher Judith Butler is a helpful guide in 
approaching theories of sex/gender.2  Butler maintains that although different discourses set 
limits to the analysis of gender based on their presuppositions and basic tenets, there are 
some basic questions that all theories of sex/gender should address. 
 Gender theories must attend to the very notion of the person and the relationship of 
the person and their materiality.  How does the subject come to be and what is the role of the 
concepts of sex/gender in this process?  Is the person someone embodied, creating a division 
between the substance of the person and their material reality or is there no such distinction?  
Is the subject a person who is the bearer of essential and nonessential attributes or do these 
attributes constitute a subject?  These initial questions about the relationship of the person 
and their materiality lead to more specific questions regarding the relationship between the 
identity categories of sex and gender.  The central issue is whether there is or should be a 
distinction between sex and gender.3  Is sex to nature as gender is to culture?  Is there a 
precultural, prediscursive “nature” to identity or is “nature” produced?  Questions like this 
disclose varied understandings of ontology underlying different gender theories. 
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 I rely especially on Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (New York: 
Routledge, 1990).   
3
 Butler herself makes no distinction between the two but discusses how Lévi-Strauss’ structuralist 
anthropology with its nature/culture distinction was appropriated by some feminists to create a sex/gender 
distinction.  See Butler, Gender Trouble, 36-37. 
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Gender theories begin in the reality that all people are assigned to one of two sexes, 
and intend to explain whether and why this binary is problematic.  This discussion includes 
reflection on the normativity of heterosexuality, which the binary approach to human living 
establishes and reinforces.  Discussion of sexuality goes hand in hand with discussions of sex 
and gender since any gender theory will critique sexual practices.4  Reflections on 
heterosexuality and the binary categorization of sex force attention to the very meanings of 
“female,” “woman,” “male,” and “man.”  There is disagreement in gender theory about what 
does and should constitute these categories.  Do they establish an individual’s primary 
identity or establish cross-cultural constituencies?  Butler challenges gender theorists to 
decide whether “unity” of subject or constituency is a presupposition, a goal, a provisional 
status around action, or an impossibility.  Gender theorists should contend with how other 
identity markers, such as race, class, ethnicity, and sexuality, intersect with sex/gender.  Such 
an investigation is especially important for feminist liberation theologians because various 
identity categories have been used to oppress groups of people throughout history.  Theories 
of sex/gender should explore if and how people have been limited by the meaning assigned 
to their materiality, and if and how our understandings of the categories of sex and gender 
can and should be changed in order to bring about a fuller life for all body-persons. 
 The theologians and theorist I include in this chapter have different answers to the 
questions involved in proposing a gender theory.  These differences emerge from their 
various interpretations of the degree to which the identity categories of sex and gender are 
socially constructed.  The first theory claims that neither sex nor gender are socially 
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 Butler cites Michel Foucault’s argument that the mode of sexuality in fact constructs the very category of sex.  
See Butler, Gender Trouble, 23.  Foucault makes this assertion in the closing chapter of the first volume of The 
History of Sexuality, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978); and in the introduction to 
Herculine Barbin, Being the Recently Discovered Journals of a Nineteenth-Century Hermaphrodite, trans. 
Richard McDougall (New York: Colophon, 1980). 
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constructed but have ontological and transcendent meaning outside of any specific social 
discourse.  This first approach to sex/gender is articulated in Pope John Paul II’s theology of 
the body.5  The second answer treats sex as an unconstructed biological fact but defines 
gender as the socially constructed way of living our sexed reality.  The second theory finds 
voice in the ethical approach of Lisa Sowle Cahill.  The third approach argues that both sex 
and gender have been constructed to support a system of oppression; but that some form of 
these constructions must be maintained in order to overcome this oppression.  Biblical 
theologian Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza explores this third theory.  The final consideration of 
sex/gender in this chapter defines the very materialization of sex and its corresponding 
articulations of gender as socially constructed phenomena.  Philosopher Judith Butler 
presents this final approach.  These authors have been chosen because their work articulates 
examples of four general theories of sex/gender.  The theories themselves are the focus of 
this chapter, not the specific theologians or theorist chosen to articulate it.  My presentation 
of their work is not meant to be exhaustive nor intended to define their approach to 
sex/gender once and for all. 
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 John Paul II is the only theologian included in this chapter that is not a feminist scholar.  There is much debate 
about whether John Paul II’s pontificate took a pro- or anti-woman stance, and opinions differ depending on 
whether one agrees with John Paul that there is some kind of fundamental difference between men and women 
that does and should affect the living of life.  Feminist theologians such as Rosemary Radford Ruether view 
John Paul II’s pontificate as a time of reactionary backlash in matters having to do with the status of women in 
the church.  See “John Paul II and the Growing Alienation of Women from the Church,” in Church in Anguish: 
Has the Vatican Betrayed Vatican II?, eds. Hans Küng and Leonard Swidler (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 
1987), 279-83.  Lisa Sowle Cahill, however, points out that John Paul II has defended the equality and rights of 
women in the family and in society to an extent far exceeding the teaching of previous pontiffs.  See “The 
Feminist Pope,” in Does Christianity Teach Male Headship?: The Equal-Regard Marriage and Its Critics, eds. 
David Blankenhorn, Don Browning, and Mary Stewart Van Leeuwen (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans 
Publishing Co., 2004), 40-48.  Other women scholars who also understand John Paul to be pro-women have 
taken up his challenge to build a “new feminism” in Michele Schumacher, ed., Women in Christ: Toward a New 
Feminism (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2004).  
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II. THEORIES OF SEX/GENDER 
No Construction 
 This first theory of sex/gender claims that neither sex nor gender is constructed in or 
by their social context.  An example of this theory is found in The Theology of the Body: 
Human Love in the Divine Plan by Pope John Paul II.  The body is central in John Paul II’s 
theology. 6  His exploration of the body does not simply discuss the body in general but 
addresses its specificity in terms of sex/gender.   In The Theology of the Body, John Paul II 
argues that both sex and gender have transcendent and ontological meaning fashioned and 
intended by God in the original creation for all times.  Therefore, John Paul II’s method for 
explaining the body in its sexed/gendered reality is exegesis and commentary on the stories 
of Genesis.7  John Paul II argues that in these stories is revealed the absolute originality and 
truth of what the male and female human being is.  These primordial experiences are treated 
as the root of every human experience.  John Paul II’s method for reflection on the body 
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 In a commentary on John Paul II’s theology of the body, Christopher West writes, “The length of this 
catechesis [The Theology of the Body] and its place as the inaugural teaching project of John Paul II’s 
pontificate points to its fundamental significance.  In fact, the theological vision detailed in these addresses 
informs all his subsequent papal teachings.  We have not fully penetrated the teachings of John Paul II if we 
have not penetrated his theology of the body.”  See Christopher West, Theology of the Body Explained: A 
Commentary on John Paul II’s “Gospel of the Body” (Boston: Pauline Books and Media, 2003), 5. 
7
 The Genesis commentary begins with reference to Matthew 19 and Mark 10 where Jesus is answering 
questions about the indissolubility of marriage.  In his answers, Jesus references “the beginning.”  John Paul II 
picks up on this reference and explains how that conversation about marriage has its roots in the creation stories 
of Genesis.  He further explores Genesis with reference to the Gospel story of Mt 5:27-28 and the topic of lust 
and adultery.  John Paul’s method is not considered critical biblical scholarship.  Although he is in favor of 
historical critical method, John Paul does not usually employ it because he is more interested in the divine 
meaning of the text rather than the human meaning.  It is widely agreed that John Paul’s method of interpreting 
scripture is meditative and homiletic reflection.  His use of the Bible treats it as a unified whole.  His biblical 
reflection on Genesis is not based on a literal reading of these stories.  He categorizes the accounts as mythical, 
not in its meaning of fabulous, but rather as an archaic way of expressing a deeper content.  For more on John 
Paul II’s use of scripture, see Charles E. Curran, “John Paul II’s Use of Scripture in His Moral Teaching,” 
Horizon 31 (Spring 2004): 118-34; Michael Waldstein, trans., Man and Woman He Created Them: A Theology 
of the Body, by John Paul II (Boston: Pauline Books and Media, 2006), 18-23; and William S. Kurz, “The 
Scriptural Foundations of The Theology of the Body,”  in Pope John Paul II on the Body: Human, Eucharistic, 
Ecclesial: Festschrift Avery Cardinal Dulles, S.J., ed. John M. McDermott and John Gavin (Philadelphia: Saint 
Joseph’s University Press, 2007), 27-46.  
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represents his overall belief that there is something to be known about the body beyond 
specific historical experiences of it.   
John Paul II considers both creation accounts in his development of a theology of the 
body and what I am calling his gender theory.  He understands there to be no contradiction 
between these accounts but explains them as two ways of exploring the reality and meaning 
of humanity.  The first account, Gn 1:1-2, 4, simply gives the objective facts about the 
creation of humanity: created male and female; created in the image of God; created to be 
fruitful and multiply (and fill, subdue, and have dominion over the earth); and seen by God as 
good.  The second account, Gn 2:5-25, has a subjective character and is concerned with 
humanity’s self-knowledge.  John Paul II maintains that the subjectivity of this second 
account corresponds to the objective reality of the first account.  Both are significant for his 
theology of the body and his gender theory but he focuses much more on the second account. 
As leader of the Roman Catholic Church, Pope John Paul II’s approach to the body 
was intended to support and defend the Church’s teaching on sexuality, marriage, and family 
life.8  John Paul II’s gender theory, explicated from his overall theology of the body, includes 
the teaching that heterosexuality within monogamous marriage with an openness to 
reproduction is the only acceptable form of sexuality.  According to John Paul II, these are 
the divine intentions for human bodies found in the scriptures and revealed by the body 
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 John Paul II addresses the complementarity of women and men in terms of marriage and the family in his 
Apostolic Exhortation Familiaris Consortio and his Apostolic Letter Mulieris Dignitatem.  In addition, his 
approach to the body supports the teachings of Humanae Vitae, which restrict the use of contraception for 
Catholics and supports the Church’s ban on homosexual relationships.  For more on John Paul’s teaching on 
sexuality, marriage, and the family, see Janet E. Smith, “Pope John Paul II and Humane Vitae,” and John F. 
Crosby, “The Personalism of John Paul II as the Basis of His Approach to the Teaching of Humanae Vitae,” in 
Why Humanae Vitae was Right: A Reader, ed. Janet E. Smith (San Francisco: Ignatius, 1993), 229-50, 195-225; 
Ronald E. Modras, “Pope John Paul II’s Theology of the Body,” in The Vatican and Homosexuality: Reactions 
to the “Letter to the Bishops of the Catholic Church on the Pastoral Care of Homosexual Persons,” ed. 
Jeannine Gramick and Pat Furey (New York: Crossroad, 1988), 119-25; Richard M. Hogan and John M. 
LeVoir, Covenant of Love: Pope John Paul II on Sexuality, Marriage, and Family in the Modern World (San 
Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1992); and Michael J. Wrenn, Pope John Paul II and the Family (Chicago: 
Franciscan Herald Press, 1983).  
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itself.9  The goal of his theology of the body and its gender theory is to explain the true 
understanding of human life intended by God from the beginning so people can take steps to 
live this meaning authentically in their lives according to church teachings. 
John Paul II’s gender theory argues that a fundamental fact of human existence is that 
at every stage of its history God “created them male and female.”  He contends that God 
always creates humanity in this way and that they are always such.  For John Paul II, the fact 
that humanity is divinely intended to be male and female is revealed in the Genesis account 
of both humanity’s original solitude, ‘adam alone, and its original unity, the creation of male 
and female.  Humanity’s original solitude includes the events from the creation of the first 
person to the creation of the woman as such (Gn 2:7-2:20).  John Paul II starts his theology 
of the body from a consideration of the human person alone before considering sex as a 
human marker.  He argues that the first human being, ‘adam, is not yet specifically 
sexed/gendered but embodies both male and female humanity.10  Both male and female 
participate in the original solitude so that all that is said about the person before the duality of 
sex is affirmed in both the male and the female after the duality is established. 
John Paul II assigns two meanings to original solitude, one about the general meaning 
of personhood and the other about the necessity of male-female sexual differentiation for this 
                                                 
9
 John Paul II’s exegesis of Genesis, especially Gn 2:24, “Therefore a man leaves his father and his mother and 
clings to his wife, and they become one flesh,” leads him to conclude that the finality of man’s masculinity and 
femininity is in the life of the spouses-parents, that man and woman are created for marriage.  Later in The 
Theology of the Body, John Paul II does address the choice of celibacy in light of these reflections on Genesis.  
John Paul II describes the choice of celibacy as a “charismatic orientation” toward that eschatological state in 
which men “Neither marry nor are given in marriage” (Mk 12:25).  The same anthropology remains.  The 
person remains “dual” by nature (directed as man toward woman and as woman toward man), but is capable of 
discovering in their solitude a form of communion.  The reciprocal “for” of man and woman can also be at the 
basis of continence “for” the kingdom of heaven.  The person fully rediscovers self through a sincere gift of self 
totally to Christ.  See John Paul II, The Theology of the Body, 262-303. 
10
 John Paul II notes that it is significant that the first man (‘adam), created from “dust from the ground,” is 
defined as a “male” (‘is) only after the creation of the first woman.  The bible calls the first human being “man” 
(‘adam), but from the moment of the creation of the first woman, it begins to call him “man” (ish), in relation to 
ishshah (“woman,” because she was taken from the man – ish).  John Paul II, Theology of the Body, 30, 35.  
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personhood.   By means of the body ‘adam moves out into the world in a search for identity.   
In original solitude, the human being realizes through the body that they are different from 
the other creatures and alone.  The human being discovers their own superiority to the other 
creatures in that the human is capable of “tilling” the earth and transforming it according to 
their own needs.  The human way of participating in the visible world, through their body, 
leads them to the conclusion that they alone are created in the image of God.  The experience 
of the body teaches the human being that they are both beyond the visible world as the image 
of God, but still of this world as a corporal being.  In original solitude, the human being 
searches for an identity that reflects both of these realities and finds it in the realization of 
themselves as a person.   
As a person, the original human being yearns for communion with another person.  
John Paul II contends that right from the beginning the human person is moving toward 
relationship and the overcoming of the frontier of solitude.  As the image and likeness of 
God, the original person represents all humanity and embodies the unity of the male and 
female.  The person recognizes their humanity as male and female and longs for communion 
between the two with another person.  John Paul II argues that humanity requires the dualism 
of sex, which is fully achieved in the creation of the second person and the sexing and 
gendering of the first, in order for humanity to overcome its original solitude.   
John Paul II maintains that the sleep of the first person which precedes the creation of 
humanity as male and female is a return to the moment preceding the creation, a return to 
non-being.11  It is the creation of humanity as male and female which represents the 
“definitive” creation of humanity as it gives life to that communio personarum that man and 
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 John Paul II, The Theology of the Body, 44. 
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woman form.12  He makes special note that in the biblical text, upon awakening, the human 
person expresses joy in the other person, in the second “self,” and the person recognizes their 
shared humanity not their difference.  This is the “helper fit for him.”  John Paul II translates 
this notion of help to have the meaning of exact correspondence in a way that supports his 
definition of gender relation(ship)s as complementarity.13  In this original unity there is 
absolute trust and recognition of completeness between the male and female.  This original 
unity affirms everything that constitutes the person in solitude; the communion can only be 
formed on the basis of double solitude.  The Fall interrupts the total trust that is represented 
by original nakedness in the original unity.  The male and female are then divided and 
opposed to one another rather than united.  They become estranged from the body, both their 
own and the other’s.  It is then that the male becomes “husband” and rules over the woman. 
John Paul II explains that Genesis reveals that human beings are not meant for the 
antagonism between the sexes that the Fall brings.  Rather, persons are meant for communion 
and intimacy.  He argues that the body calls out for unity in original solitude and in original 
unity because human beings realize their essence by existing with and for someone.  This is 
the nuptial meaning of the body, which is John Paul II’s central understanding of materiality 
and the basis of his gender theory.  He explains the relationship between man and woman as 
the quintessential example of this.  The original person had to reawaken as two, male and 
female, to attain this relationship because no animalia offered man the possibility to exist in a 
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 John Paul II, The Theology of the Body, 45-46.  John Paul II maintains the equality of the two sexes.  In John 
Paul II’s theology of the body, these equal but different incarnations of the human as male and female form a 
communio personarum.  He explains that communio is a better descriptor than community since it underlines 
the notion of the person “beside” or “for” the other person. 
13
 John Paul II writes that it is difficult to translate the Hebrew expression cezer kenegdô.  The English is “a 
helper fit for him.”  He maintains the term suggests “complementarity,” or better, of “exact correspondence,” 
and expresses the reciprocity in existence (because of double solitude), which no other living being could have 
ensured.  John Paul II, The Theology of the Body, 96.   
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relationship of mutual giving.14  The man and woman gift their masculinity and femininity to 
each other and in this way come to know their essence.  The woman was given by the creator 
to the man and accepted by the man as a gift the way the Creator wished her to be “for her 
own sake.”  In her continued giving of herself woman rediscovers herself.  In receiving the 
woman as a gift in the full truth of her person and femininity, the man enriches her.  Man 
gives himself in response to woman and is thereby also enriched through the gift of self in his 
masculinity, which the woman also receives and welcomes, and the mutual relationship is 
now established.15  John Paul II writes that this giving and this accepting of the gift 
interpenetrate, so that the giving itself becomes accepting and the acceptance is transformed 
into giving.  One finds oneself in giving oneself and this “possession of self” becomes the 
source of a new giving of oneself.  It is only in and through the body that this giving and 
receiving can occur because it is through the body that the human person expresses 
themselves.   
In both original solitude and original unity, human beings are the duality of male and 
female.  In original solitude the person embodies both the male and female as the full image 
and likeness of God and as the basis for the communion of persons for which the person 
longs.  In original unity the male and female live out their mutuality for each other and reflect 
the complementary duality at the heart of human being.  John Paul II’s analysis of Genesis 
argues that the two creation stories do not contradict each other but rather give both the 
objective and subjective meaning of creation.  Physical sex, that humanity was created male 
and female in the beginning, is understood by John Paul II to be both objective and 
subjective and includes within itself both sex and gender.  He reads the creation accounts as 
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 John Paul II, The Theology of the Body, 60. 
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 Ibid., 71. 
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revealing that it is the Creator’s decision that the human being should always and only exist 
as a woman or a man.  The reality of two sexes is an objective fact of creation as evidenced 
in the first creation account.  He contends that sex is a constituent part of a person and not 
merely an attribute as evidenced in the second account.  The person is deeply constituted by 
the body as “he” or “she.”16   
The nuptial meaning of the body includes not just sex but also what some would call 
gender.  John Paul II does not separate sex from gender since each biological sex has a 
corresponding and appropriate gender.  He writes that sex decides not only the somatic 
individuality of man, but defines at the same time his personal identity and concreteness.17  
We live our unique and unrepeatable self within the specificity of our sex/gender.  In 
addition, we are for and with each other in this same specificity.  John Paul II contends that 
femininity finds itself in the presence of masculinity and masculinity is confirmed through 
femininity.18  Human life is dependent on what she will be for him and he for her.   
Sex/gender in John Paul II’s gender theory is the foundation on which human life is 
built and understood.  Sex/gender has been given its meaning by God not human beings.  We 
express ourselves in and through our sex/gender but we do not create or construct the 
meaning of sex/gender as such.  John Paul II’s theology of the body is not concerned with 
specific historical articulations of sex/gender but with their true meaning revealed in the 
mystery of creation.  This true meaning is ontological and transcendent of time and place.  
The true meaning of the body is beyond any specific articulation of it yet this meaning is 
present in all articulations.  John Paul II recognizes that the sinfulness of historical humanity 
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 John Paul II, The Theology of the Body, 49.  He writes that the constitution of the woman is different as 
compared to the man and that we know today that it is different even in the deepest bio-physiological 
determinants.  John Paul II, The Theology of the Body, 81. 
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 Ibid., 79. 
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can distort our understandings of sex/gender but that does not negate that they have true 
meanings, which is understood in light of scripture and the Church’s interpretation of it.19  
The body expresses the divine intention for humanity.  The body reveals the unique being 
willed for their own sake and enables this being to participate in the communio personarum 
willed by the Creator for them, and to live out the nuptial meaning of the body.   
 
Gender Constructed 
A second theory of sex/gender states that sex is not a social construction but gender 
is.  Lisa Sowle Cahill’s work, Sex, Gender and Christian Ethics, represents this approach to 
sex/gender.20  Like John Paul II, Sowle Cahill approaches the body in its specificity of 
sex/gender as a crucial theological topic.  Sex and gender are treated as foundational 
questions for Sowle Cahill’s Christian ethics and considered central to any ethical discourse 
and a base on which to build this discourse.  Sowle Cahill presents the materiality of the body 
as a cross-cultural point of contact because she understands the differentiation of the human 
body into the male and female sexes which cooperate for reproduction as a cross-cultural 
phenomenon that is invariant over time.  The sexual differentiation of men and women is 
given form by cultural institutions such as family and marriage.  Gender is this cultural 
translation of sex, and as such, a socially constructed phenomenon.  This approach to 
sex/gender argues that although people cannot change the reality of sex, they can debate and 
judge different interpretations of gender and the institutions that give form to them. 
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 John Paul II writes that systematic theology discerns two antithetical situations or two different states of 
human nature before and after the transgression of Genesis.  The former is the state of integral nature and the 
latter the state of sin in which historical humanity always finds itself.  He contends, however, that the reality of 
historical humanity has its roots in and always references the state of original innocence.  There remains 
continuity between the two because although we are closed to original innocence we are open to the mystery of 
redemption.  John Paul II, The Theology of the Body, 31. 
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 Lisa Sowle Cahill, Sex, Gender and Christian Ethics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
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Sowle Cahill employs a theological method she calls critical realism.  She presents it 
as a response to postmodern critique, which she argues cannot make objective moral 
assessments because it gives equal validity to a plurality of moral foundations and agendas.21  
Sowle Cahill maintains that ethicists must rediscover or reinvent some account of 
knowledge, truth, and the “universals” of human experience that is reasonably objective in 
order to make moral judgments.  Her method proposes a modified objectivity that recognizes 
that culturally relative assumptions are not timeless absolutes and all judgments are 
potentially revisable.  However, normative proposals for human living can be made based on 
reasonable reflection on human experience within historical existence.  She traces her 
approach to the ethical tradition found in Aquinas’ interpretation of Aristotle.  Such a method 
requires generalizations about human life in order to condemn some moral and cultural 
practices and promote others.  Sowle Cahill proposes the sexed and gendered body as a 
foundation for these generalizations.  Because she describes the human body as such and in 
its physiology as relatively invariant over time, she can use it as a common point of contact 
for all people.  Two examples of this invariance according to Sowle Cahill are the 
differentiation of the human race into two sexes and the male-female sexual union to produce 
children.22   
 The goal of Sowle Cahill’s ethical project is to promote human flourishing across 
cultures.  Human flourishing, according to Sowle Cahill, requires equality and compassion, 
including equality between the sexes.  She argues that how sex is socialized into gender can 
create impediments or possibilities for human flourishing.  Therefore, Christian theology 
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 Sowle Cahill describes the postmodern sensibility as marked by randomness, fragmentation, distrust of all 
“meta-narratives,” self-irony and irreverence, and countercultural politics.  She argues that postmodern thought 
defines the “foundations” it rejects too narrowly, and therefore can rebut only some understandings of moral 
objectivity and universality.  Sowle Cahill, Sex, Gender and Christian Ethics, 14, 18. 
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 Sowle Cahill, Sex, Gender and Christian Ethics, 79. 
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must give careful attention to these socializations.  While she acknowledges that modernity 
played a large part in teaching people to recognize and prize freedom and the equality of 
persons, she proposes that Christianity can help people mold these values with compassion 
and solidarity.  She admits that the Christian tradition has not gone far enough in 
implementing and supporting the range of ecclesial, familial, and social changes that 
women’s equality requires.  However, she still maintains that Christianity has much to add to 
the discussion and realization of this equality.  What it has to add is the kingdom preaching 
of Jesus that invites people to transform their personal relationships into relationships based 
on compassion and inclusiveness.  Sowle Cahill reads New Testament instructions about sex 
and gender as a challenge to hierarchy within and outside the family.  Early Christians were 
resocialized from the patriarchal family of society and the state to the new family of brothers 
and sisters in Christ.23   
Sowle Cahill proposes that the equality between the sexes that human flourishing 
requires does not call for disregarding or contesting differences between men and women.  
She understands these differences as not only an opportunity to bring about equality and 
mutuality between the sexes but their recognition a necessity for this equality.  Therefore, her 
project is not to deconstruct sex but to critique the institutionalization of sexual 
differentiation.  She proposes a feminist ethical critique of social institutions that construct 
gender in ways that create unequal relations between men and women, including marriage 
and family forms.  The question becomes how to socialize the body in order to promote 
equality and compassion. 
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 Sowle Cahill, Sex, Gender and Christian Ethics, 150.  She reads the gospel stories and actions as responding 
to and challenging the highly stratified social relationships of their time, including that of the Greco-Roman 
family.   
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 Sowle Cahill posits that in order for widespread ethical dialogue about human 
flourishing to exist, people must recognize their commonality.  She fears that the current 
focus on diversity is becoming so extreme that there is not ample attention to connections 
and shared reality between people, even that of bodily reality.  Her project uses the body not 
as something that isolates us through radical individualization, but what unites us in our 
humanity.  She writes that it is in and through the most basic and widespread forms of our 
materiality that human beings have “common sense” access to the experience of other human 
individuals.24  Sowle Cahill proposes that human commonality can be found in the fact that 
each human person experiences a naturally occurring sex that is then gendered by common 
social institutions.  This is the foundation of her gender theory. 
 For Sowle Cahill sex originates in and comes back to the reproductive organs.  The 
sexual differentiation of the body is naturally occurring and shared by all people.  Although 
she does not dismiss individuality, she does not view the body as infinitely malleable or in 
some way unique to each individual.  She recognizes that to speak of sex, or the basic 
materiality of the body, as a fundamental reality is considered an interpretation of it; so part 
of her project is to re-establish the body’s stability.  Although she would allow that sexuality 
may extend itself in pluriform and diffuse ways, she maintains that to suggest that “there is 
no such thing as ‘sex,’ or that sex in humans has no intrinsic connection to reproductive 
physiology, is more rhetorical than factual.  Such a claim could only be maintained on the 
basis of an abrupt break between humanity and other mammalian species.”25  For Sowle 
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 Sowle Cahill, Sex, Gender and Christian Ethics, 76. 
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 Ibid., 111.  Sowle Cahill is writing in response to what she defines as the radical claims of such thinkers as 
Michel Foucault and Judith Butler who would contest the foundationalism of a shared, two-sexed material 
reality.   She notes that Foucault “even suggests in a few more extravagant passages that the human body itself 
is not a cultural constant.”  Ibid., 22. 
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Cahill, sex is a basic experience of embodied individuals.  Sex is not socially constructed but 
something on which culture operates.   
Sowle Cahill contends that there are innate differences between the sexes that always 
and everywhere inform identity.  She holds that a feminist ethics should recognize that 
women’s sexual and reproductive experience sets them apart from men as well as binds 
women together historically.  The question then focuses on the consequences of the different 
embodiment of men and women.  Sowle Cahill contends that although bodily difference does 
affect our sense of self and how we live, it does not necessarily establish social roles or imply 
a hierarchy of the sexes.26   She does not want to be labeled as a biological determinist.  She 
recognizes that an ethics that considers “natural” tendencies must integrate the reality of 
biological urges with the equally human capacity for love, commitment, fidelity, and 
compassion. 
Sowle Cahill acknowledges that selfhood includes not only sex but the socialization 
of sex that all humans experience.  The sexed body is always socialized in cultural 
institutions which channel its expression.  On the one hand, this socialization is culturally 
various leading to a diversity in how bodily realities are experienced.  On the other hand, the 
process of this socialization itself produces parallel institutions among cultures, such as the 
family and clan, which, though distinct, are familiar to all.  The experience of these common 
institutions presents another junction for cross-cultural discourse.  Although Sowle Cahill 
here differentiates gender from sex, she maintains that they are always related.  Gender is 
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 Sowle Cahill grants that sexual dimorphism need not provide the basic category for organizing human 
persons into social relations.  She admits that focusing on sex and sexual reproduction may, as Foucault warned, 
endow sex with a disproportionate centrality among human experiences and goods.  However, she maintains 
that since sex is used as a social marker, ethics must address it as such. Sowle Cahill, Sex, Gender and Christian 
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based on the biological tendencies, capacities, and differences of sex and the social ties that 
sex creates.27   
Lisa Sowle Cahill’s gender theory incorporates the idea of construction.  Although 
sexual differentiation is not socially constructed, gender is.  This construction is not ex nihilo, 
as she reads postmodern critique, but based on the differences between the sexes.  For Sowle 
Cahill basic facts of biology must be central to discourse about sex and gender.  Her work 
approaches the body as a symbol of both naturally occurring sexual differentiation and of the 
social order in which it is found.28  This makes the body both invariant and changing.  Sexual 
differentiation is a constant of bodily reality.  It expresses the commonality all people share 
with each other.   But the body also expresses its local context and its historical placement 
because customs of gender are many and varied.  How cultural communities socialize sexual 
differentiation will constantly shift because no historical understanding of gender 
encompasses the final way men and women should live their bodies.  However, on Sowle 
Cahill’s account the process of socialization is also a point of contact between people of 
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 Sowle Cahill, Sex, Gender and Christian Ethics, 89.  Sowle Cahill builds her sexual ethics around the claim 
that heterosexuality within committed marriage that nurtures children is the sexual ideal for individual persons 
and society in general.  She contends that it is not her intent to use an ideal of committed, parental sex to 
condemn, exclude, or cast into the shadows “nonconformists,” but to reflect on how and when to justify 
exceptions.  Her views on homosexual relationships are also based on the belief in some kind of innate 
differences between the sexes.  In addition, the innateness or social construction of homosexuality has bearing 
on its moral evaluation.  As personally “natural” and a “given” to those who experience it, a sexual drive 
towards persons of the same sex should be channeled by the moral values which humanize heterosexual 
relationships, that is, respect, reciprocity, love, and commitment.  If it is the case that sexual orientation is in 
fact pliable, then the question returns of the moral warrants which would make sexual object choice 
commendable, condemnable, tolerable, or neutral.  The importance of male-female reciprocity and reproductive 
potential as enriching or completing sexual relations would return as contentious questions.  Ibid., 97-119.  For 
more on her analysis of homosexuality, see Lisa Sowle Cahill, “Homosexuality: A Case Study in Moral 
Argument,” in Homosexuality in the Church: Both Sides of the Debate, ed. Jeffrey S. Siker (Louisville, KY: 
Westminster/John Knox Pr, 1994), 61-75.  
28
 Sowle Cahill appropriates this idea from the work of Mary Douglas who maintains that, since “the human 
body is always treated as an image of society,” there thus “can be no natural way of considering the body that 
does not involve at the same time a social dimension.”  See Sowle Cahill, Sex, Gender and Christian Ethics, 
130-31; and Mary Douglas, Natural Symbols: Explorations in Cosmology, rev. ed. (London: Barrie and Jenkins, 
1973), 98.  See more on Douglas’ work in Chapter 5 of this dissertation. 
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different cultures.  The body, then, serves as an anchor for cross-cultural ethical dialogue in 
both its sex and gender. 
Sowle Cahill’s Christian ethical project critiques how we gender sexually 
differentiated bodies in order to promote equality between men and women.  If a process of 
gendering does not produce bodies that express equality and compassion, it must be 
challenged and changed.  Although she recognizes that for women the institutions of family 
and marriage can be limiting and sometimes dangerous arenas, she does not believe that 
bodies need to be liberated from all social control.29  What people need to do is live social 
institutions differently.  Sowle Cahill calls on contemporary Christians to emulate the witness 
to social challenge of their early biblical counterparts.  These initial Christian communities 
recognized that how they lived family life could transform larger social patterns and 
expectations.  They embraced a communal vision of the body as well as alternatives to 
hierarchy and domination in the family and society. Christians in today’s world must find 
ways to bring about social transformation based on fundamental Christian values of 
compassion and solidarity.  This transformation does not require the denial or deconstruction 
of sexual differentiation, but it does require the rejection of patriarchy that survives in and 
through the social mediation of biological reproduction.  According to Sowle Cahill, 
Christians can upset exploitative, oppressive, and dehumanizing relationships in any culture 
and the institutions that support them by living the institutions of family and marriage which 
gender sexed bodies in a more reciprocal and compassionate way.30  The question for Sowle 
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 Sowle Cahill writes, “In relation to sex and gender, an insistence on pragmatic self-determination which is 
individualist and asocial can also permit exploitation by tacit yet tenacious sexist attitudes which survive under 
a veneer of women’s rights, masking a deeper lack of public investment in the positive welfare of women, 
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 Sowle Cahill expands her reflections on the Christian family, its inheritance from Christian history, its diverse 
articulations today, and its challenges in contemporary society in Family: A Christian Social Perspective 
(Minneapolis: Fortress, 2000). 
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Cahill is not whether the body is gendered in different ways, therefore representing different 
social systems, but rather what sort of society the body represents and what value judgment 
we can bring to bear concerning ways of being bodies.  This second theory of sex/gender 
calls for engagement with the variety of gender socialization, but for acceptance of the 
constancy of dyadic sexual differentiation. 
 
Sex/Gender System Constructed 
The next theory of sex/gender posits that the meaning and significance of both 
biological sex and its cultural articulation as gender are social constructions.  Advocates of 
this approach to sex/gender retain the term and reality of women as a political rallying point 
against the oppression that the constructed sex/gender system creates and supports.  This 
recognition of a reality of woman is meant to appreciate the continuing influence of the 
sex/gender system on our lives and identity even though the hope is to shift our intellectual 
focus away from sex/gender identity to frameworks that focus on alleviating oppression in all 
its forms.  Such an approach to sex/gender is outlined in the theology of Elisabeth Schüssler 
Fiorenza.31  Schüssler Fiorenza argues that theologians must address the construction of 
sex/gender because it contributes and supports systems of oppression.  In the name of 
liberation from this oppression, she advocates for the deconstruction of the Western 
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sex/gender system in order to understand how it oppresses as well as the discovery of 
avenues for changing how we think about body-persons.32   
Schüssler Fiorenza defends the importance of thinking about body categorization for 
biblical studies and theology.  She argues that the meaning and significance given to different 
bodies is an integral aspect of the meaning of ancient texts and their past and current 
interpretations.  The rhetorical and political goals of authors and interpreters are to construct 
bodies to fit the social and ecclesial structures these agents support.  The history bequeathed 
to us by these texts and their interpretations encode certain ideas onto bodies and create 
commonsense and “natural” understandings about which bodies rule and which bodies are 
oppressed.  She advocates an approach to reading ancient texts as well as the bodies they 
construct that undermines interpretations that lead to oppression and supports liberation from 
this oppression.  She claims that this can be done because all texts, including bodies, are 
ambiguous and allow for reading against the grain.   
Schüssler Fiorenza names her theological method a Critical Feminist Liberation 
Theology.33  This method challenges any reading of biblical texts and the theology based on 
it that oppresses women or other traditional “nonpersons.”  Schüssler Fiorenza has a critical 
approach to history, biblical texts, and bodies.  She defines all three as sites of struggle for 
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 Schüssler Fiorenza recognizes that any sex/gender system is localized and formed in a specific history, 
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authority and meaning.  History for Schüssler Fiorenza is never the objective reporting of 
“facts.”  The texts that are our history are consciously constructed narratives that reflect the 
interests and social location of the author as well as the historians and exegetes who interpret 
them.  They are stories about power relations, with “winners” ensuring how the “facts” are 
reported and remembered.  The language of those in power becomes commonsense and 
forms our reality.  In her theology, even biblical texts are treated as rhetorical structures with 
philosophical and political objectives.  Thus, Schüssler Fiorenza applies the same method of 
investigation to bodies as she does to texts.  She maintains that bodies, like texts, are 
historical and political realities that have been constructed and reconstructed throughout 
history. 
Schüssler Fiorenza argues that because texts are sites of struggle, they evidence both 
oppressive and liberating movements and feminist theologians must recognize both.34  She 
contends that we have inherited a kyriarchal reality from ancient texts and their traditional 
interpretations, but also models that oppose kyriarchy.  Schüssler Fiorenza defines kyriarchy 
as a multifaceted matrix of relationships between masters and oppressed people.35  It reflects 
a more complex understanding of oppression than patriarchy, but patriarchy is part of the 
matrix of kyriarchy.  Our historical texts are androcentric because they were written within 
patriarchal contexts.  Their authors often wrote them for the purpose of maintaining this 
balance of power.  Exegetes throughout history continued to interpret them for this same 
purpose.  As a biblical scholar, Schüssler Fiorenza analyzes not only ancient texts themselves 
but the linguistic theories by which they are translated.  She contends that the historical 
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 Schüssler Fiorenza challenges feminist theologians who focus exclusively on the liberating aspects of the 
early Christian movement or just on oppressive aspects of it.  She issues this challenge in the introduction to In 
Memory of Her, and evaluates different feminist approaches to history and texts in Chapter 1. 
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 Schüssler Fiorenza, Jesus: Miriam's Child, Sophia's Prophet, 14.  Kyriarchy is derived from the Greek term 
kyrios, meaning lord. 
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development of masculine-exclusive language within the English language has led to the fact 
that although the masculine gendered pronouns are supposed to be understood as standing for 
all humanity they are not often read this way.  Therefore our reading of ancient texts can 
ignore or exclude the presence of women in the ancient world.  Schüssler Fiorenza assumes 
their presence.36  This assumption shifts the possible interpretation of many texts.  Her 
approach perceives ambiguity in texts rather than just one meaning.  By extension, she 
recognizes the ambiguity in the construction and meaning of bodies, which are based on 
these texts. 
Schüssler Fiorenza understands her approach to texts and bodies as a shift in feminist 
theology away from identity questions per se to well-being questions.  She contends that 
feminist theology must focus on those suffering from oppression and uncover what keeps 
kyriarchy and its language alive.  A focus on kyriarchy keeps her theology attentive to the 
experience of those who struggle against oppression especially the poorest of the poor who 
remain women and children dependent on women.  With this focus, she maintains her 
feminist concern for women’s experience but expands her reflection to include more complex 
and differentiated ways people are oppressed.37  Schüssler Fiorenza contends that a first step 
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 Schüssler Fiorenza cites empirical studies that have documented that men and women read so-called generic 
masculine language differently.  But She Said, 36.  Letty Mandeville Russell, in her reflections on the issues of 
inclusive language for interpretation and the life of faith, writes that “the generic ‘he/man’ was a result of the 
politics of grammarians who convinced English parliament to make it a law in 1850 because men should 
‘naturally’ take precedence.  Now feminists are seeking a return to the earlier usage of generic ‘they’ with the 
singular noun.”  “Inclusive Language and Power,” Religious Education 80 (Fall 1985): 584. 
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 Although Schüssler Fiorenza has shifted her attention from patriarchy to the wider scope of kyriarchy, she 
continues to center her theological focus on women because the poorest and most oppressed persons in the 
world continue to be women.  Although she admits that not only women suffer from kyriarchal structures, 
Schüssler Fiorenza maintains that deconstructing the reasons for women’s oppression can provide key insights 
into the antidemocratic and kyriarchal structures that oppress people of all body categorization.  Her early work 
was criticized by women and men of color for concentrating too narrowly on the experience and oppression 
they claim is that of white women only.  She addresses some of these concerns in But She Said, 114ff.  For more 
on Schüssler Fiorenza’s work on how the concept and reality of empire has shaped and affected Christian 
scriptures and our self-understandings, see Schüssler Fiorenza, The Power of the Word: Scripture and the 
Rhetoric of Empire (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2007). 
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in this process of alleviating the distress and denigration of oppressed women is the 
deconstruction and eventual destruction of the Western sex/gender system. 
 Any true elimination of oppression must present a way to include the former outcast 
into decision-making structures.  Schüssler Fiorenza argues that although Christianity was 
and is not always and everywhere liberating for women and other nonpersons, reflection on 
the Jesus movement and the house ekklēsia does offer liberating models for community.  She 
interprets the model of ekklēsia based on her understanding of the Greek word as the 
assembly of full citizens that promotes the well-being of all.38  As the model of the Jesus 
movement and the early Christian Church, she reads the ancient texts as advocating that 
everyone can and should be part of the deciding of their own spiritual-political affairs as well 
as being part of the determination of what well-being means.  Schüssler Fiorenza reads the 
Jesus movement and the early Christian Church as advocating radical democracy, which is a 
way of living inclusive of the nonpersons and outcasts of kyriarchal structures, as the best 
way to realize God’s basileia on earth.  This approach to living includes both individual 
liberation for self-actualization and the establishment of community that includes all in 
responsible decision-making.39 
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 Schüssler Fiorenza, But She Said, 128; In Memory of Her, 344; Jesus: Miriam’s Child, Sophia’s Prophet, 14-
15; Sharing Her Word, 112; and The Discipleship of Equals, 112, 199.  Schüssler Fiorenza qualifies the term 
with the phrase “of women,” in order to indicate that ekklēsia will become historical reality only when women 
are fully included.  See The Discipleship of Equals, 196. 
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 Schüssler Fiorenza argues that the Jesus movement advocated a radical Jewish democratic vision most 
evident in a table fellowship initiated by Jesus which included those alienated from societal roles.  She posits 
that some of these persons may have found themselves alienated in the larger social and religious context 
because they refused patriarchal definition.  These outcasts found a place within this Jesus movement, which 
did not advocate patriarchal submission but participation in ekklēsia.  Such participation sometimes led to the 
breaking of household relationships rather than the justification of them as evidenced in Jesus’ claim that the 
community is his family not his biological or patriarchal one.  Schüssler Fiorenza maintains that even after the 
death and ascension of Jesus, many Christian communities still formed themselves around the notion of 
ekklēsia.  She contends that the house community broke down the public/private split and the hierarchies 
between men and women based on it evidenced in the fact that women were not only part of the church but its 
leadership as well.  Communities differed in their interpretation of the gospel and lived it in varying ways.  She 
contends that although the Jesus movement and house ekklēsia offered liberatory models, there were also other 
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 Schüssler Fiorenza argues that although the Jesus movement provided the model of 
ekklēsia to guide Christian efforts to live God’s basileia of liberation for each person and 
inclusion of all into God’s community, Christian communities have not always lived ekklēsia 
and often find themselves accepting and creating kyriarchal patterns of oppression and 
exclusion.  The Christian acceptance of the Western sex/gender system into its exegesis, 
historical interpretation and ecclesial structures reflects such kyriarchal living.  Therefore, 
deconstructing and recreating the meaning of bodies is a crucial step to move Christian 
communities away from kyriarchal living to a way of being together that better reflects the 
ekklēsia of the Christian gospel.  Interpretation of the body forms a critical tool in evaluating 
whether Christian communities are living up to the call of Jesus and the example he set for 
them. 
This tension between the models of liberation and the reality of kyriarchy is central to 
Schüssler Fiorenza’s work and her gender theory.  This tension is inherent in the theological 
notion that Jesus Christ’s presence in the world announced the inbreaking of God’s basileia 
into human living, but because it is an eschatological concept and reality it is never 
completely realized in earthly life.  The “already” and “not yet” aspect of the basileia of God 
brought into the world through Jesus Christ means that the total liberation it promises is 
always a goal but never fully realized.  Schüssler Fiorenza uses this central Christian belief 
about God’s basileia as a guiding principle for her feminist theology.  Since her socio-
political and theological goals are based on the eschatological concept of God’s basileia, 
                                                                                                                                                       
forces within the Christian community that wished to bring Christian life into conformity with patriarchal and 
kyriarchal norms.  Schüssler Fiorenza has come to understand the struggle for radical democracy to be 
intricately related to women’s religious-theological authority.  In her studies of Christian beginnings, Schüssler 
Fiorenza draws a connection between religious antidemocratic arguments (lack of freedom for all) and the 
debate concerning women’s place (lack of freedom based on body categorization).  See Schüssler Fiorenza, 
Sharing Her Word, 115-18; and Jesus: Miriam’s Child, Sophia’s Prophet, 8-9. 
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which she understands as reflected in ekklēsia, this change will be gradual and incomplete.  
For this reason, her gender theory seeks to balance the hope of changing intellectual 
frameworks, such as the Western sex/gender system, that perpetuate kyriarchal structures 
with the realization that this sex/gender system still informs and constructs our lives. 
Schüssler Fiorenza’s approach to the sex/gender of bodies is the same as her strategy 
for reading texts.40  Her analysis has two main steps.  First, she seeks to understand how the 
sex/gender system oppresses by deconstructing how bodies are formed in and by this system.  
Second, she proposes ways this oppressive system can be changed and bodies reconstructed 
through the creation of more liberating practices and relations.  Deconstructing the Western 
sex/gender system means deconstructing the body since it is the manifestation of this system.  
The first step in this deconstruction is locating any body within their socio-political and 
religious context and the social networks of power that exist within these contexts.  This first 
step differentiates the social experiences of masters from that of the oppressed.  Her second 
move is to uncover the forces that create ways of thinking and therefore being that lead to the 
suffering of oppressed persons, including ideas that support sexism, racism, classism, 
colonialism, and Eurocentrism.  These ways of thinking and being are created and 
continually influenced by the biases of the texts we read, the interpretations we have been 
taught, and the privileges of the system in which we live.  Schüssler Fiorenza’s approach to 
bodies recognizes that our past and current philosophical, political, economic, and religious 
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 Schüssler Fiorenza names seven hermeneutical strategies, the first four of which are deconstructive and the 
last three constructive.  They are a hermeneutics of experience that socially locates experience, domination, 
suspicion, assessment and evaluation, reimagination, critical evaluation or reconstruction, and change and 
transformation.  She writes that these strategies are not simply successive and progressive but corrective, 
repetitive, and interactive.  See Schüssler Fiorenza, But She Said, 51-76; Bread Not Stone, 1-21; and Sharing 
Her Word, 76-77. 
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systems produce and assign identity to us.41  Kyriarchal arguments and theories for inequality 
have become encoded in the body, and affect how we live and think about bodies.  We must, 
therefore, interrogate the philosophical, political and religious subtexts of even our most 
commonsense understandings of the body.   
After these strategies for deconstructing bodies, Schüssler Fiorenza turns her attention 
to the task of reconstruction for she believes that bodies can be changed through a change in 
how we read them.  She contends that if we approach language as not deterministic, then 
texts and the reality they produce in our bodies are ambiguous and open to different 
interpretations.  In addition, inviting the voices of people of varying socio-political 
experiences to join the interpretation of texts disrupts traditional readings.  Different 
perspectives reveal the ambiguity and complexity of texts and bodies and allow for a 
proliferation of interpretations.42  Schüssler Fiorenza admits that her translation of texts and 
bodies serves her political goals, but maintains that all interpretations are motivated by 
rhetorical aims.  She argues that kyriocentric interpretations merely try to hide this 
“constructedness” of reality in order to naturalize the structures and prejudices of kyriarchal 
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 Schüssler Fiorenza points out that we in the West are heirs to the thought and understanding of bodies of 
Aristotle and Plato, which have been detrimental to the freedom of some bodies.  Plato believed in a hierarchy 
of bodies that created the notion of a great chain of being and Aristotle argued that relationships in society are 
based on nature and reason and that different bodies embodied differences in nature and reason.  These ideas 
together have undergirded many kyriarchal approaches to the domination and subordination of some bodies to 
others.  Schüssler Fiorenza also notes that the revival of Aristotelian philosophy in the first century CE was a 
weapon against emancipatory movements of the time and against democratic notions in general.  Schüssler 
Fiorenza, But She Said, 94. 
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 Schüssler Fiorenza defines her approach to texts as relative objectivity because although she proposes a 
proliferation and amplification of interpretation she does not advocate absolute relativity.  She contends that 
there can be truer, more adequate accounts of the “real” world and history.  These accounts would appreciate 
the levels of meaning uncovered by her first four hermeneutical strategies and the complexity of identity and 
oppression.  In the end, they would also move us toward liberation rather than oppression; they would help all 
persons achieve self-actualization as an individual and provide means to include all in communal decision-
making.  Schüssler Fiorenza, But She Said, 33, 90.  Schüssler Fiorenza engages postmodern themes in “The 
Ethos of Interpretation: Biblical Studies in a Postmodern and Postcolonial Context,” in Theological Literacy for 
the Twenty-First Century, ed. Rodney L. Petersen with Nancy M. Rourke (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. 
Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2002), 211-28; and Rhetoric and Ethic: The Politics of Biblical Studies 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1999), although she claims that the concepts of postmodernism are never her 
inspiration, but rather she is compelled by marginalized discourses and minority theories. 
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systems.  She claims she is simply more upfront and honest about her own rhetorical aims of 
creating a counter-discourse for liberation. 
Schüssler Fiorenza argues that since texts are inherently ambiguous and open to 
multiple interpretations they contain contradictions and fissures that allow us to read against 
the grain.  Reading against the grain allows us to open up historical memory to what has been 
suppressed by those in power.  For example, Schüssler Fiorenza assumes that history 
involved and involves both women and men and that both were historical actors who shaped 
Christianity so both should be subjects of intellectual inquiry.  She reads grammatical gender 
as inclusive rather than an instrument of language to keep people marginalized and oppressed 
by making them invisible in biblical translation and interpretation and therefore insignificant 
for contemporary life as well.  Having established that texts and bodies can and do have 
ambiguous and plural readings, Schüssler Fiorenza encourages Christians to choose readings 
that move the community toward the goal of liberation as articulated in the radical 
democracy of ekklēsia inaugurated by the inbreaking of God’s basileia in Jesus Christ.  Our 
readings of texts and bodies should move us to personal transformation and liberating action.  
Creative rereading should fashion subjects dedicated to radical democratic praxis and the 
construction of a different realty that no longer supports kyriarchal structures, including the 
Western sex/gender system. 
Schüssler Fiorenza advocates changing the ways people are differentiated away from 
the current emphasis on the sex/gender system to an approach to persons that recognizes if 
they are being included or excluded from democratic agency.  This approach to identity still 
recognizes the important influence of the Western sex/gender system in how we understand 
ourselves and others.  Schüssler Fiorenza advocates the use of the term wo/men to reflect the 
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tension of working toward liberation from kyriarchal oppression while still living within it.  
Wo/men includes both oppressed women and men and those who stand with them.  It is a 
challenge to how we think about sex/gender categories since it recognizes that identity is 
about our place in kyriarchal structures not any kind of neutral biological designation.  It is 
also an invitation to change the frameworks that create these designations in the first place.  
Her use of the category of wo/men shifts focus from men and women to oppressors and 
oppressed, suggesting a means of differentiating persons otherwise than the phallus.43  This 
shift in the meaning of the body is a move from materiality as biological specimen to the 
body as a text that is written for political purposes. 
Schüssler Fiorenza’s gender theory understands bodies as constructed for rhetorical 
and political purposes in just the way texts are.  By thinking of the body as text, she shows 
how bodies are expressions of philosophical and religious arguments that support specific 
political goals.  These arguments become encoded in the body and become the guidelines for 
how we understand our materiality.  Bodies are constructed by the “winners” of history, 
those with power interested in keeping it.  The very language of and about bodies reinforces 
power relations, which includes how we live our sexed/gendered bodies.  This language 
includes not only contemporary ideas about the body but our history as well.  The context of 
the authors of our history, the interpreters of this history, as well as our own context construct 
the meaning of our bodies.   
On the other hand, Schüssler Fiorenza argues that texts and bodies are ambiguous 
because they extend beyond their specific moment.  People are not completely programmed 
by their history or the context in which they find themselves.  Our bodies do express the 
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From a Politics of Identity to a Politics of Struggle,” Feminist Theology (September 1996): 47-72.  
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kyriarchy we have inherited, including our ideas of sex/gender, but they can be reread in a 
more democratic way.  Just like texts, bodies can be deconstructed to understand why we 
understand them the way we do and reconstructed to express something else.  Schüssler 
Fiorenza’s goal is for bodies to express ekklēsia so that all people are freed from oppression 
and all people participate in the decision-making for the well-being of themselves and others.  
Although we may never attain this reality, it should be the goal of Christian feminist 
theology.  As theological justification for this type of reading, Schüssler Fiorenza argues that 
the gospel stories invite us to engage in a rereading and rewriting of history in light of Jesus 
Christ that leads to a rereading and rewriting of ourselves as his followers. 
 
Total Construction 
 For this final approach to sex/gender, I return to the work of Judith Butler.  Although 
Butler is not a theologian, her work is engaged and used in theological reflection on the 
body.44  Like John Paul II, Butler establishes no distinction between sex and gender and 
describes both as foundational to our way of being in the world.  She does not, however, 
understand this to mean they are absolute, transcendent, or ahistorical.  Her approach to 
sex/gender differs fundamentally from that of Lisa Sowle Cahill, which argues for an a prior 
sex on which is stamped the cultural construction of gender.  Butler posits that both sex and 
gender are constructions of power through which a subject comes to be at all, a position she 
shares with Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza.  She has a different understanding of power, 
however, and so her theory takes exception to Schüssler Fiorenza’s argument that some idea 
of women must be maintained for political purposes.  Butler calls on feminist politics to shift 
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its focus from the so-called interests of the set of ready-made subjects under the heading of 
“women,” to a questioning of the very terms through which identity is articulated.45  In this 
section I consider two of Butler’s works—Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of 
Identity and Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex.”  In the first, she outlines 
a geneaology of gender and concludes that gender is performative of regulatory norms; in the 
second, she furthers her investigation of how bodies are constructed and concludes that 
power relations also work in the very formation of “sex” and its “materiality.” 
Butler applies Michel Foucault’s notions of power and Jacques Derrida’s theory of 
iterability to theorize how bodies become sexed/gendered and how the materialization of 
bodies can be shifted to positively include more articulations of the subject beyond the 
heterosexual binary of male/masculine and female/feminine.  When Butler claims that the 
materiality of the body is the effect of power, she is employing Foucault’s understanding of 
power.  Power here is not something someone has or yields nor an external force or subject 
operating on bodies.  Rather, Foucault defines power as a web of relations that 
interpenetrates society and produces its subjects.  Power is the regulatory norms that form 
identity and the very process by which anyone is.46  This process of identity formation 
produces intelligible subjects that fit the contextual norms as well as those entities that do not 
fit the criteria of a subject.  Butler names those that do not fit power’s discourse the abject. 
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Butler’s gender theory and her strategy for changing the regulatory norms that 
produce the materiality of the body rely on Derrida’s theory of language.47  Derrida claims 
that at the heart of all language, that which makes language possible, is the notion of 
iterability.  In order for language to be possible it must be able to be repeated and used in 
different contexts.  Its iteration in a different context than its original citation creates a 
rupture in the language that can result in a breakdown of meaning or the occurrence of new 
meanings.  For Butler, the language and discourses that produce the materiality of bodies are 
phallogocentrism, which is identity based on male-ness, and compulsory heterosexuality.  
These discourses provide the regulatory norms that determine what is meaningful about the 
body and therefore how the body should be lived.  Butler concludes that sex/gender is an 
effect of these discourses not their cause, and posits that we experience the body as gendered 
masculine and feminine because we live the body as dyadic.48  Her goal is to decenter these 
discourses so that more and different bodies can materialize as acceptable and meaningful 
subjects.  Thus, Butler’s methodology yields a theory of sex/gender that claims that power 
forms bodies in and as discourse, which in its necessary repetition can be rearticulated. 
Butler argues against theories of sex/gender that separate the two and establish sex as 
prediscursive on which gender operates.  Such a theory of materiality is inadequate for Butler 
because it cannot contest the discourse of compulsory heterosexuality which cast some 
bodies as meaningful and others as not mattering at all.  She claims that reference to a pure 
body or a prediscursive sexed body is actually part of the discourses of phallogocentrism and 
compulsory heterosexuality, which establish sex/gender as timeless structures.   Butler argues 
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that any reference to the body is at the same time a formation of the body.49  For her, there is 
no subject who stands before the construction of sex in any spatial or temporal sense.  All 
subjects emerge within and as the matrix of gender relations.  Butler gives as an example the 
process through which an embryo becomes a person or a subject.  She writes that through the 
interpellation of sex/gender an “it” shifts to “she” and is “girled” and brought into the domain 
of language and kinship.  Declaring the embryo or child “she” demarcates the body as female 
rather than male and as acceptable rather than unlivable.50  The body of the child becomes 
culturally intelligible only by being sexed/gendered.  Butler argues that the power of “sex” at 
its most effective is that it constitutes a field of intelligibility, a taken-for-granted ontology.   
Butler’s gender theory maintains that the regulatory norms of phallogocentrism and 
compulsory heterosexuality materialize the body’s sex and produce male and female 
subjects.  Thus, the production of materiality does not mean that power creates materiality 
but rather that it marks and delineates what portion of the materiality of the body is relevant 
and foundational for the living of our lives.  Butler contends that within our context being 
male/masculine and female/feminine matters and so we are materialized and live as such.  In 
other words, power operates in the production of the binary frame of thinking about 
sex/gender.  Butler wants to recast the matter of bodies not as a site of surface but as a 
process of materialization that is the effect of the dynamic of power.  Regulatory norms 
govern the materialization of any body.51    
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According to Butler’s theory, the construction of bodies is not a singular act, but a 
process of repetition.  Subjects are materialized through the reiteration of the regulatory 
norms that govern them.  To name a person a female or male is the repeated inculcation of a 
norm, and the power of regulatory norms stems from the persistence of their repetition.  
Therefore, the phenomenon of sex is formed within and by discourse.  The regulatory norms 
of the controlling discourses produce by marking and constraining bodies to fit the ideals of 
their discourse.  Butler argues, however, that bodies can never fully comply with these ideals 
because they are constructions themselves.  “True” gender identity and the “law of sex” are 
such because we mirror gender ideals in our living and cite sex as a law of nature.  She 
contends that norms only exist and have power to the extent that they are repeated or cited as 
a norm.  This repetition or citation occurs in our process of approximating or “identifying 
with” such norms.52  Although the norms of sex/gender compel citations and approximations, 
which we call female/feminine and male/masculine, there is no true or perfect sex/gender 
identity.   
After establishing her theory that bodily materiality is the repetition of the norms of 
governing discourses and therefore have no “true” reality, Butler lays out how change in our 
very materiality is possible.  First, she claims that the concepts of sex and gender have 
complex histories, which reveal them as historically revisable regulatory schemes.  This 
revision happens, and can only happen, within the discursive practices one wishes to contest.  
Within and as part of the construction of sex/gender is the possibility for and agency to 
change them.53  Butler argues that the materiality of the body is the effect of social discourse, 
which maintains its status as foundational through the continual repetition of its regulatory 
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norms.  By applying Derrida’s insights about language and iterability to the discourses that 
produce sex/gender, Butler treats identity as unstable and incorporating the possibility and 
necessity of its own rearticulation and disruption.  If sex/gender are regulatory norms that 
require repetition then they have the same quality as language that needs to be repeated in 
different contexts than the one for which it was originally intended.  The regulatory norms’ 
ability to be repeated in different contexts means that their meaning is divided past and 
future.  There always exists the possibility for different articulations or reiterations of the 
body by individuals.  Gaps and fissures to the current construction of sex/gender open up and 
allow shifts in the norms of sex/gender.  Change happens when one lives sex/gender as 
something different in a world that presupposes and requires that sex remain dyadic.  Butler 
argues that moral agency is in the gap of who I find myself to be and who I can be.  Persons 
can repeat these norms in other ways that allow for alternative identity formations.  The task 
is then not whether to repeat, but how to repeat the regulatory norms of sex/gender. 
The first step in this change is to recognize that there are already bodies that exist in 
what Butler calls “unlivable” and “uninhabitable” zones of social life.  She claims that these 
bodies fail to materialize as subjects within the discourses of phallogocentrism and 
compulsory heterosexuality; but if we have the eyes to see them they represent the possibility 
for change through the contestation of the regulatory norms of sex/gender.  By including 
their articulation of materiality, we can rearticulate “the symbolic horizon in which bodies 
come to matter at all.”54  These alternative articulations of materiality question the 
fundamental naturalness of sex/gender, contest its very binarism, and present new 
possibilities for its articulation.  Butler contends that a proliferation of sex/gender 
configurations can become a reality if we redescribe what is currently defined as culturally 
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unintelligible as acceptable articulations of materialization.  This proliferation then has the 
potential to deprive sex/gender configurations based on compulsory heterosexuality of their 
natural status.  Butler asks, “What would it mean to ‘cite’ the law to produce it differently, to 
‘cite’ the law in order to reiterate and co-opt its power, to expose the heterosexual matrix and 
to displace the effect of its necessity.”55  Her answer is that it would change the regulatory 
norms that bring about the sexed/gendered subject.  We would have the space and means to 
rethink and rearticulate what it means to be sexed/gendered.  In this process exist the 
possibilities of rematerialization.  For Butler, shifts in materialization are not change simply 
for change’s sake.  They are an attempt to include more persons in the realm of who matters 
in social discourse.  She wants to expand the meaning of what counts as a valued and 
valuable body in the world, of what qualifies as bodies that matter, of what ways of living 
count as “life,” and of what lives are worth protecting, saving, and grieving.56 
 
III. DISCUSSION 
This chapter demonstrates how using construction as an organizing principle can 
serve as a tool for theology to explore different theories of sex/gender through reflection on 
the degree to which bodily materiality is constructed.  Analysis of each theory centers on 
how it answers the question to what degree are the sex and/or gender of the body constructed 
in and by its social discourse.  The varied responses to this question reveal that sex/gender as 
concepts and realities exist broadly and diversely in theological discourse and life.  
Sex/gender cannot be approached as one thing in and for theology; it must be handled as a 
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transformation, see her essay “The Question of Social Transformation,” in Women and Social Transformation, 
by Elizabeth Bek-Gernsheim, Judith Butler, and Lídia Puigvert (New York: Peter Lang, 2003), 1-28. 
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81 
 
discussion.  Theologians must clarify their own theory of sex/gender, and equally important 
know where it fits within the spectrum of views on sex/gender.  This clarification invites 
theologians to delve deeply into the relevance and place of the body in theology by 
considering how reflection on the sex/gender of bodies calls attention to theological method, 
truth claims, views on subjectivity and personhood, judgment of binary sexuality, and the 
body’s relationship with language.   
Conversation organized around construction begins with discussion about the very 
meaning of the idea of construction, the process by which sex and gender are established, 
who or what is responsible for this process, and if there is any opportunity for the 
sexed/gendered person to change the meaning of sex and/or gender.  For some theologians 
such as John Paul II, construction of bodily reality would negate the belief that there is a 
divine plan to and for our bodies and their living.  If sex/gender are ontological realities that 
reflect the divine plan, then sex/gender are not constructed but rather created.  God is the 
creating agent and humanity cannot change the ultimate meaning of sex/gender; it is revealed 
to them.  Any change in a person’s understanding and living of these categories should 
reflect an acceptance of their original and ultimate meaning.  Other theologians such as Lisa 
Sowle Cahill understand construction to mean ex nihilio so using it to describe sex would 
ignore the biology of humans as a mammalian species.  If sex is a given in human reality, 
then only gender can be addressed as constructed.  Any meanings and institutionalizations of 
gender that do not create equality and promote compassion in partnership should be changed.  
Most who do use the idea of construction in their explanation of sex/gender do not mean it 
“creates” materiality.  Rather, the construction of sex/gender is understood as the assignment 
of meaning to it, the demarcation of the importance of it, and therefore the production of it.  
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Judith Butler adamantly argues that to state that sex/gender is constructed does not mean it is 
illusory or artificial, or that it is constructed once and for all.57  Even theories that accept the 
construction of sex/gender for rhetorical and political purposes might disagree on who or 
what constructs them.  Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza describes the constructing agent as other 
human beings, the winners of history who have control and want to maintain it.  Judith Butler 
has different notions of power and understands it as a web of relations rather than something 
someone yields.  Both, however, maintain that change is possible and in the hands of 
constructed individuals either as a rebellion against the constructing agent or a decentering of 
the constructing power from within. 
The answers to the central question of this chapter must be read as crucial to and 
flowing from the overall method and goals of the author’s theology or philosophy.  A 
theological method that demands the possibility of timeless realities to support unchanging 
teaching describes the meaning of sex/gender as ahistorical and transcendent of time and 
place.  If a theological method is searching for universal foundations or generalizations to 
anchor cross-cultural ethical dialogue, then sex and the process of being gendered is 
described as invariant.  Bodies will look different according to methods and goals that aim 
for the alleviation of oppression that is based on the very categorization of bodies as sexed 
and gendered.  Both the meaning and reality of sex and gender are considered in terms of 
how they move toward the goal of equality or hinder its achievement.  When sex and gender 
are understood as the result of power relations, they must be able to be changed if new 
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 Butler, Bodies That Matter, 9.  The concept of construction is central to Butler’s work, although she 
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problematic.  She realizes that many regard anything defined as “constructed” as artificial and dispensable.  
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political realities are to be achieved.  This change happens through the deconstruction of the 
history of sex/gender and a shift in how we think about sex/gender identity and live it. 
These different approaches to sex/gender reveal different understandings of truth.  
John Paul II professes a belief in ahistorical, transcendent truth we can know through 
revelation.  Sowle Cahill proposes a modified objectivity, which considers truth as something 
we come to together.  There are, however, foundations to human being that can be considered 
universals.  Schüssler Fiorenza maintains that we usually define truth according to the 
commonsense established by the winners of history and the masters in the kyriarchal 
structure.  She claims it is better to think about truth as that which brings us closer to living 
God’s basileia, which on earth is approximated in radical democracy.  Butler approaches 
truth as something constructed as such within and according to the discourses of any social 
context. 
These considerations of ontology and truth within the discourse about sex/gender 
disclose each theorist’s notion of personhood and subjectivity, another central theological 
question.  Gender theories must address the relationship of selfhood and the sex/gender of the 
body.  Is there a subject beyond their sex/gender or does the subject come to be and exist 
only as sexed/gendered?  Is true selfhood a goal that can only be achieved once the person is 
liberated from oppressive sex/gender articulations or are they what define the person as a self 
or subject?  Inherent to these beliefs about the human subject is each theory’s idea of the 
purpose of human life.  Should sex/gender be understood as complementary, based on 
equality and mutuality, undermined altogether, or expanded in order for persons to most fully 
live human subjectivity?  Each view of subjectivity comes to a different conclusion about the 
unity of each sex as a group.  
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John Paul argues for the necessity of male-female differentiation for personhood.  
Each human being knows their essence and the self in and through their own sex/gender.  In 
the giving and receiving of the sexed/gendered self, each person realizes themselves as a 
person created by God for this purpose.  It is only in and through the body that a human 
being knows themselves as a person created uniquely from other creatures and for 
communion with other persons.  The ultimate communion is the union of the male and 
female.  Because he understands sex/gender as our primary identity, the unity of males and 
females as individual groups is a presupposition to John Paul II’s thought.  Sowle Cahill 
concurs with John Paul II that being a sexed and gendered person informs our sense of self 
and through this reality we are able to connect with others.  The body as sexed and gendered 
is what makes us human.  Sex and gender are essential aspects of being a human person, 
although the hierarchy based on them is not.  Sowle Cahill considers the unity of women a 
goal to be maintained for it recognizes the uniqueness of women’s sexuality and reproductive 
capacities and allows cross-cultural dialogue.  For Schüssler Fiorenza, the person is formed 
according to the sex/gender system of their history and context, but it does not and should not 
be the essential way we think about human beings.  She advocates other ways of categorizing 
identity that would define people differently.  Schüssler Fiorenza shifts identity designation 
to wo/men in recognition that the unity of this group is a provisional status around action for 
alleviation of oppression.  Judith Butler describes the sex/gender matrix as a power discourse 
that materializes bodies and causes subjects to be.  These attributes of the body are both 
essential and nonessential for personhood.  Butler treats the unity of women as a phantasm 
and an impossibility. 
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Delving into the relationship of the subject to their materiality in terms of sex/gender 
brings to light different understandings of the relationship of sex to gender as well as how 
each relate to social life.  While Lisa Sowle Cahill separates sex and gender in her analysis, 
John Paul II, Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, and Judith Butler treat them as inseparable 
aspects of bodily reality.  These three differ, however, on the relationship of sex/gender to 
social life.  John Paul II understands sex/gender as the foundational principle for social life; 
its cause not its effect.  Schüssler Fiorenza regards the sex/gender system as a foundational 
principle of kyriarchy and established for its purposes.  Butler argues that sex/gender is the 
foundation of being in our social context and is produced and restrained by the normalizing 
institutions of phallogocentrism and compulsory heterosexuality.   Sowle Cahill tries to 
balance the idea that the sex of the body is prior to social life, but the gender of it formed 
only within and by social institutions.   
Various approaches to the relationship of sex and gender reveal diverse opinions 
about whether the binary of sex and gender is problematic.  The more problematic this 
binary, the more sex and gender are viewed as constructed in social discourse and 
changeable.  Because John Paul II argues that God always creates human beings as male and 
female, dyadic sexual differentiation is not problematic and heterosexuality is the only 
acceptable form of sexuality.  Sex/gender is not oppressive; the estrangement of the sexes 
caused by the Fall is what creates tension between men and women.  Lisa Sowle Cahill also 
does not understand binary sexual difference as problematic, but rather as the foundation for 
childbearing and rearing.  It is the basis for necessary social order, although its gendering can 
be established in oppressive ways.  Schüssler Fiorenza and Butler both find the binary 
problematic and oppressive.  Schüssler Fiorenza contests it because it is part of the 
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oppression of kyriarchy, creating relationships based on masters and oppressed.  Butler 
argues that the binary is unacceptable because it does not allow some bodies to materialize 
and therefore matter in society. 
These theories of sex/gender approach narratives and language as central to any 
understanding of the body.  Scripture is approached as both revealing a true and proper 
understanding of our bodily reality and as rhetorical and political narratives that encode 
bodies for inequality.  Even so, all Christian theologians argue that the Christian narratives 
can still expand our understandings of sex/gender to make them more about equality than 
oppression.  Theorists in other disciplines challenge theologians to recognize the importance 
of social discourses in the creation and understanding of sex/gender that may extend beyond 
and exist distinctly from Christian narratives but still affect how we know ourselves.  These 
narratives include our social and cultural history.  There are and have been different 
historical articulations of sex/gender.  Theories define some of these articulations as the 
result of sinful humanity or the interests of the powerful to keep some ruled while they rule.  
Either way, one’s knowledge and interpretation of the history of sex and gender are 
important aspects of any gender theory.  This includes contending with past and current 
scientific explanations of sex/gender.  The science of the body changes in different contexts.  
Sowle Cahill is the only theologian to base her argument for sex on science, although John 
Paul II briefly employs science to support some of his claims.  Judith Butler uses science to 
support her opposing claim, contending that whether science argues for or against a dual sex 
system is not obvious.  Butler challenges theorists to delve more deeply into the supposed 
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naturalness of sex by critiquing scientific discourses which establish its facticity, enquiring 
into its history, and questioning its very meaning.58 
The debate and discussion extracted through dialogue about sex/gender based on the 
concept of construction leads to questions about bodily expression.  Different theories about 
sex/gender articulate different understandings of what the body expresses in its materiality.  
The body can be understood as revealing God’s plan for creation or its social context that 
may or may not be based on oppressive discourses.  John Paul’s theory claims that each 
person expresses the self in and through their body.  Sowle Cahill treats the body as a cross-
cultural connection that creates discourse with others.  Schüssler Fiorenza approaches bodies 
as texts expressing the rhetorical and political goals of their authors.  Butler contends that 
they are the materialization of the norms of controlling discourses.  One must determine if 
the body’s expression as sex/gender is an appropriate and live-giving expression or one that 
should be changed.  These reflections also challenge theologians to think about how the body 
expresses not only its constructing discourses but also the individual who the body is.  To 
what degree are individuals determined by the discourses that form them?  If Christianity 
believes that each person is a unique being willed for their own sake by God, then gender 
theories must explore individual identity as opposed to and in relationship with communal 
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identity.59  Reflecting on bodily construction and how it leads to questions about bodily 
expression starts the process of thinking about the body as symbol.   
 
IV. CONCLUSION  
In this chapter, the significance of the body has been investigated through the lens of 
sex/gender.  The importance of the body in its specificity of sex/gender for theology has been 
demonstrated in each approach to sex/gender outlined in this chapter.  Sex/gender was shown 
to be relevant and significant to theological anthropology and what it means to be and live as 
the image and likeness of God.  It was argued that the body is the foundation of ethical 
dialogue and our understandings of sex/gender the difference between human flourishing and 
oppression.  The meaning and significance we assign to sex/gender is also an integral aspect 
of our scriptural texts and their exegesis.  Although not a theologian, Judith Butler challenges 
theology to investigate how sex/gender is part of our very understanding of the subject and 
its possibility.  
Theorists concerned with sex/gender have often been criticized for too narrow a view 
of identity.  Just as John Paul II establishes sex/gender as primary identity, feminist theorists 
have been criticized for not recognizing that race is also a fundamental aspect of identity in 
this country as well as around the world.  There is now a general recognition that other social 
divisions affect how sex/gender is lived in different communities and that race is a crucial 
tool of oppressive structures and institutions.  Theology must recognize, however, that race is 
not just another aspect of identity, but that race and sex/gender together interpenetrate and 
influence the meaning of each other.  Sexual difference is not prior to racial difference.  
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89 
 
Judith Butler honestly addresses race when she writes, “There are other regimes of regulatory 
production that contour the materiality of bodies.  Race emerges not simply as another, fully 
separable, domain of power from sexual difference or sexuality, but that its ‘addition’ 
subverts the monolithic workings of the heterosexual imperative as I have described it so 
far.”60  I agree with Butler’s assessment of the relationship of sex/gender and race in human 
identity and the meaning of materiality and I will explore the intersection of sex/gender and 
race in Part II of this dissertation.  For now, I will move on to a specific consideration of 
theories that give meaning to the construction of the materiality of the body commonly 
known as race. 
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A person without a past is a person without an identity.  And the absence of an identity is 
very serious, because without self-knowledge others can make you become what they desire. 
James Cone, My Soul Looks Back1   
 
CHAPTER 3:  RACE IN THEOLOGY 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter shifts focus from theories of sex/gender to theories of race but continues 
to use construction as its organizing principle.  The concept of construction is again 
employed to invite reflection on how the materiality of the body is established within and by 
means of social discourse as well as the meaning and significance attributed to identity 
markers such as race and sex/gender that categorize this materiality.  The previous chapter 
outlined theories that debated the level of construction of sex and gender.  In discussions 
about race there is general agreement that race is socially constructed, meaning it has no 
biological basis nor is it an ontological category with transcendent or ahistorical meaning.  
However, agreement about race as a social construction does not mean agreement about what 
race is.  There remains debate about the meaning and significance of the construction of race 
for human living.  This chapter focuses on this discussion. 
Declaring race a social construction does not relegate it to the status of illusion, which 
is just one theory of race.  Treating race as a social construction calls attention to the fact that 
race as an identity category has been invented in time and space and so racial meaning 
depends on its context and the history of its context.  Race is an ever-changing, continuously 
shifting concept.2  We must always ask the question of what is meant when the term “race” is 
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 For a deeper investigation of the history of the term and concept of race, see E. Nathaniel Gates, ed., The 
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invoked.  Race, like sex/gender, never exists as one thing but is subject to various 
interpretations.  Theories overlap and influence each other as well as contradict and oppose 
one another.  Exploring various theories of race helps theologians have better discussion 
about race and how it intersects with theological discourse. 
 In order to frame my presentation of race in theology, I turn to the work of 
sociologists Michael Omi and Howard Winant.3  Omi and Winant argue that the primary task 
of racial theory is not to problematize a seemingly “natural” concept of race but to focus 
attention on the continuing significance and changing meaning of race.4  They emphasize 
three main points that are at the heart of race theory in general and this chapter in particular.  
First, the importance and centrality of race in shaping identities and institutions in the United 
States cannot and should not be understated.  Omi and Winant argue that the United States is 
a “color-conscious” not color-blind society; one marked by racism, not equality. 5  Race has 
been and continues to be an important organizing concept at both the individual and 
institutional level.  Our socialization involves learning some version of racial categories and 
                                                                                                                                                       
Jordan, White Over Black: American Attitudes Toward the Negro, 1550-1812 (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 
1968). 
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 I rely on the following texts: Michael Omi and Howard Winant, Racial Formation in the United States: From 
the 1960s to the 1990s; “Racial Formation,” in Race, Class, and Gender in the United States: An Integrated 
Study, ed. Paula S. Rothenberg (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998); “On the Theoretical Status of the Concept 
of Race,” in Asian American Studies: A Reader, ed. Jean Yu-wen Shen Wu and Min Song (New Brunswick, NJ: 
Rutgers University Press, 2000); and Michael A. Omi, “The Changing Meaning of Race.” 
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 Omi and Winant, “On the Theoretical Status of the Concept of Race,” 200.  Emphasis theirs.  They write that 
although most theorists reject race as a “natural” or biological concept there are still attempts to discern the 
scientific meaning of race today in such areas as genetics and educational psychology.  These attempts seek to 
remove the concept of race from fundamental social, political, or economic determination and see the truth of 
race to lie in the terrain of innate characteristics.  Omi and Winant, “Racial Formation,” 14. 
5
 Omi and Winant, Racial Formation in the United States, 10.  Emphasis theirs.  Omi and Winant describe the 
U.S. social structure as a racial state, meaning a state that is inherently racial.  They write that the state 
intervenes in the racial order and is intervened by it; structures it and is structured by it.  From its very inception 
the state has been concerned with politics of race whether that concerns repression, exclusion, the categorization 
of groups for situation in the racial order by such means as the census, or the political action and demands of 
groups to the state.  See their model of the racial state in Omi and Winant, Racial Formation in the United 
States, 83-84.  For more on the racial state, see David Theo Goldberg, The Racial State (Malden, MA: 
Blackwell Publishers, 2002).  For Omi and Winant’s discussion of racism, see Omi and Winant, Racial 
Formation in the United States, 69-76. 
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meaning systems and our common sense knowledge includes racial thinking.  Our concepts 
of race are infused with and supported by social, economic, political and religious forces and 
beliefs.  To ignore race means to ignore central issues of our society.  
 Omi and Winant’s second main point is that although race is central to life in the 
United States, there is a general unwillingness to discuss it.  Underlying this unwillingness is 
the fact that race is a difficult concept even if it is often treated as a common sense, simple 
reality.  It is difficult to define race since it is fluid and subject to multiple determinations.  
As one delves deeper into the study of race, one must contend with many areas of human 
thinking.  It is a topic that brings us back to the difficult and painful racial legacies of the 
past, especially slavery, legalized discrimination, and violence against racial minorities, 
which continue to haunt and shape American society.  In addition, the important 
investigation of whiteness that must be part of race theory is made problematic by the fact 
that most whites do not see or recognize their whiteness most of the time.6  Because of these 
difficulties the discussion of race is usually avoided, often by means of treating it as a mere 
manifestation of some other supposedly more important social relationship or by advocating 
color-blindness and the transcendence of race.   
A third contention of Omi and Winant is that because of the importance we place on 
race, we as a society, and just as importantly as individual scholars, cannot ignore these 
realities or simply jettison our widely held racial beliefs.  They advocate that we must notice, 
not ignore, the concept of race in all its subtlety to effectively analyze issues that involve race 
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 See Martha R. Mahoney, “The Social Construction of Whiteness,” in Critical White Studies: Looking Behind 
the Mirror, eds. Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1997), 330-33.  
She writes that whites usually discuss whiteness only when they perceive their well-being threatened by race-
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and to make strides to oppose racism.7  Omi and Winant treat race as an element of social 
structure not an irregularity in it and as a dimension of human representation not an illusion.8  
In addition, race must be situated within its historical and social context.  Races do not 
emerge full-blown but are the results of historical practices as well as the contestation of 
these practices and the beliefs behind them.  Racial meanings vary over time and between 
different societies.9  Race has a dynamic reality.   
The five approaches to race that follow begin with the assumption that race is a social 
construction.  I name these theories race as essence, race as historical legacy, race as culture, 
race as class, and race as illusion.  Each section explores how race can be discussed in 
theology.  Theologians debate and investigate if and how race can be used to think about our 
ultimate concern, to discern the significance of history for identity, to reflect on different 
cultures and worldviews, to serve as an entry point to a discussion of economic inequality 
and injustice, and to distract theologians from truly understanding contemporary living.  
Included in all of these discussions is an assessment of racism and suggestions for liberation 
from it.  Each section is titled “race as…” not “race is…” because race is being treated as a 
construction and therefore open to multiple interpretations.  Theologians and theorists were 
chosen to illustrate these positions although I recognize that no neat categorization can 
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 Omi argues that it is crucial to relate racial categories and meanings to concepts of racism.  See Omi, “The 
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countries and societies.  See Omi and Winant, “Racial Formation,” 15-16, 21. 
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capture any one thinker’s understanding of race.  Theories of race often overlap and intersect 
in theology, theory, and life. 
 
II. THEORIES OF RACE 
Race as Essence 
This first approach to race treats race as essential to human identity.  Such an 
explanation of race is found in the work of James Cone, who reflects on Christian faith in 
light of the black experience in the United States.10  Cone’s theory of race is based on the 
claim that U.S. society essentializes race; we are “raced” first and everything else after that.11  
Race is the meaning and significance we give to skin color; and its essentialization attempts 
to explain who we are and how we should live based on the color of our skin.  Theologizing 
within this context, Cone asks who we should be as Christians and how we might live this 
identity in a society that essentializes race.  This reflection leads to a new way of thinking 
about race as essence.  Race for Cone is still about who we are and how we should live, but it 
is now understood from a Christian perspective about identity.  Cone concludes that 
Christians are meant to live as the image of God, which today means we must be black.  His 
theological proposal challenges how we think about ourselves as well as God by reflecting on 
theological anthropology through the lens of race, which Cone argues is necessary if 
theology is to be relevant for Christians living in the United States. 
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 James Cone is known as the father of black theology.  His first book, Black Theology and Black Power (New 
York: Seabury Press, 1969), was the first book on liberation theology.  It was published two years before 
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Cone and Black Liberation Theology (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co, 1994).  
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 See Cone, God of the Oppressed, xi; and For My People, 46.   
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Cone’s discussion about identity begins with the Christian belief that all persons are 
created as the image of God and we are called to live this identity in our specific context.  In 
order to be the image of God we must know who and how God is.  This knowledge of God 
comes from revelation, which Cone defines as God’s self-disclosure in personal relationship 
with humankind.  He claims that this revelation is found in the biblical witness as well as the 
black experience since God’s relationship with humankind continues today.12  There is 
continuity between the biblical stories of God, especially those of Jesus Christ as the 
Incarnation of God in the first century, and the experience of the risen Christ today.  
According to Cone, both means of God’s self-disclosure reveal a liberator God who is in 
solidarity with victims of injustice.  For Cone, the Bible speaks of how God is not just 
interested in spiritual liberation but also bodily freedom as evidenced in the many stories 
about cure from disease, escape from abuse, and the destruction of structures and realities 
that oppress the poor and marginalized.13  The gospels specifically reveal how Jesus Christ as 
God incarnate was with the oppressed and took on their condition as his own in his own 
humanity.   
The image of God was perfectly lived by Jesus Christ.  If human beings are to be the 
image of God as revealed and lived by Jesus Christ, each person must live as one with the 
oppressed and take on their condition as their own.  What this specifically means for a 
person’s identity depends on their context.  God will always be with the oppressed but to 
meet God in one’s living one must look at concrete reality and where the factual inequalities 
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God of the Oppressed, 140. 
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exist in one’s specific time.  Cone posits that in contemporary U.S. society living as the 
image of God is only properly understood in racial terms.  He argues that in a racist society 
such as the United States no one can be, or should be, colorless, least of all God/Christ.14  
Black theology teaches that in the black experience we find oppressed persons and therefore 
we find God/Christ.  For Cone, God/Christ is not just a theological concept but a liberating 
presence he has experienced and to which the black experience testifies. 
Cone understands God’s presence with oppressed black people as a continuation of 
the work of God in the Bible.  He argues that this continuity between God’s liberating work 
of the past and God’s presence in the struggle for black liberation is based on the Christian 
belief in the resurrected Christ.  As the risen one, Jesus Christ continues to be as he was in 
his humanly existence.  Who Christ is today is who Christ was in the first century.  In the 
first century he was a Jew in an occupied country, one of the oppressed himself.  But more 
than just a situation into which he was born, he chose to make his place with the oppressed 
and outcasts of his society and religion.  As the Incarnate One, the one who took on humanity 
and shared its condition, his human, bodily existence was and is inextricably tied to others.  
Jesus Christ shared in the condition of the outcast and oppressed in his very humanity, which 
included his materiality.  As the resurrected one, Christ continues to be as he was in his 
humanly existence, that is, one with the oppressed sharing in their condition.  Cone argues 
that Christ is alive in our midst continuing his work of liberation.  Therefore, we find Jesus 
today with the suffering and outcasts of our society and religious communities.   
                                                 
14
 Cone, A Black Theology of Liberation, 63.  The image of God/Christ as black has deep roots in black 
theology in general and Cone’s theology in particular.  For an analysis of the black God/Christ in black 
theology, see Kelly Brown Douglas, The Black Christ (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1994).  For more on 
God/Christ and blackness, see James H. Cone, “God is the Color of Suffering,” in Changing Face of God, ed. 
Frederick W. Schmidt (Harrisburg, PA: Morehouse Pub., 2000), 51-63; and Warren McWilliams, “Theodicy 
According to James Cone,” Journal of Religious Thought 36, no. 2 (1980): 45-54. 
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Cone posits that we know and make sense of God/Christ in our present context only 
in relation to the human condition as we know it.  He argues that in the contemporary U.S. 
God/Christ is found with the black community because they are the outcasts of our society.  
Because black people are oppressed because of their blackness, God has taken on this 
oppression as God’s own, and therefore God is black.  Christ must also be understood as 
black because he takes on the suffering of the oppressed as his own, in his very body.  Only 
in being black can Christ be today who Christ was.  If a person finds their being in God and 
wishes to live as the image of God, they must also completely identify with the oppressed 
and become black with them.  Christians must be black because God/Christ is black.  By 
describing God/Christ as black, Cone outlines racial identity as both literal and symbolic.  In 
a literal sense, Jesus was not a white man in the first century and because of who he was 
cannot be one today.  Since his presence and oneness with the oppressed and suffering cannot 
be docetic, in a racist society Christ must be black to share in the bodily suffering of the 
oppressed.15  But this racial identity is also symbolic for it is not just about skin color.  
Christ’s blackness represents most importantly God’s solidarity with the poor, sharing in 
their suffering today as he did in the first century on the cross, and giving hope for new life, 
as he did in the resurrection.   
As a Christian theologian, Cone professes that each person is created as and called to 
live as the image of the liberator God.  As a black man who has experienced and observed 
racism in this country, Cone argues with confidence that we are not living as God’s image.  
Cone contends that a proper understanding of who God/Christ was in the biblical stories and 
therefore who God/Christ is today is crucial for our self-understanding since our search for 
                                                 
15
 Cone, God of the Oppressed, 124.  Docetism is the belief that Jesus only seemed to have a physical body but 
in reality was incorporeal, a pure spirit.  Since Jesus’ physical body was only an illusion, he only appeared to 
physically die as a result of his crucifixion.  This belief is regarded as heretical by Christian churches. 
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identity is indeed our search for God.16  Professing Jesus Christ as the final and definitive 
word for Christians regarding their humanity, including the meaning and significance of 
bodily existence, means that Christians must convert to a new form of existence that radically 
identifies with the poor and oppressed.17  This new way of being, enabled by the inbreaking 
of the divine into social existence in the Incarnation, should transform our perceptions of 
identity.  For Cone, the meaning of Jesus Christ is an existential question; we must choose 
where we will stand and what we stand for.  A person is for or against oppression.  Because 
of Christ, people are now gifted with the freedom of self-determination about their being and 
are no longer dependent on oppressive systems by which a person’s existence was formerly 
defined.18  It is a freedom that allows the individual to choose God’s will, which calls us to 
be for others and to recognize that one’s individual freedom cannot be achieved or have 
meaning without the freedom of the other.  According to Cone, this new form of existence 
means that Christians today must be black by being fully present with the oppressed.  Race 
here is essential because it describes who we are and how we live based on the identity we 
choose within the racialized context in which we find ourselves. 
This theory of race as essence changes our current meanings of race in terms of 
whiteness and blackness as well as challenges the significance we attribute to skin color.  
Cone’s descriptions of white and black must be understood within the context of racism, 
which in this country is the context of and for our “racial” identities.  Cone writes that of 
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 Cone, A Black Theology of Liberation, 14. 
17
 Cone, My Soul Looks Back, 97. 
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 Cone writes that the new value system of black theology brings to bear the spirit of self-determination upon 
the consciousness of black people.  They are no longer dependent on the white oppressor for their understanding 
of truth, reality, or what ought to be done about the place of black sufferers in America.  To be free means to be 
free to create new possibilities for existence.  See Cone Black Theology and Black Power, 129-30.  Friday M. 
Mbon argues that the image of freedom is the central image in Cone’s analysis of what it is to be really human.  
For his analysis of all the aspects of Cone’s view of humanity, see his article, “James Cone and the Question of 
What it Means to be Really Human,” Journal of Religious Studies 18 (1992): 34-49. 
99 
 
course whiteness as such, meaning skin color, is no problem.  However, in the black 
experience whiteness almost always means racism and this is a very big problem.  Therefore, 
for Cone, whiteness in soul and mind, meaning in our way of being, is not identifying with 
the oppressed.  He argues that we cannot be white, culturally speaking, and think and act 
biblically.  In fact, he argues that the gospel denies whiteness as an acceptable form of human 
existence.  He further defines it as the symbol of humanity’s depravity and the expression of 
what is wrong with humanity, which is not living as if Christ is at the center of our lives.  If 
our racial identity expresses who we are and is the determinate of how we live, then whites 
must destroy their white identity, which represents racism and oppression, and forfeit 
privilege based on whiteness.19  They are free only when they become new persons by 
radically reorienting themselves to be on the side of the oppressed.  When they do this their 
white being passes away and they are created anew in black being.  Black identity means 
standing with that which society oppresses and denigrates, namely blackness, and taking a 
stand for liberation.   
Black persons must also embrace blackness.  Blackness in Cone’s theology represents 
the tension between oppression and the certainty of liberation.  It is both the visible reality of 
oppression in the U.S. and an ontological symbol of the ultimate liberation of the kingdom of 
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 This same theme is at the heart of a movement called race traitors.  In an interview, Noel Ignatiev of Race 
Traitor magazine defines a race traitor as someone who is nominally classified as white, but who defies the 
rules of whiteness so flagrantly as to jeopardize his or her ability to draw upon the privileges of the white skin.  
Race traitors advocate the abolition of the white race.  They contend that as long as the white race exists, all 
movements against what is called “racism” will fail.  They promote models of amalgamation.  They argue that 
although white supremacy seeks to repress the cultures of Afro-Americans and other peoples of color, American 
culture is incontestably mulatto.  Without race prejudice, Americans might discover that culturally they are all 
Afro-American, as well as Native American, and so forth.  See “Treason to Whiteness Is Loyalty to Humanity: 
An Interview with Noel Ignatiev of Race Traitor Magazine,” in Critical White Studies, 607-12. 
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God.20  Cone recognizes the suffering and humiliation of black people who are oppressed 
because of their blackness but appreciates that this suffering and oppression is not the 
definition of their humanity.  He recognizes that people of color are often symbols of 
oppression, but they are also signs of hope for the creation of a new humanity when they 
reject racist living and make the black God/Christ the center of their being.  U.S. society 
describes black as bad and rejects it as a way of being.21  Cone argues that God has made this 
blackness, this nonbeing in the world, God’s own condition.  No one can know God without 
knowing blackness.  To be in relationship with and meet God, one must embrace what the 
world hates; take it on as one’s own being.  This is why Cone writes that blackness is holy, 
because it is a symbol of God’s work and a mode of God’s presence.22  It is a special creation 
of God offered to us as a gift by which each person can reorient their existence to be on the 
side of the oppressed.  Blackness is a symbol of liberation from whiteness.  Cone writes that 
blacks have been searching for an identity beyond the boundaries of black being set for them 
by whites and white society.  This is evidenced in the shifts in self-naming and identification 
of this community from colored to Negro to black to African American.23  This search has 
also been an experience of an identity crisis because of the destruction of their past by whites 
and the attempt at assimilation as well as their own attempts to uncover their history and a 
new meaning to blackness within the reality of white social and political power.  Cone argues 
that black persons must also accept blackness as a gift of the creator, as a special creation of 
God. 
                                                 
20
 Cone recognizes that not all those who are oppressed are black.  If we understand with Cone that the kingdom 
of God is ultimate liberation, any humiliation caused by oppression is inconsistent with this promised future and 
our contemporary living of our faith based on it.  See Cone, A Black Theology of Liberation, 6 and 137. 
21
 This rejection is not mere individual or collective prejudice but backed by social sanctions in the form of 
economic exploitation and political marginalization to those who embody and embrace blackness.  See Cone, 
For My People, 5. 
22
 Cone, Black Theology and Black Power, 69. 
23
 See Cone, My Soul Looks Back, 95; and For My People, 14. 
101 
 
In Cone’s theology, in order for anyone to adopt this new way of being and living one 
must be liberated from our white past and its ideology of racism.  In opposition to a Christ-
centered way of being, racism is an outright denial of the Incarnation and Christianity.  It 
does not recognize that Jesus is with the oppressed in their blackness so it cannot recognize 
that that is where Christians must be as well.  Cone argues that the ultimate reality and 
meaning of humanity is thwarted by the existence of racism and the exaltation of whiteness, 
which sadly is the social ethos of the U.S.  The liberation Cone believes we all need is 
different for different people.  Non-freedom is a sin in his theology but we all sin differently 
depending on our social location.  White sin is the folly of playing God.  Whites are enslaved 
and dehumanized by their own will to power.  Therefore, they must be freed from their 
racism.  Black sin, on the other hand, is their loss of identity in a desire to be white.  Blacks 
must be freed from their self-hatred.  Their freedom will involve new ways of looking at and 
living reality.  Cone argues that by repudiating the other’s status as master, the oppressed are 
no longer slaves and can reorient their existence and achieve freedom even while still being 
poor or oppressed.  This new vision enables them to fight their oppression.  Both versions of 
liberation, white and black, are for Cone “not doing what I will but becoming what I should” 
and this becoming is to realize in ourselves the image of God.24 
For Cone race goes beyond mere skin color but is always connected to the meaning 
and significance given to skin color since race is a social construct based on skin color in 
U.S. society.  Just as Christ’s blackness is both literal and symbolic so is our racial identity.  
Humans obviously only live within the confines of their historical and cultural context, even 
though these are not the final determinants of humanity.  In this contemporary context, 
people live with color as a defining characteristic and from its beginnings have ordered U.S. 
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 Cone, Black Theology and Black Power, 39. 
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society based on it.  For Cone, however, racial identity is not just these constructions but also 
one’s answer to the question of where is one’s being and on what do you ground it.  Identity, 
including racial identity, is not set once and for all but is defined by what one believes about 
God/Christ and how one acts on this belief.  If people understand their purpose as Christians 
to be about the kingdom of God and their obligation to act as if Christ was at the center of 
their lives, then they will renounce “whiteness” and follow the “black” Christ.  If one 
grounds their being in God then they must become black, no matter what their skin color, 
because blackness is obedience to the gospel message to be in solidarity with the oppressed.   
As a theologian aware and reflective of his context, Cone recognizes the significance 
of race based on skin color in the United States.  He challenges this significance when he 
writes that race has little to do with skin color.  For Cone, black is the color of the heart, soul 
and mind when one is fully with the dispossessed.  Blacks are those who say they are and act 
as though they are black regardless of their skin color.  The blackness of one’s skin color is 
not enough to be living the image of God and does not exempt one from criticism.25  Only 
with the destruction of whiteness, for racially defined whites and blacks alike, can the 
wholeness of humanity, evidenced in the life of Jesus Christ, be realized.  Because it 
represents this wholeness, Cone can describe being black as our ultimate reality and 
identity.26  He admits that although blackness now describes materially the condition of the 
oppressed, it may not always be an appropriate symbol to describe the complete solidarity 
between God/Christ and the suffering.  But for now Cone uses racial identity to reflect on our 
being as human persons.   
                                                 
25
 Cone has often voiced disappointment and criticism of the black church.  As an example, see “Black 
Theology and the Black Church,” chap. 3 in My Soul Looks Back. 
26
 See Cone, Black Theology and Black Power, 32-33. 
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Cone challenges Christians to expand the concept of material identity to consider how 
it reflects beliefs and being based on these beliefs.  Cone’s challenge of reversal, 
understanding black as holy and white as evil, and his insistence on the need for all 
Christians to become black, disrupts commonsense and accepted notions of the meaning of 
skin color and race.  One is black or white, with the oppressed or the oppressors, with God or 
not.  By challenging current concepts of race, new possibilities for being are created.  The 
goal for Cone is not to reify race but to embrace individuality.  This individuality is not a 
laissez faire individuality but part of a new humanity in which the special uniqueness of 
every person is given and received, regardless of physical characteristics. 27  It is an 
individuality that expresses one’s core beliefs through the construct of race.   
 
Race as Historical Legacy 
A second approach to race is race as historical legacy, which claims that race still 
exists as the identities established to justify slavery and its aftermath of legalized 
discrimination, namely, race constructed as black and white.  This racial ideology created 
stereotypes that led to a mythology deeming blacks inferior in nature and whites naturally 
superior.  This racial ideology was so strong and so widely accepted that it was then and still 
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 Cone recognizes that identity is a complex concept.  He has come to recognize that there are interlocking 
structures of oppression that shape our society and world and has therefore broadened the scope of his analysis 
to realize the sins of sexism, imperialism, and classism.  See “Black Theology, Feminism, and Marxism,” chap. 
5 in Cone, My Soul Looks Back.  For more on Cone’s engagement with women’s experience, see James H. 
Cone, “Women’s Experience of the Sacred: An African American Male Theological Response,” Voices from 
the Third World 19, no. 1 (June 1996): 162-69.  For more on his engagement with other liberation theologies, 
see James H. Cone, “From Geneva to Sao Pãulo: A Dialogue Between Black Theology and Latin American 
Liberation Theology,” in Black Theology: A Documentary History 1966-1979, eds. James H. Cone and Gayraud 
S. Wilmore (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1993), 371-87; “Theologies of Liberation Among U.S. Racial-Ethnic 
Minorities,” in Convergences and Differences, eds. Leonardo Boff and Virgil Elizondo (Edinburgh: T & T 
Clark, 1988), 54-64; and “Black Theology and the Imperative and Dilemma of Solidarity,” in Struggles for 
Solidarity: Liberation Theologies in Tension, eds. Lorine M. Getz and Ruy O. Costa ( Minneapolis: Fortress Pr, 
1992), 37-48. Cone has also begun to engage with the ecological movement.  See “Whose Earth Is It Anyway?”  
Cross Currents 50 (Spring-Summer 2000): 36-46.  
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is at the heart of American culture.  Those who investigate race from this angle claim that by 
exploring and coming to grips with this racial legacy, we not only better understand our own 
identities as black and white, but we make conscious how this racial ideology influences our 
thoughts and actions.  This approach views race as relational and dynamic and recognizes 
that we continue to construct race in how we live together today.  The goal of this approach 
to race is to educate people about racial legacies so as to change the constructions of white 
and black to a new way of living together that does not continue the injustices of the past.  
Although all black theologians base their theology on the black experience, which in the 
United States began and continues to be influenced by slavery and legalized discrimination, I 
use the work of womanist theologians Delores Williams and Kelly Brown Douglas to outline 
this theory of race.28   
Both Williams and Brown Douglas argue that in order to understand race in this 
country one must begin with an investigation of the American institution of slavery that gave 
birth to it.  Williams uses the term slavocracy to connote that slavery in the U.S. involved not 
just the act of enslaving black people but a whole ideology—a way of being and thinking.  At 
the heart of this slavocracy was the construction of race in terms of white and black, which 
assigned essential importance to skin color. Williams contends that although colonists also 
deemed Native Americans as different and inferior, they based this assessment on English 
national and religious biases; the same evaluation applied to Negro slaves had to do with 
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 I rely on Delores S. Williams, Sisters in the Wilderness: The Challenge of Womanist God-Talk (Maryknoll, 
NY: Orbis Books, 1993); and Kelly Brown Douglas, Sexuality and the Black Church: A Womanist Perspective 
(Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1999).  I more fully investigate their work in Chapter 4, which explores how 
womanist theologians and thinkers bring together race and sex/gender. 
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English values regarding color, especially blackness.29  She argues that skin color or 
blackness became “an independent rationale for enslavement.”30   
Historian Winthrop Jordan in his book White Over Black gives a different answer to 
the question of the relationship of slavery and the creation of race based on skin color.31  
Jordan concludes that difference of color, which became the “mark” of race and really “race” 
itself, was not the reason for enslaving Africans; it was the rationale for it, after the fact.  At 
first, the English believed the Africans had no religion or civilization and they thought the 
African ways were lewd and libidinous.  These impressions made the Africans heathen, 
savage, and almost bestial in their eyes, but Jordan contends that even all of this did not add 
up to a vision of innate, ineradicable inferiority rooted in the body.  The need for such a 
vision of race based on skin color arose with the spread of slavery, which became the better 
means of meeting the material and economic interests of the English colonizers than 
indentured servitude.32  As Luther Wright writes in “Who’s Black, Who’s White, and Who 
Cares,” “One problem with the existence of indentured servants and slaves in a free society 
was the ease with which slaves or servants could escape if they were not distinguishable from 
free citizens.  By linking slavery to race, slave escape became much more difficult, 
particularly once all blacks were presumed to be slaves.”33  This focus on skin color also 
resulted from the slaveowners’ or slave supporters’ wrestling with the questions that arose 
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 Williams, Sisters in the Wilderness, 90. 
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 Ibid., 92. 
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 I rely on James Campbell and James Oakes’ analysis of Jordan’s book in their article “The Invention of Race: 
Rereading White Over Black” in Critical White Studies, 145-51.  I am not here interested in whether their 
analysis is the “correct” one but am focusing on an alternative argument about the relationship of slavery and 
race than that proposed by Williams.  Jordan argues that skin color was only one of the ways the English 
described the difference between themselves and Africans in their first face-to-face encounters.  Although they 
described them as black, an exaggerated term full of negative connotations, more impressive to the English at 
the outset was that the African appeared to have no religion or civilization. 
32
 Campbell and Oakes, “The Invention of Race,” 146-47.  A great labor shortage existed in a place where the 
availability of land resulted in few people voluntarily selling their labor for wages.   
33
 Luther Wright, Jr., “Who’s Black, Who’s White, and Who Cares,” in Critical White Studies, 164. 
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concerning the place of free blacks or the status of children of “mixed” couples.34  These 
questions demanded a more systematic approach to blacks and race.  This approach drew on 
two secular traditions of the time, the Great Chain of Being and the Linnaean system of 
biological classifications, which led to “the naturalization of man” that used the human body 
as a basis for distinguishing between different groups of people.35  The process of building 
the American nation where equality was a national ideal involved “imagining” a community 
in which some would be included while others excluded.  Jordan argues that in the post-
Revolutionary period, based on the premise of black inherent inferiority, American 
intellectuals, in effect, claimed America as a white man’s country.   
Both Delores Williams and Kelly Brown Douglas recognize that any ideas and 
theories about blackness also suggest ideas and theories about its opposite, namely whiteness.  
These bodily distinctions were constructed in relation to each other.  Both authors contend 
that the debasement of blackness is always related to the overvaluation of whiteness.  The 
white and black “races” became polar opposites connoting, respectively, “purity and 
filthiness, virginity and sin, virtue and baseness, beauty and beneficence and evil, God and 
the devil.”36  Williams argues that by regarding blacks as “nasty and beastly” they could be 
required to do any kind of work the slavocracy demanded.37  Whiteness according to the 
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 Jordan argues that widespread fear and loathing of free blacks was a crucial component in the development of 
racist ideology.  It was the existence of free blacks that constituted an invitation to develop a new rationale 
which would tell white men who they were and where they stood in the community—the rationale of racial 
superiority.  Campbell and Oakes, “The Invention of Race,” 148, 150.  By the turn of the century, the free status 
of blacks and the growing difficulty in distinguishing them from whites sharpened the nation’s need to define 
race.  The legal categories of griffe, octoroon, quadroon, and mulatto betray a society so concerned with racial 
purity that it began to define distinct categories by which to delineate the degree of “taint.”  See Wright, “Who’s 
Black, Who’s White, and Who Cares,” 166. 
35
 The Great Chain of Being is a Western medieval concept of the hierarchical structure of the universe, which 
extends from God down to the lowest forms of life.  The Linnaean system is a biological taxonomy that 
classifies organisms according to their similarities.  It was developed by the Swedish scientist Carolus Linnaeus 
(1707-1778).  In it organisms are sorted according to kingdom, phylum, class, order, family, genus, and species.  
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 Williams, Sisters in the Wilderness, 90. 
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 Ibid., 94. 
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slavocracy meant you were not a slave and did not have to prove this status.  Very 
concretely, a person’s race based on the color of their skin determined their freedom.  In 
addition to indicating one’s place in society, a person’s skin color was also assumed to 
indicate their innate value.  Slavery demanded that black inferiority be grounded in nature.  
This construction of race was supported by all manner of thought including that of science, 
religion, and law.38 
Williams and Brown Douglas argue that although most racist caricatures were 
developed in order to justify the institution of slavery, their influence continues to prevail in 
society today.  Brown Douglas writes that growing up black in America means discovering 
early in life the various stereotypes that surround blackness.  Both Williams and Brown 
Douglas examine these stereotypes and caricatures that were part of the mythology of slavery 
and analyze how they have been translated into modern parlance.  Brown Douglas writes that 
the image of Jezebel defined the black female as “a person governed almost entirely by her 
libido,” a temptress, and thereby justified white men’s sexual exploitation of black women.39  
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 Theories in religion and science were employed to justify the enslavement and oppression of blacks and to 
assuage any feelings of guilt by providing “evidence” of its historical and scientific inevitability.  White 
interpretations of the bible reasoned that the enslavement of black people was intended by God and recorded in 
scripture, especially the story of the curse of Ham and Paul’s defense of slavery.  The work of some physical 
anthropologists claimed that blacks had always been servants to the “more intelligent” races, read Caucasian, 
even in the most distant past.  “Scientific” studies of sociobiology and the eugenics movement perpetuated the 
idea of black people’s inherent intellectual and moral inferiority and white people’s inherently superior 
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presented as “evidence” that black people were biologically predisposed to being lascivious and sexually 
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those governed by reason, namely, white men.  See Williams, Sisters in the Wilderness, 96, 105-6; and Brown 
Douglas, Sexuality and the Black Church, 34.  Legal rhetoric throughout the centuries has also often 
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degradation.  For specific cases and examples, see Thomas Ross, “The Rhetorical Tapestry of Race,” in Critical 
White Studies, 89-97; and Ian F. Haney López, “The Social Construction of Race,” in Critical Race Theory: The 
Cutting Edge, 2d ed., ed. Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2000), 
163-75.  For more on how public policies are shaped by white privilege, see Linda Faye Williams, The 
Constraint of Race: The Legacies of White Skin Privilege in America (University Park: Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 2003). 
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Brown Douglas argues that the Jezebel image remains virtually intact in our culture and has 
been carried forth in the image of black women as welfare mothers/queens who are portrayed 
as promiscuous unmarried women.40  Connected to the Jezebel image is the caricature of the 
black man as beastly and violent, the sexually perverse reprobate.  This image justified 
treating the enslaved black man as a powerful animal, a buck, who could produce work and 
breed offspring.  Through the years the supposed superpotency and virility of the black male 
has meant he is a sexual predator whose common prey was and is white women.41  These 
descriptions of slave mythology were used to justify the ill treatment of enslaved blacks, but 
they did not meet all the needs of the slavocracy.  White slaveholders could not entrust the 
care of their children and their households to Jezebels and bucks.  Therefore, the role and 
stereotype of the Mammy emerged.42  Mammy was the strong asexual nurturer of the white 
family.  Mammy has become the strong, single mother with no needs, the domineering 
matriarch.  Connecting current racial stereotypes with those of the past is one way that these 
authors support the claim that the racial system that justified slavery did not cease with 
emancipation.43 
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 This Jezebel image is not limited to just impoverished black women, however.  Brown Douglas contends that 
the Thomas/Hill hearings witnessed to the continuing power of the Jezebel image for all black women.  A 
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Williams and Brown Douglas maintain that the racial ideology that was developed 
within the history of slavery and oppression and that has always valued whiteness over 
blackness is still at the heart of American culture.  Williams argues that skin color 
consciousness and the value put upon color have birthed a pathological pattern in American 
culture that continues to this day.  She names this pattern “white racial narcissism” and 
defines it as the overvaluation of one group’s skin color to the pathological point of using the 
group’s power and authority to persecute others who are not of that skin color.44  She 
contends that in this country and its society whiteness is valued as good and its opposite 
blackness has been assigned a permanent negative value.  The view that blackness is bad, 
frightening, and dangerous, especially when it is the color of human bodies, has saturated the 
American national consciousness and conscience.  Brown Douglas also views American 
society as one that is fixated on whiteness and has embraced and lives a white culture. 45  
White culture is the very culture that harbors and nurtures white racism.   
This racial ideology in the U.S. serves several purposes.  One is economic.  Williams 
writes that the debasement of blackness and therefore black people was from the beginning 
economically important to this country.  The slave trade was the primary source of wealth 
during the colonial period.  Brown Douglas concurs that black people have been absolutely 
critical to white economic power, initially as free labor and later as cheap labor.  The ability 
to freely exploit black bodies with relative impunity has been critical to the labor market.  
She adds that another reason these stereotypes have been employed by white culture is that 
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the very color and physiognomy of black persons has inspired both fear and fascination from 
whites.  Both reactions have served to heighten the sense that black people need to be 
controlled.46   
The mythology of whiteness and blackness serves not only the function of denigrating 
and subsequently oppressing blacks but also of uniting whites.  Williams writes that even 
though after slavery, poor whites would have had more in common with the plight of blacks, 
they nevertheless got their feelings of self-worth from membership in the white race since 
society invested such great value in white skin.  American culture employed whiteness as a 
variable to unite various European immigrants together in a white group identity.  Brown 
Douglas maintains that European immigrants arrived as Irish, Italian, English, German, and 
various other ethnic and cultural groups, yet somewhere on the shores of America they 
became white.  They subordinated their ethnic and cultural particularities in order to adopt a 
common national identity as white Americans.47  This white group identity was the harbinger 
of white culture, which exists primarily as it is contrasted with that which is non-white. 
The theory of race as historical legacy respects the fact that our current attitudes 
toward race and our own racist selves did not spring out of a vacuum, but have long cultural 
antecedents.  It approaches race as something formed by social distinctions, invented in time 
and place, not nature.  Race was not created by one person or even a group but by the needs 
of a way of life, in this case the slavocracy of the United States.  We cannot properly address 
our bodily reality without recognizing the inheritance of race born in the system of 
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oppression and privilege.  We are heirs to notions of race based on skin color.  People were 
members of different races because they were assigned to them based on skin color.  It was 
important for this racial ideology, however, to connect skin color not only to supposedly 
different biological groupings but to connect the color of race to innate characteristics that 
were then classified hierarchically.  Whites possessed a superior nature; blacks were closer to 
animals.  This theory of race lays out what our racial legacy works to keep unnoticed; 
namely, that race is constructed for specific purposes.  It is in no way natural or innate.   
This approach to race challenges people to understand the progression, content and purpose 
of the construction of race in the U.S. in order to better understand black and white identity.  
Black theologians and theorists understand the importance of and have undertaken the task of 
investigating the history of being one’s race in this country.  They have also repeatedly called 
upon white theologians and theorists to do their own work on the meaning of whiteness and 
of white privilege or white supremacy.  James Baldwin counseled white people to “do your 
first works over.”  He called them “to reexamine everything.  Go back to where you started, 
or as far back as you can, examine all of it, travel your road again and tell the truth about it.  
Sing or shout or testify or keep it to yourself: but know whence you came.”48  White theorists 
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and white theologians are beginning to answer this call.  Thinkers in various fields are 
beginning to interrogate whiteness and a field of critical studies of whiteness has emerged.  
The purpose of these studies is to investigate the meaning of whiteness in a white 
supremacist society.  Racism is understood as a white problem and the goal is to dismantle 
the structures that support and encourage it.49 
This theory of race contends that the origin and staying power of white supremacy are 
confronted only when we delve into the history of race and its ongoing legacy.  White 
supremacy should be understood as a system of individual, institutional, and societal 
practices in which whiteness, meaning “white” bodies, and the cultural and societal practices 
associated with those deemed “white,” are seen as normative and superior, and through 
which white people are granted advantaged status of various kinds and their political, social, 
and economic dominance is maintained as is the subjugation of peoples of color.50  Once we 
recognize that human interaction is a source and continued basis for racial categorization, we 
now put ourselves in a position to change the continuing racial ideology based on white 
supremacy by expressing, embodying, and living race differently.  This legacy results in 
some bodies being more valued, which is contradictory to both the Christian revelation that 
all are created in God’s image and the American proclamation that all are created equal.  
With knowledge and understanding we can recreate race for the purpose of equality. 
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Race as Culture 
 The approach to race as culture claims that defining race in terms of skin color is 
insufficient and inaccurate.  This theory shifts the focus from race as skin color to race as 
communities with shared histories that provide their members with a common worldview and 
culture.  Black identity becomes African American identity which better reflects the self-
understanding and culture of a specific community.  This approach to race recognizes that 
black bodies not only symbolize oppression in American society, but embody African 
American culture that stretches back before this oppression and sustained people in the midst 
of it.  Theologians who posit this approach to race believe it provides new challenges and 
insights to the Church in terms of individual and communal embodiment as well as breaking 
down barriers between people while maintaining diversity and difference.  This approach to 
race is well represented in black Catholic theology.  I use the work of Diana Hayes, Jamie 
Phelps, M. Shawn Copeland, and Joseph Brown to explore it.   
Race as culture recognizes that traditional racial classifications such as black and 
white are too vague and do not reflect the diversity that exists within the very groups they are 
trying to define.  These racial classifications define racial groups as monochromatic and 
monolithic in order to easily define who are to rule and who should be ruled.  Diana Hayes 
argues that these classifications mostly serve to maintain the “hegemonic dominance of 
persons of European descent,” those deemed “white.”51  They were never meant to address 
the diversity that exists in all racial groups.  In fact, such nuance immediately breaks down 
the categories of black and white.  For example, the black community is extremely diverse 
encompassing different languages, cultures, and skin colors.  The either/or approach to race 
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divides people into neat and specific boxes and alienates one from the other even if they 
share interests and concerns.  The approach to race as culture addresses both the problem of 
unnecessary distinction of persons into absolute others and the problem of not recognizing 
true diversity between persons.  By shifting focus to culture, and therefore community, this 
approach to race encourages true diversity in the richness of different cultures, yet allows 
room to unite for common goals of justice. 
The approach to race as culture shifts emphasis from race as skin color and the 
history of racial categorization based on it to a focus on community.  Proponents of this race 
theory argue that how people define and name themselves depends more on the particular 
communities and cultures into which they are born than any specific physical attributes.52  
Therefore, they focus on the shared story of the community not simply the physical attributes 
the community has in common.  Personal identity is understood as coming from being part of 
a community with a shared history that produces a shared culture.  Communities nurture and 
teach their members.  They provide a worldview, a context for self-understanding, traditions, 
heritages, art, music, and language.  These communities with their specific cultures provide a 
way to understand self and the world.  These cultures are part of their members forever 
because they form a person’s identity.  Community identity is not just a historical legacy but 
on ongoing and changing reality.  To be authentically part of a community is to trace one’s 
roots throughout the history of that community and also to be part of the ongoing reality of 
the community.  The community’s story is always unfolding.  Therefore, racial identity is not 
set once and for all because the story of it is still being told in the day-to-day existence of the 
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community that produces it.  It evolves as culture changes with the times and 
circumstances.53 
 The theory of race as culture in its shift of focus from skin color to community treats 
black heritage more specifically as African American heritage.  Hayes contends that although 
most black theologians use the terms African American and Black American 
interchangeably, African American is the appropriate term for those who trace their ancestry 
back to the time of slavery in the United States, while black American is a more inclusive 
term covering not only African Americans but any person of African descent living within 
the United States today regardless of intermediate places of origin.54  She argues that African 
Americans’ ancestors may have been free or enslaved, but either way they were marked by 
the experience of slavery and usually have a worldview somewhat different from that of 
other persons of African descent.  This kind of specificity in talking about “racial” groups is 
at the heart of a race as culture approach.   
This specificity also reflects the importance of self-naming for communities and 
individuals.  In the last section race was treated as a historical legacy and being raced was the 
experience of being named rather than self-naming.  This current approach to race holds up 
culture as identity because it claims that culture is who and what we say we are.55  An 
approach to race as culture understands that self-naming is not only important but liberating, 
especially if people lift up a name formerly used to denigrate and dehumanize as is the case 
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for African Americans.  Of course, African American culture includes the reality of racial 
classification and racial injustice, but it also embodies the agency of the community in self-
definition.  Self-naming as African and American better represents an identity informed by 
the new community born in the United States as a result of the institution of slavery and by 
the ancient people from whom they came and inherited ways of being in the world.   
 The African American community provides its members with an identity that 
recognizes both its African roots and its American reality.  It is a specific identity that 
reflects a particular community’s experience.  The roots of this experience stretch back to 
Africa and help the community understands itself as heirs of African cultures.  But the 
African American identity also reflects their long and proud history in the United States 
where they formed themselves into a new people.56  This African reality and American 
experience collided in the African slave trade, which affected identity throughout the world.  
Joseph Brown writes,   
No mistake should ever be made regarding an assessment of the culpability and the 
consequences of the transatlantic trade in human beings.  Millions and millions of 
lives were lost; millions more would wish for death, once they found out what the life 
of enslavement would bring them.  Centuries of systematic torture, manipulation, 
abuse, and domination of human beings by other human beings have brought into the 
world a pattern of psychosis and destructive behaviors that has infected cultures and 
peoples everywhere.57 
 
The impact of the slave trade is central to the previous theory of race as historical legacy; it is 
here explored as part of the creation of African American culture and identity. 
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 The American part of the African American reality and identity began with the story 
of African persons stolen from their communities and their land by slave traders.  This was 
just the beginning of a process by slavers to strip these people of all that made them who they 
were, including their language, traditions, and culture.  The goal was to make them a blank 
slate upon which to draw a new and derogatory image of the enslaved person.58  The 
enslaved resisted these efforts in whatever ways they could and countered with their own 
efforts to create a new self-image for themselves.  Enslaved Africans transformed themselves 
into a new people by embracing each other as brothers and sisters no matter the differences 
between them, and becoming an African American community.  The members of this 
community shared a history of oppression and suffered from the stigma associated with black 
skin color in American society.  Jamie Phelps writes that all the attempts to dehumanize 
African Americans did impact their culture-making process, but did not dominate it.59  
African Americans replaced slavery’s negative depictions of them with more positive self-
images.  Their self-understanding comes from the stories of the community that have formed 
and sustained it, especially those stories that tell and retell their history.  In addition to 
stories, Joseph Brown writes that enslaved Africans became a community through their song.  
He contends that they sang themselves from small groups of individuals into a people.  Their 
singing brought them from the brink of collective psychic collapse to a place where systems 
of psychological health could be generated and sustained.60 
 Theologians who investigate African American identity from a cultural perspective 
recognize that this new people born in America through their stories and songs were in fact 
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not new people.  The approach to race as culture leads theologians back to Africa in an 
attempt to trace African American heritage backward and find lines of influence forward.  
When theologians advocate for a black theology that is truly black, they mean one that 
reflects African American culture embracing American experience and African heritage.  The 
connection they seek is not so much an innate biological sense of being African but a way of 
understanding the influences of African cultures on the culture and community that became 
African American.  Of course, the task of African Americans tracing their roots back to 
Africa is not simple.  Unlike immigrants from other countries, enslaved Africans were 
systematically stripped of their history and heritage by the slavocracy of America.  Finding 
one’s specific heritage in Africa is difficult because it is a continent of many different 
cultures and traditions.  Even if the search is narrowed to the Western part of Africa where 
most enslaved Africans were captured, one still finds there peoples of different cultures and 
religions.  Some scholars, therefore, try to map out and make connections among the 
different cultures and religions of those Africans most likely enslaved in order to find 
similarities and patterns.  There are efforts to distinguish a distinctive African culture at the 
base of all African cultures, whether on the continent or in the diaspora, and to describe an 
Afrocentric worldview.  Theologians have begun to outline a traditionally African religious 
perspective that would have influenced African American Christianity.61 
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 Employing an approach to race as culture, black theology teases out the black 
experience, which is its main source for doing theology.  It is the African American 
community and its culture that black theology is referencing not racial classification in terms 
of biology.  Even though the African and American elements of this culture are always 
wedded to the meaning given to certain aspects of physicality, it is the entire story of the 
African American community to which black theology refers.  It reflects the particular 
experience of the divine this community has had within their culture.   
M. Shawn Copeland writes that there is a synergy between identity and theology, 
between black identity and black theology.62  Black theologians that embrace a race as 
culture approach reflect on the African American community and its culture as a main source 
for doing theology.  They learn the cultures of West Africa in order to truly understand what 
the slave trade meant to and did to captured Africans as well as what culture they brought 
with them and how that was molded into African American life and culture.  They attend to 
the stories of these enslaved people to get a sense of how they were able to embrace a forced 
and often hostile Christianity.  They learn from slave theology that slaves understood God 
speaking to them in their own medium.  Diana Hayes explains this to mean that African 
American slaves could not worship God truthfully unless they “talked” with God through 
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their black culture.63  This culture continues to mediate God’s presence according to black 
theology. 
 This approach to race as culture is central to the conversation about being black and 
Catholic.  The question has been raised to black Catholics whether it is possible to be both 
authentically black and truly Catholic.64  Obviously this question is addressing more than 
skin color.  Here the question is whether one can be wholly part of the black community and 
a full member of the Catholic Church at the same time.  The question reflects the fact that the 
Catholic Church has been beset by racism in the past and present.  The Church, with its 
Eurocentric identity, has encouraged African Americans to forsake their unique identities and 
cultural practices in order to be seen as truly Catholic.  Other members of the black 
community understand this as a denial of black Catholics’ blackness.  The question here is 
whether these cultures, black and Catholic, are compatible and whether one can participate in 
both without betraying the other.65 
Diana Hayes proclaims the belief of Catholic theologians when she writes that to be 
black and Catholic is not a paradox; it is not a conflict; it is not a contradiction.  To be black 
and Catholic is correct, it is authentic, it is who black Catholics are and have always been.66  
Jamie Phelps argues that to address this identity question one must have a thorough 
knowledge of the black and Catholic cultures in all their complexities.  Most black Catholic 
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theologians begin with tracing the black presence in the Catholic Church.  This stems from a 
conviction that to be authentically Catholic is to trace one’s or one’s people’s roots in the 
Church, just as to be authentically black means to trace one’s roots throughout that history as 
well.  Sharing authentically in the history of these groups makes one part of them.  Black 
Catholic theologians attend to their historical presence in the Catholic Church and rightly 
conclude that there have been African peoples in the Catholic Church as long as the Church 
has existed.67  The Church needs to embody this reality at the altar, in the chancery, in the 
seminaries, and other educational institutions in black bodies, which are black culture.  The 
Catholic Church has too long negated this culture, which hampers its ability to immerse itself 
in the lives, traditions, and cultures of a people historically seen as “less than” human, 
without cultures or traditions worthy of notice.68  Its ability to join with these cultures is a 
critical contemporary challenge of the Catholic Church.  These black Catholic theologians 
are challenging the Church to recognize the cultures and heritages of the many peoples who 
make up the Church and create true inculturation with respect to these life-giving and life-
sustaining cultures.  They also hope it will foster a new theology, open to the contributions of 
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every race and ethnicity, expanding our understanding not only of each other but also of God 
and Jesus Christ. 
The goal of this approach to race is to shift focus and emphasis from race as physical, 
meaning skin color, to race as community or culture.  It argues that our racial identity is 
constructed by the history of our communities as well as their ongoing stories.  It emphasizes 
the self-definition of the community and not just how it has been traditionally defined by 
those in power for the purpose of oppression.  This approach to race challenges people to 
self-define in a more nuanced way than the usual black and white categories.  It points out 
that these groupings do not do justice to the diversity of those that make them up.  Once we 
define ourselves and allow others their own self-definition we can appreciate our differences 
and meet on common ground.   
This approach to race with its emphasis on culture treats black and white as quite 
different categories.  The black community, or more specifically the African American 
community, developed a common culture based on the historical experiences of slavery and 
oppression and resistance to this but also things like food, art, music, language, styles, 
because they were robbed of their heritage and family and clan lineages.  White is not a 
culture in the same way.  Whites may have become a new group of people in America, but 
those that became “white” maintained the cultures of their immigrant forebears.  Their 
whiteness was opposed to being “colored,” it only had meaning based on the oppression of 
blackness.  There may be a worldview based on white supremacy, but this is not the same 
kind of worldview as that created in the African American community.  This approach to 
race encourages whites to reclaim their cultural heritages and once again find and appreciate 
the diversity of the “white” race.  Changing our approach to race can change how we interact 
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based on hierarchy and oppression to ways based on respect of differences.  Diana Hayes 
articulates the goal as the recognition that we are all people of mixed races, mestizaje people, 
when it comes to culture, and still all of the same race, human persons.69 
 
Race as Class 
The next theory of race contends that the construction of race can never be addressed 
as an independent variable.  A full appreciation of the meaning and significance of race must 
include an economic analysis as well.  This approach to race connects racial discrimination 
and economic exploitation as two sides of the same coin.  I use the work of Dwight Hopkins 
to give voice to this approach to race.70  Hopkins does not negate the continuing significance 
of race and racism in American society.  He maintains that race matters in the United States, 
regardless of denomination, gender, class, sexual orientation, occupation, professional level, 
and political orientation, and racial discrimination still permeates North American culture.71  
But Hopkins understands racial discrimination as just one aspect of the disenfranchisement 
suffered by African Americans.  Another aspect is the restrictions they experience in 
controlling wealth, resources, and indeed the space surrounding them.  These attacks on 
African American self-identity and self-determination have been an integral part of African 
American life and history.72  Therefore, Hopkins argues that the liberation of the black poor 
requires more than just a critique of race and an analysis of racism.  A too narrow focus on 
race is inadequate because the forces that keep the black poor poor are more complex.  Black 
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theology must understand the black poor’s place in our economic system as well as in our 
national racial order.  This complexity demands a more sophisticated theoretical framework 
that addresses both our postmodern situation and our economic reality.73  Hopkins presents a 
theological analysis of monopoly capitalism and its underlying racism and proposes an 
alternative vision of a new common wealth.  He advocates an understanding of the forces of 
global monopoly capitalism in order to create a more equitable world. 
Hopkins argues that black theology must focus on the situation of the black poor if it 
is truly a Christian liberation theology.  Black theology as Christian theology teaches us that 
God is a liberator God who co-labors with the poor and oppressed for justice.  If the 
liberation of the least is God/Christ’s purpose then it must be our purpose as Christians.  
Hopkins writes that the biblical stories call on humanity to oppose poverty, which is the 
result of human sin.  He further asserts that the stories and lessons of Jesus teach us to judge 
life by the well-being of the most broken and vulnerable among our citizenry.  Hopkins 
argues that black theology has always attended to the experience of the poor in its 
community.  It arose from real life situations of African Americans struggling against racial 
oppression and economic exploitation.  Hopkins calls on black theologians to continue to 
produce a theology concerned with the liberation of the poor, which involves dismantling the 
dehumanizing structures that make and keep African Americans poor.  To do this, black 
theology must understand why the poor are and remain poor.  This requires a class analysis.  
He writes,  
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The question of economically poor blacks living in the primary monopoly finance 
capitalist country in human history is the decisive question for both womanist and 
black male theologians.  All else in God-talk and God-walk stands or falls on how 
Jesus Christ calls us to measure our everyday living by whether or not poor black 
people are getting better or worse.  If black and womanist theologians are concerned 
with liberation and not only with band-aid reforms, then class, poverty, ownership of 
wealth, finance, and the means of production in the United States—indeed, in the 
world—need to be top priorities.74   
 
Hopkins advocates a wealth-class hermeneutic for black and womanist theologies in 
order to understand the system of global capitalism and how its unjust power dynamics on 
the national and international levels relate to and create the reality of the poor.  It is wealth 
that is crucial for economic analysis not simply income because it is wealth that determines 
one’s power and privilege in American society and throughout the world.  Class 
differentiations in the U.S. are based on the control of wealth.  Those with wealth own the 
means and distribution of production, including land, the natural minerals in the land, the 
commercial real estate on the land, the air over the land, communications networks, 
industries, technologies, companies and corporations.75  Hopkins believes that monopolized 
wealth is one of the primary targets of the gospel for social justice because it is a major 
condition for the vast poverty and economic inequalities in North America and around the 
globe. 
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 Hopkins contends that an economic analysis must be integral to black theology 
because the monopolized ownership of wealth in the United States is directly related to skin 
color.  He argues that powerful white families, under the leadership of white men, crafted a 
sinister racist asymmetry, known as white supremacy, in order to monopolize resources.76  
Defining black as evil, powerful whites forced African Americans into servant and manual 
labor roles while also denying them human and civil rights that the majority of the population 
regularly expects as its God-given entitlement.  Black human beings became just another 
resource to be used and dominated for profit and the accumulation of more wealth.  Hopkins 
further contends that the state apparatus, also predominantly white, functions in collusion 
with, if not at the behest of, the small minority of white families who monopolize the 
majority of the wealth in the United States.77  The racism of U.S. capitalism also means that 
the neighborhoods of poor black people can be the dumping grounds for deadly chemicals 
and other lethal toxins that shorten lives.78   
Hopkins’ own analysis of the finance and means of production of global capitalism is 
uniquely theological, analyzing it as he would a religion, replete with a god, clergy, 
institutions, a theology, revelation, a theological anthropology and core values.  According to 
Hopkins, the god or ultimate concern of the religion of globalization is the concentration of 
monopoly finance capitalist wealth.  It is a transcendent god beyond allegiances or 
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boundaries reflected in the fact that wealth circulates wherever in the world the owner can 
find the highest return.  The religious leadership consists of a small group of U.S. families 
who privately own, control, and distribute wealth and the means of production.  Like priests, 
they know the laws of the god and the requirements of its followers. 
The institutions of the religion facilitate the flow of finance capital and aid the wealth 
of the priests.  These entities, he argues, maintain dependent financial relationships, an 
unequal balance of trade, and unfair access to resources and wealth that allows the religion of 
globalization to have free access to the developed world and the Third World.79  Hopkins 
argues that these institutions are enabled and justified by the theology of neoliberalism whose 
three prominent doctrines are an emphasis on free markets, privatization and deregulation.  
The goal is to open up global markets for the god of globalization.  Transnational 
corporations enter developing countries, create unfavorable terms for the countries’ efforts of 
exporting, and disrupt their economic planning for domestic prosperity.  The governments of 
these countries stop regulating the harmful effects of business practices on their people and 
ecology.  They are also forced to refocus resources to repaying debts on loans by monopoly 
capitalists and away from health, education, welfare, jobs, and other safety nets for their 
citizens.  Devotees of the religion of globalization view the integration of all markets 
throughout the world, the weakening of the sovereignty and decision-making powers of local 
states and their shift of focus from their own people to the service of transnational 
corporations, and the movement to a worldwide culture as revelation of the truth and 
rightness of their god. 
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Hopkins writes that like all religions, the religion of globalization advances a 
theological anthropology, which defines what it means to be a human being in a religious 
system.  In this system a person’s worth is based on what they consume.  A true human being 
is one who actually possesses commodities or one whose goal in life is to do so.  The ideal 
person has the most concentrated financial wealth accumulation on a global scale, which they 
use for their own individual benefit.  Global capitalism rejects communalism and embraces a 
utilitarian way of being.  Only a few can become ideal persons for inequality and exclusion 
are requisites of the religion.80  These values, Hopkins argues, are at the heart of U.S. society 
and other developed capitalist countries.  These Western countries want to establish their way 
of life as the model for developing countries.  The religion of globalization intends to create 
one transcendent world culture that prescribes the tastes and sensibilities of the true human 
being.81 
 Hopkins argues that the theological anthropology of global capitalism constructs the 
wealthy white person as the ideal model of human personhood.  Monopoly capitalism is 
entwined with white supremacy.  Hopkins writes that although its advocates present it as 
intended and supported by God, true Christians should know that God did not originate or 
advocate these oppressive systems.  They are authored by humans and so can be dismantled 
by human efforts as well.  Hopkins claims that the goal of liberation theology must be to 
liberate us all from an economic system that preys on the most vulnerable and rewards only 
the wealthy few.  Economic analysis should lead us to a concerted effort to bring about 
systemic social justice and healing.  These efforts should empower individuals and attack 
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unjust systems created by the small group of monopoly owners of the world’s wealth.  He 
argues that black theology must unite its liberation theology with all the world’s oppressed 
who struggle for God’s purpose of justice on earth.82  Monopoly capitalism has stolen 
resources from blacks as well as other people of color and Third World nations and left them 
poor and oppressed all over the world.  The poor must unite against the global dynamics of 
monopoly capitalism that destroys indigenous cultures, discriminates against darker-skinned 
peoples, oppresses women, and attacks the earth’s ecology.  Global monopoly capitalism 
strangles the poor regardless of religion or nationality. 
According to Hopkins, these dialogues and actions should work toward what he calls 
a new common wealth.  This new social order will include a new democracy and a new 
economic reality.  The new democracy will focus its energy on the vulnerable and 
marginalized and will include true and equal representation of and from these populations.  
The new economic reality will be based on humanity sharing equally in all available 
resources and opportunities on earth.  The equality established in both systems will be based 
on all citizens having similar material possessions and possibilities.  The new common 
wealth will embrace communalism, not individualism.  Members will recognize that no one 
can be fully human if another has access blocked or is less than someone else in the 
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community.  Hopkins’ vision of the new social order is based on creative individuality where 
the particularity of each person’s cultural identity is respected and affirmed.83 
 Hopkins maintains that for Christians this means adopting a preferential option for the 
poor.  Christians serve the poor by putting love of neighbor above the private accumulation 
of things.  Hopkins admits this is not easy for people in the U.S. as it goes against the grain 
of the “American way of life” and its commodified, consumer economy, which purports a 
me-firstism and instantaneous gratification.  He contends that our economic and political 
structures actually reward those who oppose the poor’s liberation.  The commitment to 
embody a preferential option for the poor and embrace the love of neighbor demands a 
transformation of ourselves and our society.  It means personally taking concrete action to 
help people get out of poverty.  It also means restructuring society so that the poor become 
equal in all respects with those who currently hold privileges and wealth over them.  Dwight 
Hopkins contends that Christian theology can and must provide an alternative vision of 
people and relating than that of the religion of globalization based on a preferential option for 
the poor rather than support of the wealthy few.84   
Hopkins theologizes that this vision of humanity is God’s vision for humanity.  God 
calls us to be healthy human beings as equal partners with each other and as equal and 
responsible stewards of the earth’s resources.  With concerted efforts we can dismantle 
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monopoly capitalism and white supremacy and for the first time in U.S. history experience a 
racial democracy.  Hopkins maintains that no one in the new society would have private 
ownership of wealth, for no one can own personally what does not belong to them.  This new 
communalism would foster a positive sense of self for each person since all would be 
involved in the process of building common wealth for all.  In fact, this way of being would 
end all barriers to full humanity including not only class exploitation and racial oppression, 
but also gender discrimination and sexual identity exclusion.  The new common wealth 
would embrace all.85 
 
Race as Illusion 
 The main claim of understanding race as illusion is that race is not a biological or 
“natural” category of human existence and should not be treated like one.  This approach 
does not negate the historical significance or impact of race on our society and its members; 
but it does argue that times have changed and race is not what it was, nor should it be.  
Proponents of this theory of race contend that race has been reified in black theology and has 
indeed become an ontological category for black theologians.  They claim that the black 
identity discussed in black theology continues to be determined by whiteness and modern 
white racial ideology.  Advocates of understanding race as illusion propose a move away 
from thinking about race as the central issue of a person’s being to a more complex approach 
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to human identity.  They contend that only in this way can black theology address the real 
problems black people face and bring about true liberation.  The work of Victor Anderson 
and Alistair Kee to illustrate this approach to race.86  Both authors argue that black thinkers 
must transcend racial discourse with its racial apologetics and present a new way for black 
people to think about identity that allows for true fulfillment of the individual in community. 
Both Alistair Kee and Victor Anderson agree that black is not an ontological 
category, but Anderson contends that is has become one in black theology.  Anderson uses 
the term ontological blackness to describe this tendency in black theology to reify race.  
Racial reification, according to Anderson, is to treat race as if it objectively exists 
independent of historically contingent factors and the subjective intentions in the writings of 
historical and contemporary writers.87  Treating race in this way makes membership in a 
racial group the totality of a person’s existence.  All other identifying characteristics become 
secondary to race.  Anderson argues that in black theology blackness has been reified into the 
totality or unity of black experience.   
 Anderson contends that black theologians are heirs to a black intellectual tradition 
that has led to the reification of blackness.  He argues that the African American approach to 
race he calls ontological blackness was determined by and reflective of white racial ideology, 
the racial discourse of modernity and European imperialism.  This racial ideology was 
justified and supported by species logic applied to race as an organizing category.  Species 
logic contends that every individual member of a species shares essential traits that identify 
the member within the species.  White and black became species.  Europeans articulated 
“white” traits as the unity of experience and taste with history and culture.  The racialized 
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other of the “black” African was the opposite of the European and naturally inferior.  This 
inferiority was inherent in their race and therefore their very being and so justified the 
contemporary politics of democratic exclusion that they experienced.  Anderson writes that 
white racial ideology has had at least three functions, all of which had the goal of justifying 
inequality.  It justified the supremacy of European consciousness on a comparative and hence 
a scientific basis; it provided historical and moral rationalizations for the spread of European 
imperialism throughout the world; and it justified the exclusion of blacks and other colonized 
peoples from civic republican citizenship.88   
Black thinkers responded to white racial ideology and defended black people by 
extrapolating what they understood blackness to be.  Anderson argues that African American 
cultural philosophy became preoccupied with racial apologetics.  It rejected categorical 
racism and white racial ideology’s negative projections of blacks and worked to expound the 
black cultural genius and civilization.  The goal of black subjectivity became the disclosure 
of this genius and the representation of the civilization of African Americans.  Anderson 
argues that this counter-discourse in African American cultural philosophy, including black 
theology, has produced a cult of black heroic genius.  It, like the white racial ideology it 
repudiates, emphasizes racial categories and essentialized principles that determine identity.  
Anderson contends that just as in categorical racism all persons who are classified as 
members of the black race are included in qualities that distinguish this group from others.  
He argues that African Americans continue to represent themselves as the mirror of 
European genius.89 
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Both Kee and Anderson argue that even the new self proposed and presented by black 
theology is not really new but still determined by their oppositional stance to those who 
previously defined them.  They each contend that African American scholars are still 
presenting themselves within the confines of the blackness that whiteness created.  The new 
black being continues to be defined within the binary dialectics of slavery and freedom, 
Negro and citizen, insider and outsider, black and white, and struggle and survival.  Black 
consciousness is a revolutionary consciousness that requires oppression for its self-
disclosure.  Black being is always in relationship with white racism.  Anderson argues that if 
black experience is defined as the experience of suffering and rebellion against whiteness, 
which are ontologically created and provoked by whiteness as the necessary condition of 
blackness, then whiteness appears to be the ground of black experience.  This approach to 
black identity is problematic for two reasons.  First, it does not adequately address 
contemporary black experience and identity; and second, it does not leave room for real 
liberation of black persons today. 
Both Anderson and Kee contend that black theology’s approach to racial identity is 
modern discourse that does not adequately relate to contemporary postmodern life.  Both 
suggest that black theology needs to transcend modernity’s racial consciousness and develop 
a real radical race critique.  The first step in this move is to recognize that the culture that 
created categorical black identity is not ultimate but a human artifact and therefore changed 
and changeable.  Another important tenet of this approach to race is the argument that black 
persons are not bound by black culture but in fact inhabit widely differentiated social spaces 
and communities.  Anderson argues that African American life and experience are structured 
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by dispersed and not always commensurable interests of class, gender, sexual differentials, 
and race.  Therefore identity formation is conditioned by all of these factors as well as race.  
Black theologians must embrace the fact that raced identity is always present and effective, 
but it is not total.  Anderson calls for a new politics of identity that balances an emphasis on 
community, unity, racial pride, and black interests, which mitigate claims for difference, with 
an emphasis on personality which privileges self-realization at the levels of labor, family, 
gender, sexual interests, and personal lifestyle choices, which can make it difficult to justify 
claims for community. 
Anderson argues in favor of new literary critiques of African American cultural 
philosophy that address “race” as a dying category.  Anderson proposes the grotesque 
aesthetic, which focuses on ambiguity and difference, as an adequate foundation for a 
contemporary rationality of difference.  Anderson attributes his understanding of the 
grotesque to Friedrich Nietzsche who he claims best crystallized a reversal of the heroic epic.  
The grotesque contends with the seemingly diametrically opposed sensibilities in binary 
dialectics, but seeks neither negation nor mediation between them.  It leaves them in tension 
and unresolved.  It is a challenge to the mind’s instinctive endeavor to synthesize.  It renders 
objects we perceive and our apperception of them confused or ambiguous.  The grotesque 
aesthetic leaves open possibilities for creative ways for considering an object or subject, 
because the object is other than how it appears when one contour or another is attenuated.90  
Anderson argues that the grotesque in African American cultural analysis is able to see the 
morally ambiguous African American presence in American life.  The cultural critic is freed 
up to play in the unresolved ambiguities of black life. 
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 Anderson argues that this new approach to black identity and experience addresses 
the problems created by a focus on the heroic genius of black people in their struggles against 
oppression.  He claims that when black scholars make suffering, rebellion, and survival 
essential marks of black experience, it leads to the absurd claim that anyone who is black is 
also oppressed.  He believes that such a claim trivializes the nature of oppression many 
blacks genuinely experience.  This oppression, of course, must be faced; but it must also be 
accurately named and described.  Anderson maintains that defining race in terms of 
ontological blackness leads to another kind of limitation for black persons.  He contends that 
defining black consciousness within the binary polarities of white racial ideology and black 
racial apologetics admits no possibility of transcendence or mediation from their dialectical 
boundaries of being, or the blackness that depends on whiteness for it meaning.91  Liberation 
then becomes the assumption of a revolutionary consciousness not real release from or 
change of the categories that define and create the suffering and oppression in the first place.  
Anderson is concerned for the individual seeking true personal thriving and fulfillment and 
he wonders whether individual fulfillment is possible within the confines of ontological 
blackness.  Because of the over-emphasis on community and what it means to be really part 
of the black community, ontological blackness represses individuality and does not allow 
space for black persons to pursue goods outside of its dialectics even if they contribute to the 
person’s fulfillment as an individual.  Those who wander too far from authentic black 
consciousness often find themselves ostracized. 
Anderson maintains that ontological blackness does not and cannot recognize that 
real black interests go beyond mere surviving to thriving and flourishing.  He argues that 
human flourishing involves cultural fulfillment, which he defines as the integration of human 
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social activity with the satisfaction of categorical and reflexive human goods.92  Anderson 
believes that a prerequisite for the cultural fulfillment of black people is cultural 
transcendence from the binary determinants of racial apologetics.  This does not mean 
ignoring or neglecting the negative and difficult aspects of black life, but it calls on black 
theologians to define the black experience as more than this.  According to Anderson, black 
theology must stop focusing on suffering as well as admit the internal differences among 
blacks.  Black theology must come to recognize the conditions of postmodern North 
American life and develop “a new cultural politics of black identity” that meaningfully 
relates to it.93  Anderson argues that “pressing beyond ontological blackness requires African 
American religious critics to subvert every racial discourse, including their own that would 
bind black subjectivity to the totality of racial identity.”94 
 Both Alistair Kee and Victor Anderson argue that black identity has become 
synonymous with the blackness that whiteness created during modernity for the justification 
of European imperialism and subsequent enslavement of captured Africans.  At the heart of 
this white racial ideology is race as a classifying category that discloses the qualities of each 
individual in a specific race.  Kee contends that black is a social and political construct 
defined by the political interests of the powerful and as such should be dropped from black 
discourse all together.  He writes, “‘[B]lack’ does indeed seem a perverted category and the 
use of the term by blacks would seem to be a form of perversion or self-abuse.  It is difficult 
to imagine how the interests of white oppressors could be better served than by blacks 
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accepting this politically motivated and socially constructed term.”95  Anderson also 
questions the usefulness of the modern disclosure of blackness, whether from the side of 
white racial ideology or black racial apologetics.  He argues that neither allows for an 
adequate appreciation of the complexity of individual identity and neither allows for real 
liberation from white racism.  Both Kee and Anderson argue for an altogether new 
expression of black identity. 
 
III. DISCUSSION 
This chapter begins in the assumption that we must seriously engage race in order to 
combat racism.  It recognizes that in theory and theology race is treated as a social 
construction, invented in time and place.  It demonstrates how using construction as an 
organizing principle can serve as a tool for theology to explore different theories of race 
through reflection on the various meanings given to this construction.  Differences exist 
about what this construction is and how it should be approached.  There are different answers 
to the questions of who constructs, what meaning of race do they construct, why do they 
construct, and how and should constructions be changed.  An exploration of these answers 
allows for a better appreciation of the complexity of race.  This exploration of race helps 
theologians navigate the diverse reality of race as well as their own theory of race.  Since 
race influences how we think and how we act, theologians must become conscious of their 
own racial beliefs.   
 Thinking of race as a construction invites theologians to reflect on who constructs 
race, how this is done, and for what purpose.  Most agree that, historically, powerful whites 
constructed race in terms of black and white to meet the needs of slavery.  However, 
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theologians must reflect on how this relates to current understandings and uses of race since 
race is never constructed once and for all.  Some argue that powerful whites are still 
constructing race and that our state and economic structures support this construction.  
Theology must also attend to how the black community and other communities have and do 
construct race as well as how each person constructs race in their own life.  These 
constructions can be positive or negative depictions of human beings and result in racist and 
nonracist ways of life.  Race is constructed for specific purposes that include the oppression 
and exploitation of people of color for the advantage and continued dominance of those 
deemed white.  Race has been used to meet the needs of our national economic system.  It 
has been used as a tool to support European imperialism and democratic exclusion.  It has 
been employed to make and counter claims of white racist ideology.  Race also serves the 
purpose of uniting people in shared worldviews and perspectives, which create group 
identity.   In the U.S., race has been a social construct based on skin color, which makes 
sweeping generalizations about what it means to have this skin color.  Race theorists and 
black theologians claim that any racial construction is a conscious choice based on the core 
beliefs of the constructing agent.  This construction is accomplished through the 
establishment of a narrative that situates specific traits within specific bodies and animates 
and influences human interactions.  Human relations both create and are created by narratives 
of race. 
 In the U.S., race has been and continues to be an essential aspect of identity.  The 
theologians and theorists included in this chapter disagree about whether this is a positive or 
negative aspect of our contemporary culture.  James Cone contends that race has been a 
negative aspect of American culture but because it is a choice based on our beliefs about 
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human living we can change our racial identity to be a positive force.  Those advocating an 
approach to race as historical legacy also recognize the relational and dynamic character of 
identity and challenge us to reconstruct our inherited racial understandings into relations of 
equality.  Black Catholic theologians underscore the idea that identity is about one’s 
community and culture and that our ongoing participation in its story continues to form our 
racial identities.  Dwight Hopkins argues that we need to shift our understandings of identity 
from where we fit into the current capitalist system to how we can all uniquely fit into a new 
common wealth.  Victor Anderson most notably argues that human identity is more complex 
than just race and that identity shifts if we attend to different aspects of it.  Because race has 
always been a negative aspect of identity and continues to limit the individual, he advocates a 
shift away from it in African American discourse. 
Treating race as a construction attends to the fact that it has been invented in time and 
space; it depends on its context and the history of its context.  What race means in the U.S. is 
not what it means in other societies, but this does not negate the importance of race for 
theology done in the U.S. nor its influence on how the U.S. acts in the international arena.  
James Cone focuses on the struggles of the black community throughout its history in the 
U.S. with a special focus on the meaning and importance of the Civil Rights and Black 
Power Movements for Christian theology.  Those who understand race as historical legacy 
call attention to the racial stereotypes that pervade U.S. culture.  Dwight Hopkins challenges 
theologians to understand how the U.S. participates in global monopoly capitalism and what 
its views on race mean for people of color around the world.  Alistair Kee and Victor 
Anderson recognize that our racial discourse is changing in and for our postmodern context.  
They argue that black life, like all life, is ambiguous and diverse.  Advocates of approaching 
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race as culture also call attention to the diversity of persons who live within the groups 
defined as black and white. 
Any understanding of the context in which theology is being done must appreciate 
and understand the history of this context.  Our past forms our bodies, our worldviews, which 
are intimately connected to our bodies, and our ideas about each other.  Race in terms of 
black and white is the historical legacy of the United States.  Theologians must appreciate the 
American institution of slavery, the continued discrimination based on race that followed it, 
and the efforts to combat both institutions.  Our bodies have been marked by these 
experiences.  Our bodies also carry with them the history immigrants and enslaved Africans 
brought with them.  Racist ideology has been integral to America’s past and undermines 
American claims to equality; it has also greatly affected American Christianity.   
U.S. racist ideology, the stereotypes and caricatures it created, as well as the stories, 
songs, and discourses formed to combat it all construct race.  Theologians must investigate 
the narratives that created and sustain racism as well as those that contest it.  As Omi and 
Winant warn, discussion of race reveals it to be much more complex than usually thought 
and in it one must contend with many areas of human thinking.  Not only do theologians 
need to explore Christian narratives and theology that have been employed to support racist 
constructions and institutions, but also those of science and law.  The approach to race as 
culture invites sociological and cultural investigations of the stories, songs, and life of 
communities that construct race.  Dwight Hopkins calls on theologians to examine the beliefs 
and practices of capitalism and the discourse of neoliberalism.  Remembering that race 
continues to be constructed, contemporary as well as historical texts must be included in 
discourse about race. 
142 
 
Of course, Christian theologians are most concerned with the importance of race for 
Christian theology.  Theological anthropology is concerned with who we are and are called 
to be in relation to our ideas about God.  Christian theological anthropology addresses the 
question of how the inbreaking of God into the world as a human being affects body-persons 
as well as the community of bodies that is the Church.  The work of theologians in this 
chapter investigated how race is related to Christian identity and how we are and live it.  
Theologians cannot ignore such an important bodily reality as race in a religion whose 
central belief concerns the human body of God.  All human bodies embrace categories of 
physicality.  James Cone argues that how we think about and live these categories should 
reflect our central beliefs about God/Christ and how we are to live based on these beliefs.  
Dwight Hopkins also contends that our purpose must be God’s purpose.  This means we must 
embody a preferential option for the poor and oppressed and stand with them with our whole 
being, including our physical body.  In terms of race, theologians suggest we become black, 
change the meaning of whiteness, embrace the diversity of God’s people, and shift all of our 
understandings of race for the purpose of combating racism. 
Reflection on race is especially important for the Christian Church, which is called to 
live as the body of Christ.  The reality is that the Church has both embraced and fought 
against racism; it has both included and excluded people based on race.  The Church must 
face its own culpability in the construction of race for racist purposes and live race as if 
Christ was the center of its life.  For Cone this means the Church will be a black Church 
which stands with the poor and oppressed.  Hopkins contends that the Church must begin the 
formation of a new common wealth that equally shares the earth’s resources.  Those who 
understand race as historical legacy contend that all the Church’s priests and ministers must 
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investigate how white supremacy has influenced their own identity and how they minister.  
Race as culture advocates argue that the worship of the Church should embody the culturally 
diverse bodies that are the Church.  The Church can only be a moral voice in the world if it 
recognizes its own racism and works to eradicate it.  Black theologians call the Church to see 
the sin of racism and liberation from it as integral to redemption.  The purpose of changing 
our attitudes about race is to work toward the establishment of God’s kingdom, which cannot 
allow injustice or dominance between persons.  Race is a major barrier to peaceful living and 
the concern of those who wish God’s peace to be with us.  To be the Body of Christ on earth, 
Christians need a theology that addresses how categories of the body impinge upon this goal.   
Liberation theologies are concerned to construct race in a positive way that allows for 
all to live fully.  James Cone advocates a new way of thinking about race, the renunciation of 
whiteness and the blackness that whiteness created, and a commitment to becoming black in 
imitation of Jesus Christ.  Those who study race as historical legacy call for a cultural 
transformation that reconstructs whiteness and blackness in order that all can live the equality 
called for by Christianity and the United States’ founding documents.  Advocates of the 
approach to race as culture posit that people can come together for common goals of justice 
while maintaining cultural diversity if we respect and appreciate our differences.  Dwight 
Hopkins argues that we can only overcome racism if we embrace people as more important 
than the accumulation of things.  This mindset will help establish racial democracy and instill 
in all a positive sense of self.  Victor Anderson and Alistair Kee contend that we need a new 
racial discourse so that our identities can be different.  This discourse must change the culture 
that created blackness and embrace individual diversity.  Specific expressions of race may 
alter dominant theories of race.  Understanding race as a construction implies that race 
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changes and is changeable.  Race is authored by humans and can be changed by human 
efforts.  We continue to construct race in how we live today.  We can choose to continue to 
live race as the historical legacy of slavery and racism or we can change these constructions 
based on white supremacy.  Challenging race involves new ways of looking at and living 
reality and creates new possibilities for being.  These may include dismantling our very 
notions of race.   
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Just as in the previous chapter, reflecting on bodily construction leads to questions 
about bodily expression. Racial identity expresses many things.  The theologians in this 
chapter argued that race expresses our beliefs about God and what it means to be a Christian, 
our history, our culture and heritage, our beliefs about justice, our diversity as human beings, 
oppression, dominance, exclusion, as well as our inability to get beyond race.  White and 
black are not obvious terms but have varying meanings depending on the interpreter.  
Theology cannot assume any common understanding but must investigate their diverse 
interpretations as well as their interrelationships.  This interpretation must not only include 
what history has said these identities mean but also how persons with these identities 
describe them.  This investigation is crucial to balance group identity with self-expression.  
Black and white will mean different things to different people.  Individuals express their race 
differently.  This expression may follow from group self-expression or challenge their 
assumed communal identity. 
Bringing together the ideas of the body as construction and the body as expression 
starts the process of thinking about the body as symbol, a constructed and expressive reality, 
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which can bring together theories of sex/gender and race for a more complete theological 
anthropology.  Investigating theories of sex/gender and race is an important first step to 
appreciating how the human body in its specificity is an important theological theme.  But 
sex/gender and race are not independent variables.  A fuller appreciation of the meaning and 
significance of the body for human living must involve discourse that brings them together.  
In the next chapter I will begin to explore how race and sex/gender interpenetrate and 
influence the meaning of each other.   
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And we know that what our minds forget our bodies remember.  The body is central to our 
being.  The history of the African American ordeal of pain and pleasure is inscribed in our 
bodies. 
Linda E. Thomas, “Womanist Theology, Epistemology, and a New Anthropological  
Paradigm”1 
 
CHAPTER 4:  WOMANIST THEOLOGY AND THE BODY 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 Part I of this dissertation addressed sex/gender and race separately in order to engage 
different theories about these categorizations of bodily materiality.  Part II brings race and 
sex/gender together in its consideration of the materiality of the body.  This shift brings to 
light important considerations for theological reflection on the body in its specificity.  By 
shifting attention to the whole person rather than one variable of bodied identity, this chapter 
recognizes that many intersections of identity make up human living.  These combinations of 
bodily categorizations create unique identities for those who are and live them.  Construction 
as a conceptual concept continues to be helpful to understand and trace the historical events 
and language that create and affect unique identities.  However, consideration must also be 
given to the discourses of the groups that are these identities, often unnoticed outside of the 
group.  These group discourses may paint a very different picture of the self-understanding of 
the group despite the affect of social constructions that wish to define them.  Deliberation of 
group discourses includes attention to individual voices within the group.  These voices 
reveal the various realities existing within the group itself, which again depend on ever more 
specific identity or body markers.  Womanist theology is a discourse that brings together 
sex/gender and race and illustrates what attention to multiple bodily categorizations means 
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for theological anthropology.  Womanist theology continues to use construction as a helpful 
conceptual tool to think about identity, but it also stresses the importance of attending to 
group and individual expressions of identity.  This balance of construction and expression is 
the heart of my proposal of the body as symbol, which I will flesh out in the next chapter. 
The balance of community and individuality, of the social construction and personal 
expression of identity, is continually found in black feminist and womanist theory.  I turn 
here to the work of Patricia Hill Collins to give a brief introduction to this theory.2  
Womanist scholars attend to black women as whole persons that navigate life within an 
American society built on their exploitation and within the black female community that 
provides a more positive self-image to help them face this challenge.  The womanist project 
starts with the exploration of the juncture of sex/gender and race, but recognizes the fact that 
living the combination of black race and female sex/gender has historically intersected with 
economic instability and sexual abuse.  Womanist scholarship illustrates that any marker of 
materiality that seeks to define group identity is a dependent variable because all aspects of 
identity intersect and influence each other.3  Any combination of identity markers creates a 
unique experience and perspective.   
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 I rely mostly on Patricia Hill Collins, Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of 
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to see other volumes emerge which will be more willing to present black feminist thought as a shifting mosaic 
of competing ideas and interests, emphasizing the disjunctures distinguishing the pieces of the mosaic from one 
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 Womanists are not the only scholars that recognize that sex/gender and race intersect with other identity 
markers.  The work of Judith Butler and John Paul II, included in Chapter 2 of this dissertation, analyze the role 
of sexuality in the formation of bodies.  In Chapter 3 I explored how Dwight Hopkins’ work considers 
economic realities as intimately tied to questions of race. Womanists have begun to add to this list age and 
148 
 
Womanists argue that African American women did not and do not simply share in 
the experiences of black men and white women, the simple addition of troublesome race and 
sex/gender.  Race and sex/gender intersect in the experience of black women and create a 
unique identity.  Collectively, African American women represent a unique perspective from 
which to view life in the United States and theorize about it.  Patricia Hill Collins points out 
two aspects of this unique location.  First, African American women have and often continue 
to live in all-black communities, which carry on the traditions of African American culture 
that traces its roots to African cosmologies and epistemology rather than those of Western 
Europe.  Second, African American women have often found themselves working within 
white spaces and forced to learn and sometimes adopt the rules of the dominant society in 
order to survive, but simultaneously marginalized in and by this society.  Hill Collins 
describes this as the black woman’s “outsider-within” position.4  Whether as domestic 
workers or academics or any of a number of employment situations, the marginality black 
women experience provides a distinct angle of vision on civil, political, and intellectual 
situations.   
Womanist scholarship focuses on the unique experiences of black women, both 
individual stories and traditions within the group as a whole.  Both analyses of identity lead 
to a consideration of the power dynamics that affect these experiences and the social 
constructions that want to define black women as a group.  Womanists’ attention to the 
intersecting oppressions black women experience moves them to a further examination of the 
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matrix of domination within which these intersecting oppressions originate, develop, and are 
contained.  A central theme and critical aspect of womanist scholarship is engagement with 
the images of black women society has created to control them. Womanists recognize that 
controlling images such as Mammy, matriarch, welfare mother, and Jezebel reflect power 
relations and justify the very existence of intersecting oppressions.  To address these 
controlling images, womanists must analyze the history and narratives of the social context 
that have shaped black women’s identity.    
Womanists point out that black female identity means one thing to society at large, 
but quite another thing to black women themselves.  Womanist theology and theory do not 
stop by analyzing how intersecting oppressions construct black female identity in this 
country.  They also attend to the testimonies of African American women who are making a 
“way out of no way.”  This attention to African American women themselves witnesses to 
the different reality and identity that these women create for themselves within the context of 
oppression and negative constructions.  This counter-discourse expresses something beyond 
and in spite of these constructions.  Attention to the counter-discourses of black women 
themselves reveals that most black women do not define themselves with these controlling 
images since they do not reflect how they know themselves or each other.  Hill Collins writes 
that black women must “jump outside the frames and systems authorities provide and create 
their own frame” for stimulating positive self-definition.5  These new frames and systems are 
created in the discourse between and among black women themselves.  The tradition of 
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 Hill Collins, Black Feminist Thought, 100.  This work is often done in the safe spaces black women create for 
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sharing experiences and collecting and passing on wisdom about these experiences and acts 
of resistance in response to them constitutes the long-standing African American women’s 
intellectual tradition.6   
The specifics of this tradition are not uniformly shared by all African American 
women.  Although African American women face common challenges, they do not all 
respond to these challenges in the same way.  Hill Collins writes, “There is no essential or 
archetypal black woman whose experiences stand as normal, normative, and thereby 
authentic.”7  Individual black women find their voices in their own unique way.  They 
connect to the larger black women’s community for support and to collectively work for 
change, but they remain an individual within it.  This individuality is based on how 
intersecting oppressions have affected the individual.  Attending to the various intersections 
of identity categories reveals diverse and individual body-persons and recognizes the 
diversity present in any group.  By addressing many aspects of human identity, including 
race, sex/gender, class, sexuality, and religious pluralism, womanism recognizes that 
individual persons face different realities as these categories intersect specifically in their 
lives.  Womanists point out that just as white men, white women, black men and black 
women all differ from each other, so too is there diversity within each group, including the 
collectivity of black women.  Contending with poverty or a denigrated sexuality creates 
differences and fissures among those who identify as African American women.  
Investigating African American women’s identity points to the reality that every person’s 
identity is always more complex and unique the closer you attend to them as individuals.   
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 Hill Collins, Black Feminist Thought, 3.  She writes that the invisibility of this tradition in the larger social and 
academic society is neither academic nor benign.  Its suppression is part of the maintenance of current social 
inequalities.  It also presents black women as willing collaborators in their own victimization since they 
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7
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Black feminist and womanist work embraces the importance of individuality within 
community and emphasizes self-expression in its treatment of identity and the body.  
Womanist scholars contend that change happens in this self-expression that contests 
traditional constructions of black female identity.  This self-definition validates black 
women’s power as human subjects.  In their rearticulation of themselves is the power to 
rearticulate their social realities.  By resisting and challenging controlling images, black 
women protest the power relations that underlie these images.  Hill Collins writes that, “when 
black women define ourselves, we clearly reject the assumption that those in positions 
granting them the authority to interpret our reality are entitled to do so.”8  She contends that 
this empowerment is the first step in resisting oppressive institutions.  Black feminist thought 
recognizes that oppression cannot be reduced to one fundamental type and that oppressions 
such as race and gender or sexuality and nation work together in producing injustice.  
Womanist scholarship includes a thorough investigation of the social construction of black 
female identity for the purpose of oppression and domination and a witness to the real black 
women who know another image of self that is revealed in their individual life stories. 
 
Structure of Chapter 
This chapter explores bodily identity from womanist perspective.  Womanist work 
encourages an approach to the body that addresses the construction of bodily reality and 
attends to the life stories and individual first-person expressions of identity.  Womanists hold 
in tension communal identity, which is often based in historical constructions, and individual 
identity, which is the unique reality of the self.  Womanists employ the idea of construction 
in their investigation of the lives of African American women to tease out the various aspects 
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of black female identity.  Thinking of identity as a construction addresses how various 
historical events and narratives have and continue to shape African American women’s lives.  
Womanists give equal attention to the specific group’s expression of identity as well as 
individual expressions within the group. 
I use Delores Williams’ text Sisters in the Wilderness: The Challenge of Womanist 
God-Talk to provide the structure for this chapter.9  Williams’ work explores how black 
female identity has been constructed through the forced and coerced use of their labor and 
reproduction.  Williams uses the theme of surrogacy to organize her analysis of African 
American women’s historical experience.  Surrogacy can be defined as functioning in the 
place of someone else.  In the history of African American women in this country, Williams 
identifies two kinds of surrogacy experience.  The first was the coerced surrogacy of 
antebellum America when people and systems more powerful than black people forced black 
women to function in roles that ordinarily would have been filled by someone else.10  These 
surrogacy roles could not be refused.  After the Civil War that brought freedom to enslaved 
African Americans, black people tried to determine for whom or what black women would 
not stand in place.  However, even though black women could exercise choice in refusing 
surrogate roles, social pressures and realities often influenced and limited their power to 
choose full emancipation from all surrogacy roles.  For this reason, Williams describes this 
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 Delores S. Williams, Sisters in the Wilderness: The Challenge of Womanist God-Talk.  Williams’ text is used 
because it is a signal text for womanist theology.  Williams describes her work in the following manner, “This 
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surrogacy experience as voluntary though pressured.  Her theology presents black female 
identity as forged within intersecting systems of oppression.  Her work outlines how black 
women’s nurturance, physical labor, and sexuality have been exploited.  Her initial 
investigation of the intersection of sex/gender and race in black women’s lives leads to the 
necessary consideration of class and sexuality.  I follow Williams’ lead to consider how 
approaching the many identity markers of human living lead to a consideration of the body 
that incorporates the social construction of identity as well as unique communal and 
individual expressions of identity. 
 
II. BODILY IDENTITY IN WOMANIST PERSPECTIVE 
Surrogacy and Nurturance:  Sex/Gender and Race  
Womanist scholarship challenges any approach to the body that focuses exclusively 
on race and/or sex/gender since the body is a complex combination of identity categories.  A 
focus on how race and sex/gender intersect is just a first step in appreciating the complexity 
of bodily identity and the experiences that follow from this identity.  The way that race and 
sex/gender come together in the lives and experiences of African American women cannot be 
understood as just being the experience of being female added to the experience of being 
black.  It is something different and unique and produces a unique perspective for African 
American women that is sometimes in tension with white women and black men.  African 
American women and white women share both the challenge of facing sexism in their lives 
and the belief in the full humanity of women, which makes them equal to men.  However, 
womanists would not affirm an historical solidarity or common experience among women in 
this country.  Womanists challenge white women to explore how they have benefitted from 
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the subjugation of African American women and the social structures and standards by which 
this was done and justified.  White privilege creates a deep division between white feminists 
and women of color.11   
African American women share with African American men a common slave cultural 
heritage and the ongoing experience of racism.  They share the painful reality that in the 
United States skin color makes a difference and has had a lot to do with their enslavement 
and with the continuation of their oppression.  Sharing this common heritage of the past and 
experience in the present does not mean that all African-American people must or do think 
alike.  Black women challenge black men to see how sexism pervades the black world and to 
recognize how they themselves add to the oppressive forces pressing on black women.12   
Delores Williams argues that throughout the history of African American women in 
the United States there have been forces bent on conquering black women’s power to resist 
and rise above obstacles and trouble.  She contends that both men and women of the ruling 
class as well as some black men have worked to keep black women in the service of other 
people’s needs and goals.  These efforts included the production of negative and controlling 
images of black women and a narrative that justified their exploitation.  Williams points to 
the mythology that surrounded the figure of Mammy both before and after emancipation.  
Much of the antebellum stereotypes presented Mammy as the positive result of slavery; the 
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 Williams admits that most Anglo-American women live only with the illusion of authority and power, which 
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 African American women scholars point out that in the black community the fight against racism has often 
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denominational churches have been duped to believe that first black people must expend all their effort getting 
rid of racial oppression.  They have been told that later the community can work on the oppression of women.  
Nineteenth century black women like Sojourner Truth warned black women that ‘if the men get their rights and 
women don’t, things will be no better for black women than they were during slavery.’”  Williams, Sisters in 
the Wilderness, 219. 
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conversion of some “heathen” black women into “civilized” models of womanhood.  In fact, 
Mammy was seen as an example of how black women could model the prevalent, Victorian 
ideals of womanhood, by being maternal, virtuous, asexual, pious, tender, and understanding.  
Mammies were thought to embrace and embody white cultural ideals and values.   
In antebellum America, many African American women slaves were forced to 
perform the role of Mammy.  The job of these enslaved black women was to nurture white 
families.  Mammy was responsible for the care of the white slaveowners’ home and the 
nurturance of their children.  She managed the household, cared for the children, and often 
advised about business matters.  Even after freedom from bondage, many African American 
women, forced by financial necessity, needed to continue performing the duties of Mammy 
in the role of domestic worker.  In both roles, Mammy and domestic worker, African 
American women were thought of as subservient because of their sex/gender and subservient 
because of their race.  Patriarchy kept them locked to the proper work of women, which 
included taking care of the owner’s or employer’s children and keeping his household 
running smoothly.  Williams argues that this role according to patriarchal norms belonged to 
the white woman/mistress of the household and that the African American woman was 
forced and coerced to be the white woman’s surrogate and do the work that she wished to 
avoid.  Whether as abused slaves or exploited domestic workers, African American women 
have often been forced to put white women’s needs before their own and do the work white 
women didn’t want to do or thought was beneath them.  Williams contends that in white 
women’s fight to get out of the house and be freed of domestic drudgery, the experience of 
African American women, who have often been handed these tasks by white women to do 
for them, has been ignored and disrespected.  Mammies and later domestic workers were 
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forced to support white male dominance with their work and to appear to agree and imitate 
the ideals and values of white culture.  The authority of Mammy or the domestic worker in 
no way challenged that of the master and mistress; her race kept her subservient to both. 
Williams argues that the surrogacy roles and images of Mammy and domestic worker 
created a strain and tension for African American women in their own communities.  She 
contends that although Mammy’s forced surrogacy in the white household did not lessen her 
dedication to her own family, it muddled her relationship with the black community.  
Williams writes that Mammy’s tragedy was not that she abandoned her own people, but that 
she was powerless to offer her gifts to black people “on terms they could accept without, 
themselves, sliding farther into a system of paternalistic dependence.”13  Despite this tension 
in the slave community, the nurturing skills of black women were valued by black men after 
emancipation as long as her standing changed to support his male authority instead of that of 
the white slaveowner.14  Williams writes that apparently the freedmen did not want to 
perpetuate a model of authority subordinating black men to black women.  It was the goal of 
the black man to bring notions of black manhood into agreement with the manhood notions 
of mainline American culture.  Therefore, the black father must been seen as protector and 
authority of the black family not the black woman.  In adopting sexist role definitions, black 
men have also been part of conquering black women’s power through violence as well as 
                                                 
13
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 Even after emancipation, there were efforts to continue to force African American women into the mold of 
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emotional and psychological pressure.  Womanists argue that the inordinate demands men 
make upon the nurturing capacities of black mothers are destructive for women.15   
Williams argues that this forced and coerced form of surrogacy has contributed to the 
formation of negative images of black women that prevail in America to this day.  Mammy is 
the image of black women as perpetual mother figures—religious, fat, a-sexual, loving 
children better than themselves, self-sacrificing, and giving up self-concern for group 
advancement.  The mythology and stereotypes of Mammy and wage earner has morphed into 
the negative depiction of African American women as matriarchs.  These black women are 
not respected and criticized for supporting their families and being heads of households.  She 
contends that in black religious institutions, black literature, and black culture, African 
American mothers are often portrayed as an impediment to the black male’s struggle for 
manhood in America.  These women are seen as emasculating to black men and are often 
blamed for many of the problems that plague the black community.  Womanists counter by 
calling attention to the fact that the continuous devaluation of black fatherhood and the plight 
of black men is part of the cultural matrix of American society.16   
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Womanists turn to their own tradition to explore how sexism and racism have 
intersected in their history and its effect on their lives.  They attend to the words of black 
mothers to black daughters.  For example, in Zora Neale Hurston’s Their Eyes Were 
Watching God, she articulates a black woman’s analysis of the historical intersection of 
sex/gender and race in the lives of black women.  She writes of a grandmother telling her 
granddaughter about her perspective of the world.  “Honey de white man is de ruler of 
everything as fur as Ah been able tuh find out...So de white man throw down de load and tell 
de nigger man tuh pick it up. He pick it up because he have to, but he don’t tote it.  He hand 
it to his womenfolks. De nigger woman is de mule uh de world so fur as Ah can see.  Ah 
been prayin’ fuh it tuh be different wid you.  Lawd, Lawd, Lawd!”17  Through such 
expressions, black women explain their experience in their own words.  Womanists charge 
both black and white theologians to attend to these expressions if they are to have an 
adequate understanding of black female identity created in the intersection of sex/gender and 
race. 
Womanist analysis of the construction of black female identity challenges the 
adequacy of the notion of patriarchy that many white feminists espouse to describe the cause 
of female oppression.  Williams contends that as a term to describe black women’s relation to 
the white (male and female) dominated social and economic systems governing their lives, it 
is lacking.  It is silent about class-privileged women oppressing women without it.  It is also 
silent about white men and women working to maintain this white supremacy and privilege.  
White feminist analysis is often silent about the positive boons that patriarchy has bestowed 
upon many white women.18  Williams contends that overcoming the racist divide between 
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womanist theologians and white feminist theologians will require an analysis of the racist 
leanings of the secular and religious notions of womanhood in the country and in Christian 
tradition.  Williams argues that black women and other women of color have been oppressed 
by the standards of white womanhood; and that often for women to be assumed to have 
humanity at all, it must be white-woman humanity.19  African American women express 
different notions of womanhood within the context of their lives. 
Williams argues that just as a directed analysis of patriarchy is not enough, neither is 
an exclusive analysis of racism enough.  Such analyses are usually silent about black sexism 
in all its forms.  Williams suggests that African Americans need to continue to attend to how 
they describe blackness.  She contends that much of the language used to discuss the struggle 
between blacks and whites assumes an androcentric black history so that blackness comes to 
mean black maleness.20  As a theologian she challenges the black Church to reflect on its use 
of the bible and to spurn patriarchal theology that prohibits women from asking questions 
and keeps them in a secondary role to men in church and society.  Womanists urge the black 
Church and community to understand the unique suffering and struggle of African American 
women and to not join the larger society in blaming her for what she had and has to do. 
 Womanist theologians recognize the unique identity of black women is situated 
within the intersection of sex/gender and race.  Their attention to the specific experiences of 
African American women leads them to understand that black female identity is more than 
just sex/gender and race.  Black women know that their history includes struggles with not 
only racism and sexism but also economic marginalization and sexual exploitation.  These 
experiences both unite and differentiate black women with and from each other.  In the 
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complex intersections of identity categories there are ever more unique experiences of being 
a black woman. 
 
Surrogacy and Physical Labor: Sex/Gender, Race, and Class 
The persistent reality of poverty continues to be a common experience for African 
American women.  Therefore, to be true to the real-life situation of many African American 
women, womanist analysis cannot stop with a critique of sexism and racism, but must also 
make the connections between these and the structures that keep the majority of African 
American women poor and/or economically disadvantaged.  Womanists recognize that class 
status is a crucial identity marker in U.S. society.  Understanding class is not an independent 
study in womanist discourse, but is understood through its interaction with sex/gender and 
race.  From the very beginning of black life in this country, race dictated one’s economic 
status.  Blackness made one a slave; it continues to make many poor.  From their very first 
moment on American soil, African American women found themselves exploited within the 
U.S. economic system.  The daily struggles of poor black women today witness to the 
continued interaction of sexism, racism, and classism, so womanism employs a tri-
dimensional analysis of this triple oppression.  Womanist theologian M. Shawn Copeland 
writes that the experiences of African American women are a pivot for focusing, defining, 
and coding the interaction of sexism, racism and classism.21  She argues that theologians 
interested in liberation cannot rank or order oppression but must see all its expressions and 
their interaction both in the individual and societal realms.   
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 Through their experience of economic hardship, African American women know that 
economic systems also construct how we are known and how we know ourselves.  Delores 
Williams argues that investigating the history of African American physical labor reveals 
various ways that sex/gender, race, and class intersect.  She begins with how the institution of 
slavery originated this tri-dimensional oppression.  The debasement of black women has 
always been economically important for the U.S.  Williams points out that the slave trade 
was the primary source of wealth during the colonial period and the work of the slaves 
helped build the economic foundation of this country.  The debasement of all black people 
was important for the success of the U.S. slavocracy.  It was believed that the enslaved could 
not be overworked and were “comparatively insensitive to sufferings that would be 
unbearable to whites.”22  For enslaved black women, this justified the practice of forcing 
them to do the same work as men in roles usually associated with men.   
Not all female slaves were Mammies and forced to nurture white families.  Most 
female slaves were field hands and sex/gender and race intersected differently for them.  
Williams describes the substitution of black female energy for black male energy as another 
example of the forced surrogacy they experienced during slavery.  The substitution of 
enslaved women for enslaved men led to the “masculinization” of these slaves in their work, 
meaning they lost the gender distinction society made between men and women.  Williams 
writes that in the consciousness of many slaves, the masculinization of the roles of female 
slaves erased gender boundaries in relation to work.  This is reflected most clearly in some 
slaves’ lack of gender distinction in their use of pronouns.  They would refer to both female 
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and males slaves as “he.”23  The masculinization of their labor bred the idea that black 
women were not feminine and did not desire to be so.  When compared to white women, 
black female slaves were considered to have not only far more physical strength but also 
more capacity for pain than white women.  But these women were not completely equated 
with men.  Williams writes that female field hands could not fill the highest role of field 
slaves and become the slave driver.  In addition, these masculinized female field hands were 
thought to be of a lower social class than the female house slaves who usually did “women’s 
work.”  Williams argues that these female slaves were forced into the roles they had to 
perform and then their suffering in them was justified based on the view of them the 
performance of these roles created. 
Even after emancipation, African American women often still filled the roles usually 
associated with men at that time, including breadwinner and head of household.  She entered 
into these roles because of her economic circumstances.  Poverty necessitated that black 
women work either in the fields or as domestic workers.  In the fields, they would continue to 
do the same work as men.  As domestic workers, they would do the work that white women 
wished to avoid and had the resources to pass off to black women.  Poverty and the search 
for work often separated families and left black women to support their children without the 
help of men.   
Racism has historically undermined the efforts of black people to gain financial 
security.  Delores Williams gives an example from postbellum U.S. society.  She writes that 
even though white men and women had serious labor struggles with each other in Southern 
factories after the Civil War, white women and white men together mobilized to keep 
manufacturers from hiring black women and black men.  Whites joined together, regardless 
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of sex/gender or class, to keep African Americans economically and racially inferior.  Some 
of these tactics were violent.  Employers came up with plans to “utilize black and white labor 
in a reasonably efficient manner while still preserving white supremacy, especially for 
disadvantaged whites.” 24   
Focusing on the experience of black women, womanist scholars have always made 
connections between racism, sexism, and economic exploitation.  Frances Beale, in her early 
black feminist article “Double Jeopardy: To Be Black and Female,” argues that the “system 
of capitalism and its afterbirth racism” have always existed contemporaneously in the U.S.25  
She contends that both narratives are imbued with sexism.  Beale challenges capitalism’s 
definitions of women and family.  She contends that its sexist and racist model of family has 
wreaked havoc in the black community because black people do not fit.  The capitalist model 
of woman is a bourgeois white model of womanhood and the model of man is the head of 
household.  Beale argues that the economic system of capitalism seeks to reduce women to a 
state of enslavement and defines their labor as surplus and exploitable.26  For most of its 
history, capitalist America has defined woman as full-time caregiver to the family who is 
then a mere satellite of her mate.  Beale argues that such an existence for women is sterile 
and parasitic and offers her little opportunity to develop herself as an individual.  In addition, 
black men, even after slavery, have and continue to find it difficult to secure meaningful or 
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productive employment.  This reality attacks their sense of self given that the capitalist 
evaluation of men depends on their status as breadwinner.  Black women historically have 
had to work and in fact are sometimes the breadwinner for the family.  They are then accused 
of emasculating black men.  Beale contends that too often black men may have accepted the 
sexist guidelines about women, but racism prevents them from taking their place beside 
white men.  She argues that the black community must renounce these ideas of manhood and 
womanhood as counter-revolutionary.  
Beale argues that capitalism and its class structure give birth to and perpetuate racism 
and sexism, and calls on black female scholars to address this underlying problem.  
Womanists have taken up Beale’s challenge.  Womanist scholars recognize that fighting 
classism is a different battle than taking on racism or sexism.  First of all, it includes a 
critique of capitalism, which is whole-heartedly embraced by most of the U.S.  Second, in a 
country that prides itself on equal rights and equal opportunity for all, it is difficult to even 
make the argument for the existence of class structures.  However, Katie Cannon, in her 
articles, “Unearthing Ethical Treasures: The Intrusive Markers of Social Class” and “Racism 
and Economics: The Perspective of Oliver C. Cox,” does both.27  In true womanist fashion, 
she writes about both the realities of class and how to assess our place within it by balancing 
“theoretical” approaches with personal reflection on individual history and the sense of self 
that issues forth from that history. 
Cannon’s analysis of class posits that before understanding our own personal place 
within U.S. class structures, one must first recognize the reality of class itself.  Cannon 
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argues that knowledge of class is habitually suppressed in this country and the false idea of 
classlessness is promoted.  This illusion of classlessness promotes the idea that one’s social 
standing is determined by individual merit and hard work, even though the class position of 
one’s family is probably the single most significant determinant of future success.28  Success 
according to capitalism is defined in terms of affluence and possessions.  The way of life of 
the privileged and affluent is established as the norm in U.S. capitalist ideology.29  For 
capitalism and its resulting class structure to work and survive, it is important that the 
majority of people buy into these values and ideology.  Even those exploited by the system 
are expected to embrace it and the justifications for their exploitation.  Cannon writes that 
most people opt to live this parcel of lies and either pose and pass as so-called members of 
the muddled middle-class or exist in a state of we-are-all-the-same classlessness.   
Cannon argues that this we-are-all-the-same attitude is dangerous for those who 
possess little resources and limited opportunities, because class is not just about money but 
our being and sense of self.  When a person’s real life does not reflect the prosperity and 
affluence of the ruling class, one can develop a sense of nobodiness.  Those with higher 
economic standing blame the poor for the problems in the U.S., an attack on the very being 
of the poor.30  Cannon advocates honesty in assessing our place within the U.S. capitalist 
order.  She argues that each person must apply a fundamental inquiry of class indicators to all 
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areas of their biotext in order to recognize class in one’s own individual life and how this 
connects to the class structures of the U.S. capitalist political economy.  This process invites 
each person to claim who they are and where they come from as well as what roles they 
adopt to survive and succeed in our society.  It asks each person to assess their beliefs about 
the internal worth of humanity and on what they base it. 
This process of self-reflection in terms of class will highlight how each person relates 
to capitalism.  Some will be the powerbrokers who benefit from the system while others may 
recognize that they are embracing a system that exploits them.  Cannon argues that this self-
reflection is especially important for the black community because racism is inherent in our 
capitalist economic reality.  She uses the work of Oliver C. Cox to uncover the 
interconnections of racism and capitalism.  Cox contends that the exploitation of black 
people and people of color is an inherent dynamic of capitalism.  Racism is about labor 
relations.  Black people and other people of color have and are intended to continue to 
occupy the lowest rungs of the labor hierarchy both domestically and internationally.  
Cannon writes that chattel slavery was an extreme institutional expression of capitalist 
exploitation but demonstrates the frightful principle of capitalism that the greater the need for 
black labor, the greater would be black subjugation.31  The suppression and mistreatment of 
black people is maintained because it serves the needs of the system.   
Cannon concludes from Cox’s analysis that since white supremacy has been 
interstructured with our capitalist political economy only the elimination of a capitalist mode 
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of production can open the way to making racism dysfunctional.  She recognizes that this 
fight against capitalism must be undertaken in the Church and theology as well.  Cannon 
writes that the form of Christianity shaped by obeisance to the economic interests of a 
capitalist system is a new form of Christianity, one that legitimates exploitation.  It is a form 
of capitalist Christianity which combines defense of the sanctity of the economic system with 
racial and theological conformity.  Such Christianity, Cannon argues, separates the spiritual 
person from the bodily person and calls on people to be spiritual and avoid politics.  Such a 
Christianity has no place in womanist theology. 
The racism inherent in capitalism does not always preclude some African Americans 
from achieving middle-class status.  As African American life in this country diversifies in 
this manner, womanists have become aware of the classism developing within the black 
community.  Bridgette Hector, in her article “Womanist Model: Crossing Class Barriers: 
Middle-Class Black Women Relating with Inner-City Black Female Youth,” observes a 
tension growing between black women of different economic class status.32  She contends 
that class divisions are dividing the black community and leaving it diminished as a result.  
Hector argues that African Americans of different classes do not know each other anymore, 
and an important first step to unifying against oppression is to tell each other their stories so 
they can learn about and from each other.33  In knowing each other outside of the dictates of 
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capitalism, women of different classes can become “empowered cojourners” who dismantle 
stereotypes and establish opportunities for ministry between each other.34  Womanist analysis 
recognizes that economics both unites black women in their historical battle with poverty and 
divides them in their present economically diverse realities.  It is an important social marker 
that groups and distinguishes bodies. 
 
Surrogacy and Sexuality: Sex/Gender, Race, and Sexuality 
 In order to give a wholistic account of black female identity, womanist scholarship 
attends to the sexuality of African American women.  Kelly Brown Douglas addresses 
sexuality and the black community and Church in her book Sexuality and the Black Church: 
A Womanist Perspective, and concludes that the violation of black sexuality by white culture 
is about nothing less than preserving white power in an interlocking system of racist, sexist, 
classist, and heterosexist oppression.  Brown Douglas approaches sexuality not as a term 
synonymous with sex but rather implying a person’s very humanity.  She contends that 
sexuality is basic to personhood.  It compels emotional, affective, sensual, and spiritual 
relationships and involves self-understanding and ways of relating in the world as women 
and men.35  Brown Douglas contends that the exploitation of black sexuality is part of the 
overall effort to control black bodies in the support of white patriarchal hegemony.  This is 
especially true for black women who are held in lowest regard by white patriarchal culture 
because they are black and female.  In contrast to the myth of white womanhood, which 
“leads men and children to God,” black women are blamed for the depravity of the entire 
                                                                                                                                                       
middle-class individualistic mentality that some middle-class black women have bought into.  Hector, 
“Womanist Model: Crossing Class Barriers,” 130-31, 134-35.   
34
 Hector, “Womanist Model: Crossing Class Barriers,” 144. 
35
 Brown Douglas, Sexuality and the Black Church, 6. 
169 
 
black community.  They are also held responsible for their past and present abuse at the 
hands of white men.  She claims that black sexuality and its attack and humiliation serve an 
essential function in white culture’s myths, stereotypes, laws, and customs. 
The attack on black sexuality began during and as part of the enslavement of African 
people.  Although according to the racist ideology of the time white men should have limited 
their sexual relations to white women, they continually forced black women to endure their 
advances and to provide for their sexual “pleasure.”36  This experience of surrogacy, which 
entailed the continued rape of enslaved women, was a constant attack on their self-esteem 
and self-worth.  Delores Williams contends that the sexual surrogacy of enslaved women 
contributed to a negative image of black women as “loose, over-sexed, erotic, and readily 
responsive to the sexual advances of men, especially white men.”37  She argues that by 
describing the black woman in this way, white society could put the responsibility for the 
sexual liaisons of slavery upon the “immoral” slave woman, whose “passionate” nature was 
supposed to have stemmed from her African heritage.  These ideas laid the foundation for a 
mythology of black sexuality that helped justify the institution and practices of slavery and 
which continue to justify white patriarchal hegemony.   
The racist caricatures and stereotypes surrounding blackness portray the belief in the 
intrinsic depravity of black persons.  The image of the wild and savage Jezebel was used to 
justify the sexual exploitation of black women by white men.  Brown Douglas argues that the 
stereotypes and false images surrounding black womanhood provided a gateway and 
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foundation for the dehumanization of black men.  The stereotypes about the lasciviousness of 
the black female required a matching mythology for the black male.  Black people were 
portrayed as governed by passion and therefore naturally violent.  Black women were 
described as seductresses of white men and black men as sexual predators of white women.38  
The mythology created about black sexuality has and does support and justify white control 
of black bodies.  Brown Douglas contends that the myths employed to justify this control 
painted black persons as potential threats to the peace and sanctity of the white world.  For 
the sake of the white world, these people needed to be controlled.39 
 Brown Douglas argues that Christian teaching has supported white culture’s control 
of black bodies by giving sexuality authoritative prominence in the denigration of particular 
human beings.  Brown Douglas maintains that Western Christian tradition opened wide the 
door for the possibility of utilizing sexual practices, or alleged sexual practices, as a means 
for devaluing and demonizing human beings by associating sexual activity with passionate, 
irrational, and even satanic behavior.40  White Christian society embraced and used this 
tradition to place a sacred canopy over their acts of domination and oppression.   
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Brown Douglas utilizes Michel Foucault’s theory of power with insights from black 
female and male social critics in order to address both the reality of the denigration of black 
sexuality and reasons behind it.41  She reads Foucault’s relational view of power as 
originating in and controlled by the hands of people not impersonal or elusive structures of 
domination.  Through the production of certain forms of knowledge and their deployment 
through public discourse, power produces constraints over the bodies and consciences of 
people and thereby compels them to behave in certain ways.  Foucault argues that sexuality is 
integral to power because it is central to the regulation of bodies.  By questioning and 
impugning another’s sexuality, one bolsters their own claim to superiority and suggests the 
other group’s inferiority.  Such distinctions establish justification for the control of one over 
the other.42  By attacking black sexuality, white culture attacks black people’s being for the 
purpose of controlling them.  By painting black people as deviant and uncivilized, white 
culture produces and deploys knowledge meant to define black people as inferior, 
intrinsically depraved, and in need of control.  Brown Douglas argues that the main purpose 
of this mythology is to make white supremacy seem natural, normal, necessary, and 
inevitable, and thereby deflect attention from the sinister nature of white power.  White 
culture has benefitted from the control of black bodies, both their reproductive and 
productive capacities. 
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Brown Douglas argues that the assault on black sexuality by white culture has 
impeded black people’s ability to love themselves, to love each other in all their diversity, 
and to know God.  The result of centuries of attack on all aspects of their person, including 
their sexuality, is a lowered self-esteem of individual black persons.  An inability to love self 
is an obstacle to loving others.  Brown Douglas writes that “the consequences of sexual 
humiliation have left black men and women vulnerable to adopting perceptions of 
masculinity and femininity that place them in dysfunctional relationships with each other and 
oblige them to negate the humanity and worth of gay and lesbian persons whose ways of 
being challenge their distorted views of sexuality.”43  Brown Douglas argues that black 
people must face the degree to which their perceptions of femininity, masculinity, and family 
have been shaped by and in fact support the ideology of a white, patriarchal, heterosexist 
culture.  She quotes Patricia Hill Collins who writes, “Much of the antagonism African-
American women and men feel may stem from an unstated resentment toward Eurocentric 
gender ideology and against one another as enforcers of the dichotomous sex role inherent in 
the ideology.”44   
Brown Douglas argues that divesting themselves of this gender ideology will help the 
black community better define black freedom as freedom for all black people.  Like many 
womanists, she contends that too often black freedom has meant gaining a certain standard of 
“manhood” for black men.  This manhood is too often reflective of patriarchal and sexist 
norms that equate it with physical strength, independence, and dominance.45  This manhood 
meant the subjugation of black women and the derision of homosexual persons.  Male 
homosexuality becomes equated with effeminate behavior and black mothers are blamed for 
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causing it in their sons.  Lesbians are often thought of as a betrayal of manhood by simple 
virtue of who they are outside of sexual relationship with black men.  In spite of this, these 
notions of manhood and womanhood are often embraced by the black community.  Brown 
Douglas posits that one reason may be that in a society where privilege is accorded on the 
basis of race (namely, whiteness), gender (maleness), and sexual preference 
(heterosexuality), heterosexual privilege is virtually the only privilege that black people – 
especially black women – can claim in order to move to the center.46 
 Brown Douglas contends that the worst response to the white cultural attack on black 
sexuality is the silence in the black community concerning their sexuality.  Brown Douglas 
challenges the black Church to engage in a sexual discourse of resistance, which is a counter 
discourse to the one white culture has created to describe and construct black sexuality.  She 
embraces the theory that discourse constructs us and it is through a disruptive discourse that 
we can change.47  This counter discourse can change interpersonal interactions and 
undermine oppressive institutions.  Because Brown Douglas proposes this counter discourse 
from a womanist perspective, she advocates dealing with sexuality within its intersections 
with sex/gender, race, and class.  She finds precedence for this counter-discourse in the 
history of African Americans in this country.  She points to the example of the enslaved 
African people whose sexuality and persons were continually under assault, but who forged 
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their own notions of their sexuality that affirmed their personhood and fostered well-being in 
the community.48   
 Brown Douglas proposes that this sexual discourse of resistance should have two 
main steps that could lead to many positive outcomes.  First, it must deconstruct the sexual 
politics of the black community in order to uncover and understand what forces have shaped 
black sexuality.  Most importantly, according to Brown Douglas, this discourse must name 
and expose the impact of white culture on black sexuality.  Second, the sexual discourse of 
resistance must be constructive in that it should cultivate more life-enhancing approaches and 
attitudes concerning black sexuality.  Brown Douglas posits that by discussing sexuality the 
black community could divest itself of its sexism and its homophobia.  Both sexism and 
homophobia destroy black life.  Black feminists and womanists have long proposed to end 
the silence about sexism in the black community because sexism is destructive to both black 
men and women.  Brown Douglas proposes that homophobia is similarly destructive to both 
those who perpetuate it and those who suffer from its perpetuation.49 
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Brown Douglas urges the black community to fully understand how the tools of 
power have been used against black people, and recognize how they in turn are using them to 
oppress gay and lesbian persons.  Like white culture, the black Church invokes biblical 
authority for its denouncement of homosexuality and thereby places a sacred canopy and 
divine sanction over their views and thereby justifies its oppression of homosexuals.  Brown 
Douglas maintains that with such a history of the bible being used against them, it seems 
abhorrent for black people to be so steadfast in their use of the bible against other black 
persons.  She challenges the black Church to remember how Christianity was used to support 
their own oppression and therefore develop a hermeneutic that reflects the struggle for 
freedom it says it embraces.  She contends that the black Church needs to reexamine the 
biblical texts it uses to denounce homosexuality and determine if homophobia is driving its 
reading of these texts.50  She calls attention to the first chapter of Genesis that all of God’s 
creation was good, including the human body.  God is present through our very humanity and 
the body is the instrument for divine presence, the means through which God is actualized in 
our lives.  The Incarnation reaffirms another Genesis claim that every human body-person is 
created in the image of God.  Brown Douglas emphasizes that God loves our bodies, all our 
bodies.  She urges the black community to remember that black bodies are not an affront to 
God but the means by which black persons enter into loving relationship with each other and 
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with God.  She looks to the ministry of Jesus, which was partial to justice and the victims of 
all oppressions, to justify her goals of tolerance and inclusion.  Brown Douglas contends that 
if the black Church really chooses Jesus as the center of its life and faith then it must also 
choose a way of being in the world that includes an appreciation for the sanctity of human 
sexuality and an acknowledgement and acceptance of the rich sexual diversity in the black 
community. 
 
III. WOMANIST PARADIGM 
This chapter has teased out examples of how womanist theologians analyze black 
female identity from the perspective of black women themselves.  This analysis recognizes a 
unique identity for black women formed within the multilayered oppressions they have 
collectively experienced.  This identity is not monolithic as black women experience and 
respond to these challenges differently.  Markers of class and sexuality as well as others 
create diversity within the African American female community.  However, womanist 
method embraces the claim that a unique theological perspective follows from the unique 
experiences that result from black female identity.  Womanists identify and learn the stories 
of oppressed black women and witness to both their abuse and degradation as well as their 
power and hope.  Womanist theology explores the exploitation of black women in this 
country, but sees how this difficult history has taught them to defy identity categories that 
aim to define what a person can and cannot do.  Black women are more than what our society 
defines them as.  Their own stories reveal a counter-discourse about their identity and the 
power structures that affect this identity. 
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 Many womanists claim that what they offer is not just a unique perspective but a new 
epistemology that creates a new paradigm for doing theology.  Ideas have bodies and these 
bodies affect ideas.  Womanists claim that truth has been reified within ideological 
formulations that keep white supremacist heteropatriarchy intact and continue the 
marginalization of black women.51  Womanist theologians such as Delores Williams 
challenge all theologians to consider how their bodily identity affects their theology.  
Williams contends that a theology’s focus is often the result of whom the theologian 
identifies with in biblical texts.  She suggests that all theologians engage in a womanist 
hermeneutic of identification-ascertainment in order to discover with whom and with what 
events they personally identify.52  This will be the result of the theologian’s individual faith 
journey and communal influences.  She maintains that mainstream white male theologians 
too often just identify with the patriarchs, that white feminist theologians are too often just 
concerned with patriarchy, and that black male theologians identify too thoroughly with 
Israel’s election.  She suggests that because of their historical experience in this country, 
African American woman see the oppressed of the oppressed in the biblical stories and 
identify with them. 
 Williams posits that the unique identity and therefore perspective of the theologian 
creates different ways of addressing theological themes.  She challenges liberation theology 
to expand its theological focus from a too narrow concentration on liberation themes to 
include survival themes.  Womanist theology’s identification with the oppressed of the 
oppressed brings to light the reality that the oppressed do not always experience bodily 
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liberation in the biblical stories or real life.53  It is still important theological work to reflect 
on survival issues since oppressed communities must have tools to survive within the 
oppression they fight to eliminate.  Womanists consider what it means for the oppressed to 
believe in a God that not only liberates but leaves some in bondage.  The gift of revelation is 
sometimes hope and survival tools.  Williams claims that this recognition is a challenge to 
black theology and its exclusive focus on liberation.54 
 Williams argues that the womanist method of identifying with the oppressed of the 
oppressed in real life, in the form of black women and their experiences of surrogacy, also 
raises serious questions about how Christians are taught to think about redemption through 
the image of Jesus on the cross.  As a surrogate for sinful humanity, Jesus on the cross seems 
to redeem humans by enduring torture and death at the hands of cruel, imperialistic, 
patriarchal power.55  God’s “love” is therefore manifested in the death of God’s innocent 
child.  Williams finds this problematic for two reasons.  First, it bestows on surrogacy an 
aura of the sacred and may encourage black women to also view their suffering as sacred, as 
part of God’s divine plan.  Williams contends that as Christians, black women cannot forget 
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the cross, but neither can they glorify it for to do so is to glorify suffering, and to render their 
exploitation sacred and to glorify the sin of defilement.  For Williams, the image of Jesus on 
the cross is the image of human sin in its most desecrated form.  It should remind us of the 
ongoing reality of oppressive systems that continue to attack, mock, and destroy human 
bodies.  The existence of this sin and its manifestation in systems of oppression such as 
sexism, racism, classism, and heterosexism cannot bring about redemption.   
 Not all womanists agree with Williams’ theology of redemption, but many would 
agree with her claim that redemption and the ushering in of the kingdom of God comes about 
through the righting of relationships.  William contends that if we focus on Jesus’ life we see 
that righting relationships was core to his person and ministry.  In this theology, the cross 
becomes a reminder of how humans have tried throughout history to destroy visions of 
righting relationships.  Womanists claim that the wholeness that Jesus preached includes a 
new vision for both individual identity and interpersonal relationships.  This process often 
involves the transformation of tradition and social relations sanctioned by the status quo and 
its power dynamics.  Williams interprets Jesus’ work as helping people exchange their old 
identities based on inherited cultural meanings for new identities shaped by his gospel ethics 
and worldview.  Womanists call on Christians to embark on a similar personal and 
communal transformation from identities based on patriarchal, racist, and heterosexist 
meanings to those that embrace equality and inclusion. 
 
IV. CONSTRUCTION AND EXPRESSION 
 Womanist theology contributes important insights to theologizing about the body in 
its sexed/gendered and raced reality.  Womanists call attention to the fact that all bodies are 
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always sexed/gendered and raced at the same time so both identity markers must be 
considered in theological discourse.  The intersection of these identity categories creates 
different and unique identities and realities.  Womanist theology also recognizes that identity 
markers beyond sex/gender and race affect the lives of body-persons.  It advocates movement 
away from narrow or essentialized definitions of black and/or female subjectivity, including 
black female subjectivity.  Womanist consideration of black women’s historical experience 
recognizes the influence of class and sexuality on black female identity that sets them apart 
as a group as well as creates diversity within the group.  These insights advocate an approach 
to the body that recognizes that the identity of body-persons is greatly affected by how 
sex/gender and race intersect in their lives as well as how these two intersect with a plethora 
of other identity markers that create unique individual identities.  Womanist theology urges 
theological discourse about the body to balance consideration of the social construction of 
identity with the unique expression of identity at both the communal and individual levels.  
Womanist approaches to the body balance the fact that historical and societal 
experiences and language construct our identity and the equally important fact that we are 
always capable of both embracing and contesting these constructions.  Our bodies include 
both the construction of group identity as well as counter-discourses to this construction and 
the life stories that individualize identity.  Womanists recognize that white supremacy has 
authored language that has defined black female identity for general consumption.  But 
female black bodies have a language of their own.56  Womanist theologians regard this 
attention to the discourses of specific communities and individuals as integral to the 
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theological enterprise.  Rosemarie Harding writes, “Religion is not simply a doctrine of faith 
or the methods and practices of church, rather it is all the ways we remind ourselves of who 
we really are, in spite of who the temporal powers may say we are.  Religion is how we 
situate ourselves, how we understand ourselves, in a particular place and time vis-à-vis 
ultimate reality, vis-à-vis God.”57 
Just as in the previous explorations of sex/gender and race, womanist theologians use 
construction as a useful though limited conceptual tool for exploring and understanding the 
unique identity and reality of African American women by teasing out the various aspects of 
identity that black women experience.  Construction can be a limited tool because if often 
does not attend to the counter-discourses of historically oppressed communities since these 
discourses are rarely known outside of the community.58  Emilie Towns contends that the 
images of black life from beyond black life usually keep black people as objects not as 
subjects with complex identities and realities.59  Womanist consideration of history includes 
both what those outside of the black female community have said about black female identity 
and what they have said about themselves to each other.  Central to the womanist approach 
to black female identity is the fact that black women are and always have been more than the 
constructs of white supremacy have portrayed them to be.   Womanist discourse brings to 
light the forces against black women and their own counter-discourse based on their culture, 
language, and self-knowledge.  Women of African descent have unique experiences and a 
narrative about it that is uniquely their own.  It is “a narrative of their persistent effort to rise 
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above and beyond those persons and situations, which attempt to hold them down.”60  It is a 
narrative that helps black women know themselves and how they came to be. It is a narrative 
that is crafted within African American female culture.  Womanists utilize this narrative with 
the assumption that these women have intimate knowledge of the matrixes of power that 
structure their lives.61   
Womanists look to anecdotal evidence to speak the truth of the private lives of black 
women and liberate and utilize the power of this knowledge.  They look to ordinary people’s 
reflection on their experiences of gender, race, class, and sexual oppression.62  Womanism is 
based on the right of self-naming and a central tenet of its methodology.  Black female 
scholars of religion claimed the power of naming and called themselves womanists, knowing 
that changing names can change minds.  The power of self-naming reflects that each person 
is a moral agent and a potential agent of change.  Through the stories of the oppressed we 
learn of their power and agency and our worldview changes.   These stories are not just 
communal stories but individual stories.  By approaching the body in its totality, womanism 
recognizes that each body-person is unique.  They seek out and call forth the whole self-
expression of individual persons.63   
Womanist scholarship claims a respect for individuality and the space each individual 
needs to know the self.  As individual creations with the stamp of the imago Dei, each person 
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has their own expression of self and revelations of the divine to bring forth into the world.  
Katie Cannon argues that womanists, and all theologians really, must bring the specificities 
of their autobiographical context into play because our contextual lens affects our theology.  
In other words, we must all tell our stories.  These stories include our familiar narratives and 
our communal practices.  This self-reflection must include who we are and who we are 
becoming.  Life can only be accessed through individual persons.  Womanists maintain that 
only in knowing the person’s story can you know their understanding of black female 
identity and therefore their rendering of womanist scholarship.   
The community self-named as womanist is not a homogeneous group and its 
narratives are not monolithic.  Womanism recognizes that individuals make up communities 
and they do not lose this individuality by being part of a group.  Womanist scholarship 
endeavors to negotiate and balance communal identity, which is both historical constructions 
and their contestation, with individual identity, which is the unique reality of each black 
woman.  Although all black women live in the intersection of black race and female 
sex/gender, the influences of class, sexuality, age, and religion on identity result in diverse 
experiences and form unique persons.  Womanism needs this diversity and expansiveness to 
address the many challenges black women face both in the wider world and within the 
community of womanists themselves.  Womanists challenge each other to value the multiple 
voices, cultures, and experiences of black women.  It is not an easy challenge to embrace 
diversity within community, but womanists believe it is true to their heritage and necessary 
for their future to do so.64 
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 Womanist thought as an identity politics must be inclusive of black women’s religious pluralism.  In Debra 
Mubashshir Majeed’s essay, “Womanism Encounters Islam,” she challenges womanists to recognize the 
religious diversity of African American women.  She praises Katie Cannon and other first-generation 
womanists who understood the need to reject an essentialist womanism which privileged religion or any single 
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This attention to individuality does not lead womanists to embrace relativity and the 
ultimate isolation of persons from each other.  Womanist discourse reveals that attending to 
individuality does not preclude community.  Although different aspects of human identity 
fragment communal identity into different experiences and realities, womanist scholarship 
teaches that persons are always connected in their sharing of certain intersections of identity 
categories.  We are connected to others through the very uniqueness of our identity and the 
aspects of it we share with them.  Jacquelyn Grant argues that in all dynamics of oppression, 
black women share in the reality of a broader community. They share race suffering with 
black men; with white women and other Third World women they are victims of sexism; and 
with poor blacks and whites, and other Third World peoples, especially women, they are 
disproportionately poor.  Therefore, in doing their theology, womanists in their concern for 
the concrete lives of black women are also concerned with broader issues.  Grant presents the 
experience of a black woman as both unique and connected with others.  She claims that “it 
is in the context of black women’s experience where the particular connects up with the 
universal.”65  Grant continues that this belief that the particular can and does connect up with 
the universal is central to Christian belief.  She writes that with Jesus Christ there was an 
implied universality which made him identify with others—the poor, the woman, the 
stranger.  Emilie Townes echoes these sentiments when she writes, “It is in exploring these 
                                                                                                                                                       
spiritually based experience and to allow space for the problematizing of womanist theories so as to 
acknowledge, differentiate, and reclaim the diverse faith journeys and spiritual influences in the lives of African 
American women.  In Deeper Shades of Purple, 43.  In “Hospitality, Haints, and Healing,” Rosemarie Freeney 
Harding writes that an openness to and acceptance of the diversity of God’s witness in the world is a legacy of 
the wisdom brought from Africa.  She writes, “Indigenous African religions are known for the inclusivity of 
their worldview—most tend to find ways to absorb and adapt new traditions (even those of conquered and 
conquering peoples) into a fundamentally accepting and essentially flexible whole.”  In Deeper Shades of 
Purple, 113.  
65
 Grant writes, “The theology is potentially wholistic because the experience out of which it emerges is totally 
interconnected with other experiences.  It is potentially liberating because it rests not on one single issue which 
could be considered only a middle-class issue relevant to one group of people, but it is multi-faceted.  Thus, the 
possibility for wholistic theology is more likely.”  Jacquelyn Grant, “Womanist Theology: Black Women’s 
Experience as a Source for Doing Theology, With Special Reference to Christology,” in Black Theology, 287. 
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depths, in taking seriously my particularity—not as a form of essentialism, but as 
epistemology—that I can meet and greet others because we are intricately and intimately 
interwoven in our postmodern culture.”66  Womanism celebrates community that finds 
common ground not sameness, and builds solidarity within diversity. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
Womanism attends to a “specific” community, namely black women, but offers its 
work as a platform and starting point for the liberation of all to wholeness and right 
relationships.  Diana Hayes hopes that, in time, womanist would be adopted by all women as, 
unlike feminism, from its beginnings it has been a theology that attempts to deal holistically 
with issues of race, class, and gender (including sexual orientation).67  The womanist tenet of 
critical engagement proclaims the inclusiveness of womanism for black women of different 
religions and life situations.  In addition, it proposes that womanist discourse is a thought 
process “from which other critical discourses might glean directives for doing thoroughgoing 
research and analysis ‘that seeks to discover and tell what is true.’”68  It is in this spirit that I 
have explored womanist theology.  Womanism advocates a method based on the belief that 
to bring about a future inclusive and representative of all, theologians must attend to the 
actual experiences of diverse persons.  These experiences will help us redefine what it means 
to be male and female or black and white or any other combination of identity markers 
because they are the stories of how people live these identities.  The following chapter on the 
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 Townes, “The Womanist Dancing Mind,” 242. 
67
 See Hayes, “Standing in the Shoes My Mother Made,” 57, 74. 
68
 Stacey M. Floyd-Thomas, “Introduction,” in Deeper Shades of Purple, 11.  She is quoting M. Shawn 
Copeland, “A Thinking Margin,” in Deeper Shades of Purple.   
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body as symbol embraces an approach to the body that balances the social construction of 
identity with the discourses of the oppressed and individual expressions of self.  
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And the Word became flesh and lived among us…full of grace and truth. 
 Jn 1:14 
 
 
CHAPTER 5:  THE BODY AS SYMBOL 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
At the heart of this dissertation is the belief that the human person cannot be or be 
known apart from their body.  We are body-persons.  Our coming to be is a materialization.  
Theology needs to consider not only the process of materialization but our materiality as 
well, including its sexed/gendered and raced aspects.  What the previous investigations into 
sex/gender and race and their interconnection in womanism reveal is that theology must 
balance two aspects of materiality in any consideration of the body.  Theologians must 
explore what bodies mean in their specific context as well as investigate bodies as the reality 
of specific body-persons.  The purpose of this chapter is to propose a theological approach to 
the body as symbol that builds on the discourses concerning sex/gender and race from the 
previous chapters as well as applications of symbol to the body in theological and other 
intellectual disciplines. 
The first aspect of materiality that is important for theological analysis of the body-
person is the impact of its context on the meaning of the body.  I use construction as an 
organizing concept to present different approaches to contemporary meanings of sex/gender 
and race.  Using construction as an organizing principle reveals how both discourses explore 
the extent to which language and narratives establish norms and regulations by which we 
know and are our bodies, how history defines and influences bodily identity, and how 
changing times change bodies.  Investigations of sex/gender and race that use construction as 
an organizing principle are helpful for several reasons.  They reveal the range of descriptions 
188 
 
of sex/gender and race that exist simultaneously in theological and theoretical discourses as 
well as their application to life and living.  They present the diversity of opinion that exists 
about these identity categories without deeming one correct and the others wrong.  By 
reviewing the multivalent reality of sex/gender and race, these investigations into sex/gender 
and race invite theologians to chart their own theories of these identity categories.1 
Specific investigations of theories of sex/gender and race are important for 
theologians but they are not enough.  Isolating sex/gender and race is a good first step to 
seriously addressing them but theology must recognize and contend with the fact that all 
people live both at the same time.  Womanist theology is a theological discourse that 
specifically explores this aspect of human living.  Womanist theology utilizes the concept of 
construction in its investigations of the experience of black women.  Womanist theologians 
explore how historical events and the narratives and mythology that followed from these 
events construct black womanhood in this country.  They explore how the intersection of 
different bodily constructions influences each construction.  In addition, womanist 
theologians offer two other important insights for any theological analysis of bodily identity.  
First, womanists point out that the constructions explored in most academic discourses are 
those developed and known by those with power in our society.  Womanists call upon 
theologians to also attend to the counter-discourses developed by those who traditionally 
have had no power in society or academia.  Black womanhood means different things to 
those who have traditionally oppressed black women as opposed to black women themselves.  
Second, womanist theologians recognize that black womanhood is not a monolithic 
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 I recognize that it is difficult for some theologians to embrace the idea of construction as a reality.  For them, a 
constructed sex/gender or race is an illusion.  It is my intention to propose construction not as the answer for 
thinking about sex/gender or race but as an organizing concept around which to have discussion about these 
identity categories.  
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categorization.  Womanist discourse addresses issues of class and sexuality that have affected 
black female identity as well as differentiated black women from each other.  Because it 
begins with the complexity of human identity for any group as well as person, womanist 
analysis moves out from race and sex/gender to consider other important identity markers.  
As a result, womanist scholarship teaches theologians to attend to the individual as well as 
the constructed group.   
Womanist theology highlights a second aspect of materiality that is important for 
theological analysis of the body-person, namely, that each body is the specific reality of a 
unique individual body-person.  Theology must recognize that persons choose how to 
understand the constructs of sex/gender and race and their intersection, and speak and live 
from this perspective.  There are many different frameworks, discourses, and iterations of 
identity, some of which have never been brought into mainstream discussion because of the 
social location of those who embrace the standpoint.  Theology must invite and explore 
various communal narratives about identity, but it must also recognize that individuals may 
be more diverse than the community identity by which they are known.2  The unique 
individual at the heart of Christian theology must be included and recognized in theological 
discourse about the body. 
Approaching the body as symbol achieves the balance of the body as construction and 
the body as individual expression that is needed for better consideration of sex/gender and 
race in theological discourse.  The body as symbol embraces both the body as a symbol of its 
context, including the language and history of this context, and as a symbol of the individual 
who is the body, including the person’s expression of their context and of their uniqueness.  
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 These community identities would include the definition of a person as “woman,” “man,” “African 
American,” “black woman,” “Caucasian,” etc. 
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The body as symbol learns from and builds on ideas running through the previous chapters 
on sex/gender, race, and womanism.  First, it includes the idea that socio-cultural and socio-
historical contexts and their discourses are articulated and made visible in the materiality we 
call race and sex/gender.  Second, it allows for the reality that the meanings of bodies are 
always shifting and changing.  The constructions of bodies are not static.  Because bodies 
include individual articulations of identity constructions as well as the unique utterance of the 
individuality of the body-person, race and sex/gender as such are continually being 
reconstituted.  Sex/gender and race have ambiguous meanings since there are so many people 
articulating the materiality that is these identity categories.  Third, the body as symbol 
incorporates the tension and interconnection between individual identity and communal life, 
which is central to human identity and theology, especially liberation discourses. 
The concept of symbol embraces the insights revealed in the previous investigations 
of theories of sex/gender and race, namely that material symbols reflect their context and 
express mystery.  The concept of symbol has a long history in theological discourse and has 
been used by theologians to describe the body.  There is also precedent in other intellectual 
disciplines for thinking of the body in this way.  An investigation of Karl Rahner’s 
presentation of the body as symbol explores the body as expression, while analyses of the 
body as symbol in philosophy, anthropology, and sociology promote understanding of the 
construction of the body in and by social discourse.  Each provides a corrective to the other 
and in their balance is a good approach to the body as symbol.  Balancing insights from 
theology and other disciplines produces a good tool for a theological consideration of human 
materiality that properly addresses sex/gender and race.  This approach investigates the body 
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as construction, reflecting its social location, and the body as expression, reflecting its unique 
expression of its context and its self.   
 
II. SYMBOL 
With the concept of symbol, theology already has a tool to reflect on the two aspects 
of materiality highlighted by the previous investigations of sex/gender and race.3  The 
concept of symbol applied to the body invites reflection on how its context impacts the 
meaning of any body and how the body reveals the unique individual it is.  The concept of 
symbol addresses how materiality makes immaterial concepts and realities present.  Although 
the concept of symbol is prevalent in theological discourse, any attempt to give one universal 
definition of symbol is almost impossible because of the many understandings of what 
symbols are and how they function.  This ambiguity is what makes symbol such a good tool, 
because it invites discussion about bodily materiality and how and what it symbolizes.  My 
argument that human beings embody and live as symbols relies on certain aspects of the 
word and concept of symbol, which are specifically helpful for thinking about the body in its 
sexed/gendered and raced reality.   
The word “symbol” itself can be traced to the Greek συµβάλλειν (symballein), which 
means to throw together or place together.  In its basic etymology, the word indicates one 
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 I rely on the following articles for overviews of the concept of symbol from a theological perspective: Diane 
Apostolos-Cappadona, “Symbols,” in Encyclopedia of Christianity, ed. John Bowden (New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), 1160-71; David Brown, “Symbolism,” in The Oxford Companion to Christian 
Thought, eds. Adrian Hastings et al. (New York : Oxford University Press, 2000), 690-92; William L. 
Hendricks, “Symbol,” in A New Handbook of Christian Theology, eds. Donald W. Musser and Joseph L. Price 
(Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1992), 467-68; Stephen Happel, “Symbol,” in The New Dictionary of Theology, 
eds. Joseph A. Komonchak, Mary Collins, Dermot A. Lane (Wilmington, DE: Michael Glazier, 1987), 997-
1002; Jörg Splett, “Symbol,” in Sacramentum Mundi: An Encyclopedia of Theology, eds. Karl Rahner et al. 
(New York: Herder and Herder, 1967), 199-201; and Stuart Chambers, “Symbolism, Ecclesiastical,” in The 
New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge, ed. Samuel Macauley Jackson (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Baker, 1964), 203-12. 
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thing, usually material and visible, bringing to mind or representing something else, usually 
immaterial and unseen.  This idea of symbol has been used throughout Christian history to 
think about the mystery that materiality makes accessible to us.  The materiality of the body 
makes present and accessible the very concepts of sex/gender and race and the person who is 
the body.  The body is the symbol of these identity concepts and the individual person.  In its 
visibility, the body triggers a huge vocabulary and diverse language about the meanings we 
give to sex/gender and race.  The body simultaneously symbolizes linguistically by evoking 
historical meanings of sex/gender and race and nonlinguistically by its color, shape, 
movement, gestures, clothing, and so on.  The Greek root of symbol can also mean to 
compare.  Any body we encounter is compared with our preconceived ideas about sex/gender 
and race.  We want to determine if that body complies with or diverges from these 
assumptive interpretations of sex/gender or race.   
In its original Greek form (symballein), symbols were understood to indicate more 
than one meaning, “thrown together” in such a way that one meaning implies or entails 
others.4  Because of their open nature, symbols can be explained in many and sometimes 
contradictory ways.  A proper appreciation of symbols must embrace their overload in 
meaning.  They invite exploration and speculation.  This multivalent character of symbol can 
attend to both the complexity and diversity of persons and the complexity and diversity of the 
very notions of sex/gender and race.  Human persons are each unique, diverse, social, 
oppressed and/or oppressing, agents of change, as well as a combination of many identity 
markers.  In addition, race and sex/gender also exist in multiple ways and are variously 
interpreted in theology, theory, and specific societies.  These explanations sometimes overlap 
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 Happel, “Symbol,” 997. 
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and sometimes contradict each other but all are present in the broad concepts of sex/gender 
and race and the bodies that symbolize them. 
Symbols are contextual; in other words, the meaning and very existence of symbols 
depend on their context.5  Symbols communicate to the members of particular cultural or 
religious groups who have been taught their proper interpretation through the process of 
socialization to the group.  Symbols function as part of larger social systems and cannot be 
fully understood in isolation.  When it comes to the body, we are all socialized into certain 
understandings of what particular bodies are and mean and what they can do.  The identity of 
any body-person is initially established by bringing together the individual body in question 
with the concepts of sex/gender and race that are relevant to the context in which we 
encounter them.  To have a fuller appreciation of the body as a symbol of its social context, 
interpreters must pay attention to and know the language and history of this context, 
including its notions of sex/gender and race and how these have shifted over time.  The body 
as symbol is also communicating its own self-understanding.  This meaning may align with 
accepted rules of sex/gender and race or may be a counter-discourse to dominant theories.  In 
addition, an interpreter’s own perspective about sex/gender and race will influence the 
meaning assigned to any body they encounter or investigate. 
Catholic theology embraces the idea that materiality can and does reveal mystery 
within the context of its time and space.  The Incarnation and the Eucharist bring believers 
into direct contact with God in specific places and times and do so through the thought and 
language of these contexts.  Just as theologians and Church leaders must reflect on how 
different cultures embrace alternative liturgical and theological symbols, theological 
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 Some suggest that the similarities of certain symbols around the world have their origin in a common 
psychological unconscious shared by all human beings. 
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anthropology must also wrestle with various notions of sex/gender and race, as well as other 
concepts of human identity.  Christian revelation is historical and interpersonal as are the 
symbols that make it present, including the body. 
Another use of the original Greek term for symbol, symbolon, refers to the comparing 
or setting together of two things for the purpose of identification.  This harkens back to the 
custom of bringing together the two halves of a broken object, called “symbols,” in order to 
establish the identity of one or both of the persons possessing the matching halves.6  More 
generally, the term symbolon could be applied to whatever signified a means of recognition 
or identification.  The Christian Church has employed this idea of symbol.  In the Patristic 
era, the liturgical creeds pronounced by candidates at the time of baptism were called 
symbols.7  By professing their belief in formulas that began with “I believe” and inferred “we 
believe,” the candidate was recognized as acceptable for baptism and incorporation into the 
community.  By uttering the Church’s profession of faith, the person was set aside once and 
for all as a Christian and accepted into the community of faith.  This personal expression of 
the words that formed the community changed the identity of the individual.     
The use of the idea of symbol as a token of identity is an important aspect of my 
application of it to bodies.  Bodies establish individual and communal identity.  Each body 
symbolizes the unique individual who it is as well as the meaning(s) assigned to bodily 
                                                 
6
 The purpose of the symbols could be for identifying two contracting parties, or legitimate guests, messengers 
and partners.  It originally referred to a coin, ring, staff, or tablet, which was cut in half and then carried by two 
separate parties.  Each party kept a piece (a symbolon or symbol) as proof of identity when one or the other 
presented their piece.  The value of the object lay in its being united with its other part.  With this token a guest 
or ally could reclaim the rights of friendship or hospitality when the two participants next met.  
7
 The term symbol has been applied to early creedal formulas at least from the third century (e.g., by St. 
Cyprian, d. 259) and the Apostles’ Creed was called a symbol from the fourth century onward.  These common 
professions of faith were collections or summary formulas of dogmatic statements “brought together” as 
succinct expressions of basic Christian truths.  These creedal statements, which compress the whole belief of the 
church into succinct statements, reflect the overflow of meaning that is inherent in symbols.  The study of the 
distinctive doctrinal characteristics of church bodies is called symbolics. 
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categories such as sex/gender and race, which group bodies into distinct identity subsets.  
Being able to identify persons, discerning how to feel about them, and thereby knowing how 
to act toward them is an important part of everyday living.  Recognition and identification are 
crucial purposes of the body.  Race and sex/gender serve important roles in this process of 
identification and reaction.  They can trigger feelings of belonging and acceptability or 
rejection.  These identifying categories may connect people cross-culturally as well as allow 
people to live more specific cultural lives.  In this way the body allows us to be open to 
others while still forming communal loyalties.8   
The concept of symbol itself allows for different opinions about how symbols 
symbolize.  The question is to what degree is a symbol the thing it is symbolizing and to 
what degree is it not.  This question also entails discussion about what it means that one thing 
is or represents something else.  The history of Christianity’s use of symbols has witnessed 
periods of belief in a real affinity or correspondence between the visible sign and the 
invisible truth and periods of iconoclasm when there was the need to distinguish reverence 
for symbols and their worship.9  This “is” vs. “is not” debate can be translated as nature vs. 
convention when it comes to bodies.  Questions about nature and convention invite 
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 The reluctance of some black theologians as well as feminist theologians to stop using traditionally oppressive 
categories like black and woman is because they are also concepts that rally people for political action and 
social change.  Symbols are significant for the establishment of communal experience.  
9
 For example, the early and medieval Church and theologians took a symbolic view of scripture and the 
universe as a whole.  The time of the Reformation was a period when rationalism and the development of 
science were valued and the use of symbols was suppressed.  The twentieth century saw a renewed interest and 
attention to symbols.  The question for theologians considering symbol is whether the symbol represents by 
participating in that which it symbolizes or does it manifest Being Itself only in negation, revealing the 
discontinuity between symbol and what it manifests.  Two leading scholars who represent these different 
approaches to symbol are Karl Rahner and Paul Tillich.  Roger Haight, a theologian who tries to bring together 
their theologies, describes their approaches as reflecting the “is” vs. “is not” dialectical structure of religious 
symbols.  Emphasizing the “is,” as Rahner does, assumes a continuity between our world and a transcendent 
one.  Emphasizing the “is not” of symbol focuses more on the disjunction between humans and God.  This 
theology would use symbol as a way to talk about something we do not know how to think or talk about.  For an 
example of this approach to symbol, see Paul Tillich, Dynamics of Faith (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 
1957).  For more on Haight’s analysis of the “is” and “is not” aspects of symbol, see Roger Haight, Dynamics of 
Theology (New York: Paulist Press, 1990), 129-45. 
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speculation about how materiality symbolizes and what it symbolizes.  The body as symbol 
asks the question of whether the body is uttering ahistorical and ontological realities and 
materializing something natural and innate about human identity, or merely pointing to and 
making present identity constructions based on how certain characteristics of the body have 
been historically or conventionally associated with particular personality and capability traits 
by specific social contexts.10  Today the “natural” status of sex/gender and race is being 
challenged or has been eradicated.  Theological discussion of the body must address what 
happens if we change the register of a description from natural, ontological, or ahistorical to 
one that is established by convention or power dynamics.  The usefulness of the idea of 
symbol in theological discourse about the body includes its invitation to conversation about 
understandings of ontology, how being materializes, what it embodies, and the role of human 
agency in changing any of these.   
 Thinking of the body as symbol invites critiques of the meanings assigned to the body 
because all symbols must be investigated and questioned.  While we are aware that symbols 
shape our lives, at the same time, we question the meaning and intent of social, political, and 
economic symbols, all of which are expressed by the body.  We must investigate symbols not 
only to more fully understand them, but also to judge whether those symbols lead us toward 
the transformation of society for good or toward ill.  Human history has witnessed the 
expansive use and abuse of symbolic images.  Within this conversation about the body as 
symbol, interlocutors must remember that symbols elicit not only intellectual responses but 
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 Some argue that characteristics of specific sexes/genders and races have been tied to “natural” modes of being 
and therefore explained as ontological descriptions.  For example, there have been and are many theories and 
explanations of women’s reproductive capacities.  The female sex and its corresponding feminine gender have 
been described as more nurturing and the roles assigned to them often in the capacity of caregiver because some 
women can birth and nurse children.  Africans were thought to be less human because they enacted different 
modes of religion and living than the Europeans who described them in this way.  
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emotional reactions as well, because symbols are deeply embedded in human living and the 
meaning we attach to it.  Debate about the materiality of the body is often difficult because of 
the emotional connection people have to the meaning they gain from and give to bodies. 
The fit of symbol for my approach to the body is evident in the fact that human 
beings are body-persons; they are both at the same time physical matter and mysteriously 
more than that.  Bodies are powerful symbols because they can bear more than one meaning 
and evoke a gamut of ideas and responses.  Christian theology maintains that human persons 
are the imago Dei and therefore the body symbolizes both human and divine mystery.  
Neither is exhaustibly expressed in the body, yet neither can be revealed without the body.  It 
is through the body as symbol that we attain knowledge of the mystery of the human and the 
divine that expresses itself in it.  Yet at the same time that the body as symbol plunges us into 
the mystery of being, it also reveals aspects of human history and determines everyday 
actions and policy.  The body-person achieves meaning in their context and expresses the 
mystery of the individual who is more than just this context.  The immaterial something that 
is made material in the body is both the constructs of sex/gender and race and the expression 
of the individuality of the body-person.  The body is construction and expression at all times.   
 
III. THE BODY AS SYMBOL 
The concept of symbol has been used in theology to reflect on the body.  Karl 
Rahner’s ideas about the body in particular are helpful for theological discourse about 
sex/gender and race.  Rahner demonstrates how discourse about the body flows from the 
central questions of theology and is inherent in them.  His theology of symbol argues that 
expression is essential to being and the body as symbol is first and foremost the self-
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expression of the individual.  Rahner’s emphasis on expression serves as a needed corrective 
to discourse about the body that focuses almost exclusively on the group identity of the 
person and loses sight of the unique individual that the body-person is.  However, Rahner’s 
theology also needs the corrective of discourses that understand the body as a symbol of its 
context since his approach does not address the specificity of the body to which the 
categories of sex/gender and race point.  The juxtaposition of Rahner’s theology of symbol 
with other theories of the body as symbol creates the balance of the body as expression and 
the body as construction that is needed to have better theological discourse about sex/gender 
and race as identity concepts and about the whole body in all its specificities.  The body as 
symbol expresses the mystery of the body-person that it reveals as well as the construction of 
materiality that informs and is informed by this mystery. 
 
The Body as Expression 
Symbol is central to the theology of Karl Rahner.  He wrote that “the concept of 
symbol is an essential key concept in all theological treatises, without which it is impossible 
to have a correct understanding of the subject-matter of the various treatises in themselves 
and in relation to other treatises.”11  Rahner explains that a real theology of the symbol is 
based on the fundamental truth of Christianity, namely that God enunciates God’s self to the 
world through the incarnate Logos.  He uses symbol to explain his theology of the Trinity 
and the Incarnation as well as his theological anthropology that claims that the body is the 
symbolic reality of the human person. 
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 Karl Rahner, “The Theology of the Symbol,” in Theological Investigations, vol. 4, ed. Kevin Smith  
(Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1966), 245. 
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Rahner admits that the word “symbol” has no clear and definite meaning in every 
instance and that the very concept of symbol is much more obscure, difficult and ambiguous 
than is usually thought.  Symbol for Rahner is the highest and most primordial manner in 
which one reality renders another present.  Rahner argues that the symbol is not something 
separate from the symbolized.  The symbol contains the reality it represents and allows the 
other to really be there.  He writes, “the symbol is the reality, constituted by the thing 
symbolized as an inner moment of itself, which reveals and proclaims the thing symbolized, 
and is itself full of the thing symbolized, being its concrete form of existence.”12  For Rahner, 
the symbol represents primarily for the thing symbolized itself and only secondarily for 
others.   
Rahner’s basic principle in his ontology of symbolism is that all beings are by their 
nature symbolic, because they necessarily “express” themselves in order to attain their own 
nature.  He posits that all being must express itself.  Being achieves its expression through 
forming something distinct from itself yet one with itself.  This expression is a symbol of the 
being.  Beings cannot fully express themselves all at one time so they are multiple in their 
expression.  These plural moments have an inner agreement among themselves on account of 
the unity of the being.13  In its multiplicity, being sees “the other,” a derivative of its unity, 
which expresses its unity.  In the recognition of the whole in each part or expression, the 
being is made present to itself and finds itself in knowledge and love.  Therefore, Rahner 
explains the expression or symbol of the being as its self-realization.  The being needs this 
“other,” this expression, to be present and to be known by itself and by others.  Without the 
symbol the being cannot be known at all.   
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The Trinity is the constant background of Rahner’s ontological considerations of 
symbol.14  Rahner argues that communication is intrinsic to God as God is in God’s self and 
symbol is central to his explanation of this communication.  God the Father, in order to attain 
[his] proper nature, expresses self and possesses self in the other.  The other is the Father’s 
self-expression and therefore shares the Father’s be-ing.  This other is the Logos, the second 
person of the Trinity.  The Logos is the perfect symbol of the Father.  What is communicated 
within the Godhead is the essence of God.  This divine essence is communicated in three 
manners, since expression of being is multiple.  The Father as the unoriginate mediates self 
to self.  The Son is the one who is in truth uttered for self, and the Spirit is the one who is 
received and accepted in love for self.  This communication is the divine act of self-
possession in knowledge and love.  Here is the perfection of unity in multiplicity that Rahner 
understands as the ground of all being.  This is Rahner’s first proposition about symbol; that 
through symbols we express self and therefore possess self.  We communicate first of all for 
ourselves. 
Secondarily, symbols allow beings to be known by others.  This idea is also rooted in 
Rahner’s Trinitarian theology.  He argues that because God must express God’s self inwardly 
in order to possess self in the other and therefore attain God’s own nature, there is potential 
and capacity for God to be known outwardly and by others.  God is known outwardly by the 
same “other” by which God possesses God’s self, namely the Word.  The content of God’s 
communication is God’s self.  God is the giver and gift of the communication itself.  Rahner 
maintains that how God is with us in and through this self-communication is how God is in 
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 For a full exposition of Rahner’s trinitarian theology, see Karl Rahner, The Trinity, trans. Joseph Donceel 
(New York: The Crossroad Publishing Company, 1998). 
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God’s self because it is God’s self-communication.15  For Rahner, this self-communication of 
God is a real ontological communication which gives real knowledge and therefore implies 
real relation to what is known.  That is why his basic Trinitarian axiom is that the 
“economic” Trinity is the “immanent” Trinity and the “immanent” Trinity is the “economic” 
Trinity.16  The relationship that Jesus Christ revealed to us through the historic event of the 
Incarnation reveals the real relation of the Father and Son as they are in God.  Rahner 
contends that God has made God’s self known as triune, a unity and multiplicity that is at the 
heart of his understanding of symbol. 
 Rahner contends that in the same way as Trinitarian belief is best understood through 
a theology of symbol so are Christological tenets.  Because being expresses itself, the Word 
must also express self in “the other.”  This other is the humanity of Jesus Christ, which 
shares the be-ing of the Logos.  Jesus’ humanity is the symbol of the Logos, the second 
person of the Trinity, and as the symbolic reality of the Logos, the self-disclosure of the 
Logos.  Rahner maintains that each person of the Trinity communicates self according to 
their personal peculiarity, that is, according to and in virtue of their mutual relations.17  Since 
only the Logos became human, we must believe that only the Son, in [his] peculiarity as Son, 
could become incarnate.18  Only then could the mission of the Son tell us anything about the 
Logos.  In this human symbol, the concrete symbol of the Logos, God is expressed and is 
known by the world.  The fact that the second person of the Trinity expresses self in created 
reality has consequences for all created reality.  Rahner argues that we know human being in 
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 Rahner, The Trinity, 101. 
16
 Ibid., 22. 
17
 Ibid., 35. 
18
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reference to divine self-communication because there is continuity between God and 
humanity through grace. 
Rahner’s theological reflection on being, both divine and human, is based on the 
notion of the fundamental knowability of being because being is expressive.  The central 
symbol by which human beings are known is the body.  The human being expresses self as 
the body and through the body.  Only through its self-expression in the body can the person 
acquire self-knowledge and achieve self-fulfillment.  In addition, it is only through the body 
that the person can make themselves known to others.  Therefore, Rahner defines the body as 
the symbolic reality of the human being.  In Rahner’s theology, to say that the body is the 
symbol of the soul means that the soul renders itself present in the body.  The soul 
determines the body by expressing itself in it.  The body becomes the actuality and reality of 
the soul, its concrete form of existence.  Therefore we can talk about corporeality as the 
symbol of the unity of the person, which is self-communicated in the body.  The person 
speaks of self as one self-knowing whole which evokes the unity of one’s being.  One only 
knows the self in the body. 
Rahner’s claim that “the body is the symbol of the soul, in as much as it is formed as 
the self-realization of the soul,”19 reflects several important considerations for my own 
project.  First, the body is the person in that there is no separation between the soul and body.  
Rahner writes that reality and its appearance in the flesh are for ever one in Christianity, 
inconfused and inseparable.20  Therefore, Rahner argues that Christian theologians cannot 
separate the reality of the person from their materiality in the body for the highest knowledge 
of the spirit is corporeal.  According to his theology, people come to be and know themselves 
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only in their corporeality.  This recognition of the importance of corporeality for human 
living and being is at the heart of my project.  There is no person without the body and 
sex/gender and race are important aspects of the body and so must be seriously considered in 
theological discourse. 
Second, I agree with Rahner’s ontological assumption that being is expressive.  By 
understanding communication as intrinsic to being, we are able to think about the body as 
self-expression.  In fact, it is only through the body that persons can express themselves, 
remembering always that this body is contextualized in time and space as well as through the 
categories of sex/gender and race.  These categories reflect the fact that human identity is not 
simple.  Like Rahner, I would argue that human self-expression is multiple even though the 
human being is the unity of all these intersecting identity markers.  Because human beings 
cannot express themselves all at one time, theologians must attend to the many expressions 
of the one person, including how sex/gender and race are part of these expressions.   
Rahner is again helpful when he states that the body expresses the unity of the person 
in different ways in its different parts.  He contends that the person is known in each part of 
the body, although some are more important than others.21  We certainly see this in how 
critical identity aspects are based on specific body parts.  For example, sex/gender is based 
on genitalia and race is based on skin color.  Other body parts do not matter as much, i.e., eye 
color, hand size, or belly-button configuration.  Rahner contends that differences clearly exist 
in the various “parts” of the body with regard to their power of expression, their degree of 
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belonging to the soul, their openness of the soul.22  For my purposes this can translate to the 
whole person expressing self in their sex/gender or race at one time and then the other at 
another time or a unique combination of the two at still other instances.  This helps 
understand the critique of womanists that feminists are not always in solidarity with other 
women of color but sometimes more in community with white men based on their race.  In 
each case, the woman in question is expressing herself.  Each aspect of the body contributes 
its part to the whole of the symbol and all must be considered in theological reflection on 
body-persons. 23 
Another important contribution Rahner makes to thinking about the body as symbol is 
his reflection on the uniqueness of the body-person.  Each body is unique and particular 
because it reflects and expresses the uniqueness of the person in and through it.  The body is 
not merely flesh that all humans share but the real symbol of the unique person.  The 
relationship of the person with their body is not arbitrary but true to them.  Rahner writes, 
“one cannot give another body to a spiritual soul; not only would it express itself differently, 
but it would itself become other or else transform the body into which it was forced into its 
body.”24  This body is symbolic of this soul.  It is the person’s self-proclamation.  What they 
are saying in and through the symbol of their body is something real and true about 
themselves.   
Finally, I agree with Rahner that the body as symbol is the means by which the 
person is known by self and by others.  His theology of symbol posits that the being posses 
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self in knowledge and love in the plurality they create in their symbol.  For my project, this 
means that how one expresses one’s body in terms of sex/gender and race is how one knows 
one’s self.  A person’s race and/or sex/gender may be a real symbol for them, the means by 
which they realize themselves.  This may be different for another person who may not know 
or express self through the same particular categories.  One must be attentive to how each 
person is expressing their body in terms of their race and sex/gender to themselves in order to 
know and understand how the body is communicating this individual to the outside world.  
Rahner concludes that persons do not have a symbolic quality; they are symbols.    
Rahner’s importance for theologizing about the body is his emphasis on the body as 
an expressive symbol of the unique human person.  The person known and knowing self 
through the symbol of the body is a singular creation of God.  Rahner’s ideas about symbol 
allows for a pluralism of identity since each body as symbol reflects the unique individual it 
is.  This approach to the body as expression needs to be balanced with a strong historical 
consciousness and social understanding of human existence in terms of the body.  Rahner is 
somewhat aware of determinants that affect the body and therefore the person known by it as 
their self-expression.  He posits that although the body does not have any positive content 
prior to the reality of the soul, it may be influenced by prior determinations of matter. These 
prior determinations of the body affect how the body-person can and does know themselves 
and therefore how they are known by others through the symbol of their bodies.  For my 
proposal, the determinations of what certain aspects of the body such as race or sex/gender 
mean would influence the body of the individual person and therefore the reality of the 
person known in the sexed/gendered and raced body.  These prior determinations may shift 
but at this time in our society certain aspects of the body matter more than others and two of 
206 
 
which matter most are one’s classification as male or female and white or person of color.  
Rahner’s insight that the soul determines the body by expressing itself in it must be balanced 
with the idea that the body also determines the soul by being the medium through which it 
expresses itself.  I posit that this balance can be achieved by incorporating into theological 
reflection on the body an appreciation and consideration of social context and its construction 
of bodies.  
 
The Body as Construction 
A corrective for the previous theological approach to the body as symbol in the work 
of Karl Rahner and in much of traditional theology is to balance its insight that the body in 
general as human materiality expresses the individual soul with an approach to the body as 
symbol in other disciplines that considers the body specifically as a product and reflection of 
its particular context.  This section explores how other disciplines speak about the body as 
symbol with an emphasis on its constructedness within its particular societal context.  In this 
section, I focus on how the body-person is a symbol of the society that forms it.  I use Fiona 
Bowie’s work The Anthropology of Religion as a guide to ideas about the body as symbol in 
philosophy, sociology, and anthropology.25  As with theology, symbol in other social 
sciences is a varied concept with diverse meanings.  Bowie describes what she understands 
as two poles of interpretation in the study of symbols.  One pole maintains that there are 
intrinsic genetic or psychological mechanisms that generate appropriate symbols.  At the 
other pole is the doctrine of conventionalism, which contends that symbols and what they 
symbolize are arbitrary and based on social agreement.  One can borrow from theology the 
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insight that there are different emphases in the study of symbols on the “is” and “is not” 
aspects of them.   
Bowie maintains that when considering the body one must always remember that we 
are not talking about biology per se, but rather we are speaking of symbolic classification.  
Bodies are classified and regulated according to the markers, such as sex/gender and race, 
that are deemed significant by the surrounding culture.  The body is a symbol of its context 
embodying and reflecting the beliefs of the culture in which one finds it.  I focus here on 
three ideas about the body as a construct of its social location.  First, the body symbolizes its 
society; the body and its surrounding culture reflect each other.  Second, the body comes to 
be and have meaning according to the regulations and control of a particular social context.  
Third, the body’s personal expression is related to, influenced by, and an influence on 
societal constructions of bodily reality.  Throughout this section, I connect these theories of 
bodily construction with my previous investigations of sex/gender and race in theology and 
theory.  I read liberation theologies concerned with sex/gender and race as part of this 
corrective to traditional theological anthropology. 
To suggest that the body is a symbol of its society in that the body and its surrounding 
culture reflect each other has two aspects.  First, societies, including religions, take cues from 
the body and its functions and create meaning systems based on these.  Second, the body 
symbolizes society by reflecting its structure and beliefs.  These two considerations of the 
body create a constant back and forth between materiality and society.  The conflation of 
cultural rules with the body makes these rules and values appear natural.  To explain this 
aspect of the body as symbol, Bowie turns to the work of Robert Hertz and Mary Douglas. 26  
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Hertz’s work on the concepts of right and left demonstrates how societies have taken the fact 
that right-handedness is more dominant and married it to beliefs about religion and gender 
role differentiation so that the right has meant good, sacred, creative, life, and male, while the 
left has symbolized uncleanliness, profanity, death, weakness, and female.27  The defamation 
of the left has limited the capacities of left-handed individuals who were forced to use their 
right hand and has thereby been a loss to humanity collectively. 
The continual interaction between the embodied individual and the social and natural 
world of which the individual is a part is also prevalent in the work of Mary Douglas.28  
Douglas contends that even the most lowly and intimate of bodily processes can be given the 
most elaborate and metaphysical of interpretations.  Douglas’ work stresses the importance 
of the body as a symbol system in which social meanings are encoded and in this way how 
body-persons are classified in any system.  The body exists as a cipher for understanding 
social structures because it symbolizes these structures.  Douglas’ work on purity reflects 
how religious/cultural beliefs are crucial for understanding bodies, classifying them, and 
living them.  She understands dirt not as a thing-in-itself but as a symbolic category that 
                                                                                                                                                       
social values.  Bowie concentrates on his essay, “The Pre-Eminence of the Right Hand: A Study in Religious 
Polarity,” which was originally published in 1909 and translated by Rodney Needham in Right and Left: Essays 
on Dual Symbolic Classification (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973).  For more on Hertz, see Robert 
Parkin, The Dark Side of Humanity: The Work of Robert Hertz and Its Legacy (Amsterdam, Netherlands: 
Harwood Academic Publishers, 1996).  Mary Douglas (1921-2007) was a British anthropologist, who is also 
considered a follower of Durkheim and a strong proponent of structuralist analysis.  Douglas wrote on how 
human cultures employ symbols to express their reality.  Bowie focuses on Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger: 
An Analysis of the Concepts of Pollution and Taboo, Routledge Classics Ed. (New York: Routledge, 2002).  
Another important work by Douglas in this area is Natural Symbols: Explorations in Cosmology, rev. ed. 
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reveals the dualities of order/disorder, being/nonbeing, form/formlessness, and life/death.  
Body-persons must be attentive to the purity of their bodies so as not to be classified on the 
wrong side of these dualities, which has grave consequences for one’s place and potential in 
society.29  These examples expound on the idea that the body-person is a symbol of the 
society/culture in which it lives not only as a source of symbolic ideas for the meaning 
making of society, but a reflection of this meaning making. 
The links between the individual body and cultural forms that define this first aspect 
of the body as a symbol of its context are found throughout the previous investigations of 
sex/gender and race.  Some theologians extrapolate from bodily realities such as 
heterosexuality, birth, and infant nursing by the mother and present a “natural” and 
ahistorical understanding of sex and/or gender.  However, one could also argue that the body 
is in fact constructed by these “ahistorical” meanings given to them by theology.  
Theologians who treat race as a theological theme call attention to the fact that U.S. society 
was built on beliefs that marry skin color to a mythology of color that understands black as 
bad and white as good.  Skin color is encoded by and reveals the social beliefs of our time as 
well as our reactions to them.  Our life and living is marked by skin color in black/white 
relief.   
A second supposition about the construction of bodily materiality is that the body-
person comes to be and have meaning only according to the norms and regulations of its 
social context.  Control of how bodies can and should be is the means of regulating society as 
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a whole.  If bodies are and do what they should, then society will be as it should.30  The 
regulation of bodies is the result of socialization and its process of imitation and the exercise 
of power through the regulatory norms that define bodies as acceptable or unacceptable.  
Michel Foucault’s work explores how societal power creates bodies and continually regulates 
them by authoritative monitoring and the restriction of physical movement.31  This approach 
to the construction of the body argues that in many ways the formation of the body-person 
according to social norms is prior to any act, even imitation.  The argument is that we can 
only come to be as the embodiment of the regulatory norms of our society.  Those not 
adhering to this obligatory social conformity are left out of, removed from, or some would 
argue do not materialize in the social order.32 
This process of bodily construction is not a once and for all event but must continue 
throughout life.  Bowie investigates the work of anthropologist Judith Okely on boarding 
schools to provide an example of this idea of the construction of the body-person by societal 
norms and regulations enforced through the constant surveillance of power.33  Bowie 
categorizes Okely’s description of her private girls’ boarding school as a “total institution,” a 
notion of Erving Goffman for “a place of residence and work where a large number of like-
situated individuals, cut off from the wider society for an appreciable period of time, together 
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lead an enclosed, formally administered round of life.”34  The goal of the boarding school is 
to sculpt the minds and bodies of the students to reflect the understanding of the world 
according to the custodians of the institutions.  This understanding embraced the wider social 
messages of class and gender.  Okely describes the achievement of the school as the defeat of 
the individual student.  The comportment of the body was crucial in this process since bodies 
reflect our inner attitudes.  Its control was understood as integral to the control of the 
person’s thoughts and emotions.35 
The interconnection of the social, psychological, and biological is intrinsic to any 
understanding of the construction of the body-person and is part of many of the liberation 
discourses discussed in previous chapters.  Many argue that history and the texts that tell its 
tale are told by those with power and for the purpose of perpetuating the social structure that 
keeps them in power.  Bodies are understood as both a reflection of and the materialization of 
society’s controlling discourses concerning sex/gender and race.  These discourses are argued 
to determine the meaning of bodies, the proper living of life based on these meanings, and 
even the production and control of wealth.  Victor Anderson addresses this notion of the 
regulation of bodies from a different perspective altogether.  He questions whether cultural 
and racial communities themselves are guilty of regulating and defining bodies in a way that 
limits their full potential for personal fulfillment.  His argument contends that bodies must be 
allowed to express themselves personally and not always collectively. 
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This insight about the reality and need of personal expression is also explored in 
Bowie’s article when she investigates the idea of personal symbols and the body.  This 
approach to the body as symbol contends that the body reflects not only the wider society but 
also the individual within this society.  In the body is located the back and forth between the 
personal and the social.  Bowie writes that we continually create patterns of meaning out of 
both our individual and collective experience; even though individual classifications are less 
powerful than those with the weight of collective authority, which in turn are more rigid than 
private ones.36  Bowie includes the work of Gananath Obeyesekere as a consideration of the 
personal symbolism of the body.37  He argues that personal bodily symbols are optional for 
the individual and may fill a psychological need rather than reflect obligatory social 
conformity.  These symbols are nevertheless recognized by the culture in which the person 
lives.  Obeyesekere maintains that personal symbols may be missed or misunderstood if one 
does not attend to the individual life history of the person who is expressing the symbol and 
the meaning they attribute to the symbol.  He concludes that the public meaning of a symbol 
relates to, but may not be the same as, the genesis and personal meaning of the same symbol.  
Here is what I call the personal expression of the social construction of the body. 
Any approach to the body as a construction of society and therefore a symbol of it 
needs to be balanced by not only the body as an expression of the unique individuality of the 
person but also the body as a personal expression of the constructions of society.  Expression 
must include the idea that the body expresses the constructions that form it, sometimes 
uniquely.  The body’s personal expression of sex/gender and race is related to, influenced by, 
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and an influence on the societal constructions of bodily reality.  Therefore, personal symbols 
constitute part of the symbolic language of the wider society.  Obeyesekere claims that the 
need to express personal symbols, or personal variations of culturally acceptable symbols, 
may represent a psychological need so deep that the person would suffer if it were not 
expressed.  He claims that the personal expression is received by society as meaningful and 
rational.  We must also consider that personal expressions are often not accepted by society 
as such.  Some expressions are dismissed as silly, false, irrelevant, over reactive, or 
unnecessary.  The need to express the personal in the body may make the body-person an 
anomaly or an outcast.38 
This third point that there is always also a personal aspect to the constructedness of 
bodies is quite evident in the work of womanist scholars.  Womanism focuses on the unique 
reality of black women with special attention to their expression of black womanhood.  
Womanists emphasize the strong psychological need to express identity in one’s own words 
and ways.  They recognize that this expression does not erase the social construction of black 
womanhood that has defined them and often limited their opportunities in their historical 
context in the United States.  But their expression of black womanhood serves as a counter-
discourse to this construction.  Womanists recognize that black women must study the 
history of the construction of black female identity in the United States as well as how that 
same identity has been expressed by black women themselves.  There is a constant 
relationship between public and personal symbols.  It is the hope of black women as well as 
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other traditionally oppressed groups that as their members are more able to publically voice 
their personal or communal expression of public constructions, their counter-discourses will 
become part of the language of the wider society and the meaning assigned to their identity 
by the wider community will shift.39  Womanists, much like Obeyesekere in his work, 
recognize the need to attend to the individual who is making an expression of identity.  Their 
life story is important in order to properly understand how their body is symbolizing their 
identity.  This attention to the individual within community must allow for diversity of 
expression and perhaps even contradictions of what it means to be a black woman. 
 
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR THEOLOGY 
My proposal of the body as symbol as a tool for theological anthropology emerges 
from my investigations of theories of sex/gender and race in theology, of their intersection in 
womanist work, and of relevant reflection on the body as symbol in theology and other 
intellectual disciplines.  It is a platform for deeper, more critical theological discussion of 
sex/gender and race and through these of the overall complexity of identity for body-persons.  
The body as symbol does not define race or sex/gender once and for all, but rather 
acknowledges their diversity and multiple realities in our society.  It also embraces the fact 
that no identity markers are separate from the others that an individual embodies and is.  
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black womanhood is just now coming into theoretical analysis as womanist scholars make their way into venues 
to speak it.  In the same vein, we learn from white feminists and black male scholars a new way of talking about 
the body that is not focused on the universal white male body.  It is a way of thinking about the body that is 
outwardly political with the goal of changing all manner of academic and public discourse.  It is a way of 
thinking about identity that is determined to liberate bodies to tell their own tale and their own interpretation of 
their history and their selves. 
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Theology must attend to these identity markers without losing sight of the individual, unique 
person.   
The constructions of bodily identity may determine many aspects of one’s life but 
one’s own narrative and individual expression in relation to them is just as important and 
must be included in any theology that wants to be relevant for real people.  Attending to 
identity constructions guards against getting lost in the specificities of individual expression 
and losing sight of the social constructions that always inform personal life.  Attending to 
individual circumstances and identities guards against a structuralist view of human identity 
that leaves little room for uniqueness of expression and agency.  The body as symbol reflects 
on the person who lives and navigates social constructs and expresses individuality.  This 
approach to the body balances knowledge of various theories of sex/gender and race as well 
as sensitivity to personal life stories.  The concept of the body as symbol posits that the 
person expresses and forms their body and that their body expresses and forms the person.  
The body is both an expression and a construction. 
The body as symbol invites theologians to consider the relationship between the 
concept of construction and the body, including the idea of construction itself, the level of 
bodily construction, and the agent(s) of construction.  Fiona Bowie’s exploration of 
philosophical, anthropological, and sociological work that treat the body as symbol provides 
examples of how the body is a reflection and creation of its specific cultural context.  These 
approaches to the body as symbol argue that the body symbolizes, represents, and, some 
argue, is the societal constructs of materiality in which it finds itself and comes to know 
itself.  There is much debate in theology and other disciplines about the “reality” of 
constructions and some hesitation to think of bodies as construction since materiality is 
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commonly considered the most real of realities.40  However, the term construction invites 
reflection on how sex/gender and race influence and are our identities without depriving 
them of their force in life.  For example, most theorists and theologians understand race as a 
social construction not a “real” biological distinction; yet saying it is a social construction is 
not the same as relegating it to the status of illusion, which is just one theory of race.   
 Using construction as an organizing principle for discussion about sex/gender and 
race invites dialogue about whether these bodily categories are transcendent, ontological, 
ahistorical realities that tell us something ultimately true and timeless about ourselves or are 
somehow constructed in time and place.  One can understand the level of bodily construction 
as total, as partial, or as none.  If one accepts some level of construction in bodily life, 
questions follow concerning who is doing the constructing and what kind of agency 
individuals have within the matrix of construction.  These initial questions about the 
construction of material identity in terms of sex/gender and race disclose the existence of 
various theories about sex/gender and race in both theology and theory.  The meaning of 
sex/gender and race varies according to the interpreter and even then no neat categorization 
can capture any one thinker’s understanding of these identity markers.  In a postmodern 
context, theology must find methods to discuss race and sex/gender that recognize their 
varied interpretation and simultaneously varied reality.  Individuals understand and live 
sex/gender and race differently and authentically.41  This variety includes multiple 
explanations that may overlap and influence each other as well as exclude and contradict 
each other.  Approaching the body as symbol encourages and supports discourse about 
                                                 
40
 Butler, Bodies That Matter, x. 
41
 I do not mean here to include women haters or white supremists who do violence to women or people of 
color.  I would argue that the need to enforce one’s will through violence would not be an authentic way to live 
any identity. 
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sex/gender and race that embraces the multiple realities and understandings of sex/gender 
and race because the concept of symbol itself is open and allows for more than one meaning.  
In addition, theology must be prepared to explore how race and sex/gender intersect and 
influence each other.  There is never just one construction of identity at work but several at 
the same time.   
The body as construction invites consideration of the language, history, and context 
of the identity concepts by which it materializes and according to which it has meaning.  My 
investigation into theories of race and sex/gender includes three main ideas about the 
relationship of the body and language.  First, theologians must ask what language we use to 
define bodies in their raced and sexed/gendered realities.  Which language or narratives does 
a theologian think important in furthering our understanding of bodies?  Second, theologians 
must interrogate how language forms bodies.  Third, theologians must consider how the body 
itself is language.  Treating the body as symbol in theological discourse also invites 
theologians to consider the history of bodily categories such as sex/gender and race.  There 
are many theories about how the body symbolizes the history of the context in which it finds 
itself.  The categories of the body may or may not be explained as historical and political 
realities which have been constructed and reconstructed throughout history.  Regardless of 
whether one views the body’s meaning as historical or ahistorical, all must recognize the 
influence of the body’s context on our understanding of it.  Our understanding and 
description of bodily categories such as race and sex/gender change in different historical 
contexts and so the material identity markers that are important today, or were important 
yesterday, may lose their importance in the future or may have already lost some of their 
relevance for contemporary society.  Thinking of the body as symbol embraces this 
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changeability, whether it is explained in terms of the symbol’s birth, growth, change and 
death, or in terms of our changing interpretation or growing understanding of the symbol.  
Regardless of one’s approach to symbols, thinking of the body as symbol forces some level 
of engagement with the historical shifts in the concepts of identity, such as sex/gender and 
race. 
Consideration of the body as construction, which includes reflection on the concept of 
construction itself as well as the language, history, and context of the body’s identity 
markers, is just one part of my proposal of the body as symbol.  Bodies express more than 
constructions and understanding constructions cannot tell us all we need to know about body-
persons.  The other aspect of my proposal investigates the body as expression.  If the body as 
construction considers how the body informs the person, then the body as expression 
addresses how the person informs the body.  There are two important aspects of the 
expression of the body.  First, bodies express individual and communal interpretations of the 
constructions of sex/gender and race.  Second, the body is the expression of the unique 
individual. 
Personal interpretations of the constructions that give meaning to race and sex/gender 
are expressed in the body.  The same construct can take on different meanings for individuals 
and groups.  The philosophy, narratives, perspective, goals, and personal ambitions one 
brings to this interpretation determine bodily expression.  Differences in methodologies and 
ontologies result in a multiplicity of meaning of sex/gender and race for bodily reality.  The 
expression of the body as symbol is each person’s expression of their self-knowledge, which 
is their personal reality in relation to the constructions of race and sex/gender.  This reality 
might reflect an acceptance of the meaning of race and/or sex/gender received from their 
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community or may involve contestations of these meanings.  The body as expression 
includes a person’s informed and lived sense of self which attends to the interconnection of 
identity categories in one’s life that makes them aware that their identity fragments away 
from sole categories of identity.  Sex/gender and race may not only mean different things for 
different people but have various levels of importance for their self-identity.  Sex/gender and 
race are interpreted differently because there are various experiences of them.  As a result of 
personal expressions of sex/gender and race, they exist as diverse realities.  Communities 
bring together persons with shared experience but even communities must recognize the 
unique individuality of each of its members.   
The body as symbol as a method for addressing materiality in theological 
anthropology embraces the unique individuality of each body-person.  The body expresses 
this unique individuality and is always uniquely individual.  Each body-person is a unique 
utterance of the constructions that mark its identity as well as a unique occurrence of the 
mystery of humanity.  The unique expression that is the body-person may be shifting the very 
constructions it is uttering in order for these to include the one time only utterance of any 
individual person.  Christians especially believe that the person is willed for their own sake 
and represents a unique utterance of humanity by God.  Therefore, there are and have been 
untold numbers of expressions of the uniqueness of human living.42  The body as symbol 
invites consideration of the individuality of the person in all the vastly different philosophical 
and ontological approaches to sex/gender and race.   
My investigation of the theology of Karl Rahner especially addresses the 
individuality of each person and how this is reflected and expressed in their body.  Starting 
                                                 
42
 In addition, Christians cannot forget or dismiss in their consideration of the body as symbol that the body 
always expresses the mystery of humanity as imago Dei, and as such utters the mystery of God as well.  The 
complexity of human bodily life leads us to new considerations of divine life. 
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with the belief that Christian revelation says something truthful about God and us, Rahner 
concludes that beings, both human and divine, must be expressing something truthful in the 
symbols they use to reveal themselves.  God expresses self using the symbol of the 
Incarnation and humans express their being using the symbol of the body.  The materiality of 
humanity becomes expressive of both human and divine life.  It expresses uniqueness in both 
ways.  Human materiality expresses the unique being of the second person of the trinity that 
has become incarnate and it expresses the unique being of each person who is a body.  The 
idea of being as expressive is important for thinking about human beings and what they may 
be revealing through their body-selves.    
In narrowing the analysis of human being from the general concepts of race and 
sex/gender to individual persons, one becomes more and more aware of the varied and 
complex instances of human identity.  Womanist work especially teaches us this lesson.  For 
example, considering a black woman is different than just thinking about a black person or a 
female person; and to be a black lesbian woman is different again.  If class is added to the 
analysis, one must recognize that a white middle class woman has a different identity and 
reality than a poor white woman or still more different than a poor black woman whose 
experience is different again from a middle class black woman.  Black feminist and 
womanist thought recognize that oppression cannot be reduced to one fundamental type and 
that different oppressive forces work together to produce various instances of injustice.  This 
lack of attention to more than one identity factor that leads to oppression was and is a critique 
womanist scholars level against both feminist scholars and black liberation theologians.  
Their challenges charge theology to recognize that bodies are complex and unique if it hopes 
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to address human reality.  Neither sex/gender nor race can be approached as an independent 
variable in the final analysis.   
The very concept of symbol means that the body as materiality points to something 
immaterial beyond it in which it participates and which it makes present.  The body 
participates in the societal constructs of its time and place and materializes them.  The body 
also participates in the individual identity of the human person and makes the person present 
and known.  The idea of symbol presents symbols as expressions which make something 
intangible present, but which only can be understood in the context in which we find them.  
The unique individuality of each body-person is always situated within the language, context, 
and history in which they come to be.  Addressing the body as construct and as individual 
helps theologians better appreciate that identity markers both create community and fragment 
it.  The language, context, and history that form the constructs of identity will connect a 
person to others that share some or all of these identity markers and form community for this 
person based on shared language, belief, history, context, ability, religion, and so on.  But 
even within these seemingly bounded communities there will always be fragmentation 
because they are made up of unique individuals.  The boundaries of these communities and 
the constructs which create them are always porous.  This reality should not be problematic 
for a Christian theology that confesses the uniqueness of each person as a never before 
creation called into being individually by God and bound together in community through the 
mystery of the Incarnation. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
This balance of construction and expression in the idea of the body as symbol brings 
together the goals of this dissertation.  Thinking of the body-person as construct allows for 
more adequate discourse about the specific identity markers of sex/gender and race.  The 
concept of construction is a good organizing tool and an instrument of education about 
theories of sex/gender and race and how they are used in theology and theory.  By deploying 
this concept from contemporary theory, theologians can consider how the body is a reflection 
and reality of its context.  We come to learn that sex/gender and race are not concepts that are 
outside of theological purview but intimately connected to its central themes.  Understanding 
the body as construct invites theologians to wrestle with the reality and complexity of 
identity markers of the body such as race and sex/gender and our collective and individual 
understandings of and relationships with them.  But the concept of construction is not enough 
for a full theological presentation of the body-person.  Construction alone can focus on the 
object of the body and lose sight of the subjective understanding and living of the body.  It 
also keeps race and sex/gender as separate concepts for consideration; but real human living 
always knows their interrelationship.  Theology must approach the individual and 
communities not in terms of one category but a complex interaction of various discourses.  
Therefore, theology needs to consider the body as expression in order to attend to individual 
discourses about the body as well as communal counter-discourses that bring accepted and 
commonsense understandings of sex/gender and race into question.  This project is based on 
the belief that race and sex/gender are important theological topics that are not being 
adequately addressed in theological discourse.  Approaching the body as symbol is a tool to 
better develop theological conversation about these topics and address any oppressing and 
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limiting aspects of them.  More adequate and critical discourse about race and sex/gender 
forms a crucial strategy in the overall battle against racism and sexism.  The ultimate goal is 
for each person to live to the fullest their unique instance of the imago Dei so that the Spirit 
of God can more fully dwell among us all. 
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EPILOGUE:  AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
 
 At the end of any project, one must ask oneself, “Where do I go from here?”  This 
dissertation has endeavored to develop a tool to better think about bodies in their specificity.  
I narrowed my approach to a consideration of sex/gender and race in terms of white and 
black, recognizing that any body and all bodies are more than these identities.  This tool 
should be expanded to include other identity markers.  Any consideration of race in theology 
must expand to include racial identities not included in the black-white paradigm, even if 
influenced by it.  In the United States Hispanic, Latino/a, and a variety of Asian American 
identities represent other important racial distinctions.  Considering the body as symbol 
requires that any consideration of these identity markers must include how these 
categorizations have been constructed in this country as well as the understanding of self-
identity that arises in each community.  Recognizing that every racial group is diverse, it 
would be necessary to map different understandings of each body categorization.  In turn, 
any consideration of sex/gender in theology must expand to include sexual identities that do 
not fall neatly into the sexual dimorphism of male-female.  Explorations of scholarly theories 
and personal discourses about homosexuality, bisexuality, transsexual identity, and 
transgendered identity must be considered in themselves as well as representing challenges to 
our current understandings of sexual differentiation and gender.  These further investigations 
in the general topics of race and sex/gender are still just some of the identity categories that 
mark bodies.  Age, disability, and disease also affect how bodies are understood and treated 
in our society and church as well as the body-persons who know these ways of being.  The 
endless expansion of a tool, however, is not the main purpose of creating it.  Its 
implementation is the reason for its creation.  It is my intention to present the work of this 
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dissertation as a tool for students, colleagues, church communities, and religious 
communities to better consider the complexity of bodily identity.  In its use and the 
conversations that I hope it encourages, the tool will be refined. 
 Thinking of the body as symbol, as both a construction and an expression, has 
implications for all areas of theological inquiry.  It calls all theologians to be in dialogue with 
theorists concerned with bodily identity.  It also invites theologians to reflect on the literature 
and stories of communities marked by different body categories.  Both of these engagements 
expose the theologian to the constructed and expressive aspects of bodily identity.  No 
theologian can be an expert on all identity formations, so theology must invite and welcome 
diverse voices within its discipline.  The presence of such diversity will not only present a 
more nuanced theological study of the body, but diverse body-persons will bring new 
questions, challenges, and propositions to central theological themes.  This is already 
beginning to happen, but mainstream theology and theological study must better incorporate 
and appreciate the work of diverse body-persons.  There is a reciprocal and interdependent 
relationship between one’s theory and living of the body and one’s approach to the 
theological enterprise.  One only has to look to the Christology of James Cone, the theory of 
atonement of Delores Williams, or the exegesis of Genesis of John Paul II to understand how 
central one’s approach to the body is to theological study.   
 Let me present some ideas for the application of thinking of the body as symbol for 
specific theological projects.  Considering the body as symbol in biblical studies and 
historical theology can lead to new insights on historical figures in the Christian tradition.  
For example, the stories of Jesus with Martha and Mary in Lk 10:38-42 and Jn 11:1-44; 12:1-
7 can be reread in light of this tool.  An historical critical method helps us understand the 
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constructions of sex/gender of the time.  A narrative method helps us understand how the 
expressions in word and deed of each of the characters is embracing or contesting these 
constructions.  In the stories from Luke and John, the characters sometimes acting according 
to the sex/gender constructions of their time, and sometimes contesting them.  It is interesting 
to note that Jesus appears to be inviting the contestation.  The balance of thinking of the body 
as construction and expression continually reminds us that bodies did not all and always 
mean one thing at any time in history.  The unique individuals that are bodies express their 
context and their individuality at all times.  Approaching the stories in Luke and John by 
keeping in mind the body as symbol presents the possibility for new understandings of early 
Christian witness to bodies defined as male and female.  In the same way, all historical 
figures should be approached as both reflecting and embodying their context and expressing 
their individuality through an acceptance or contestation of all or some of the aspects of this 
context.  In addition to biblical scholars and historical theologians, systematic theologians 
must also be challenged to embrace a better appreciation of the body in its specificity.  
Systematic theologians must be challenged to be systematic.  Theologians should address 
how their methods, theories of Christology, Trinitarian themes, and ecclesiologies influence 
their theological anthropology and their understanding of body-persons who are specific in 
time and in themselves.  The study of any theologian’s work ought to question the 
ramifications for our understanding of the body, including how we think about its race and 
sex/gender.  Studies of the theories of sex/gender and race of specific theologians can further 
map the variety of approaches to the body in its specificity in theological discourse. 
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